Sponsoring Committee: Professor Richard Arum, Chairperson
Professor Teboho Moja
Professor Laetitia Atlani-Duault

STRATEGIC PHILANTHROPY, ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA: THE PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA (2000-2010)

Fabrice Jaumont

Program in International Education
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences in the Professions

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
The Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development
New York University
2014

UMI Number: 3613476

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
Dissertation Publishing

UMI 3613476

Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Copyright © 2014 Fabrice Jaumont

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

Without the support and encouragement of many individuals and organizations this dissertation would not have been completed. For their assistance and encouragement, special appreciation is expressed to:

Dr. Richard Arum, who gave unselfishly of his time, knowledge, and efforts in directing this study, guiding my theoretical inquiries in its early stages and keeping a watchful eye over my Academic explorations. Committee members, Dr. Teboho Moja, who brought wisdom and expertise on African higher education and U.S. foundations in Africa; Dr. Laetitia Atlani-Duault, who helped with orchestrating the myriad voices that shaped this dissertation; Dr. Dana Burde and Dr. Philip Hosay who offered suggestions and encouragement from the very beginning of this project six years ago all the way to the final stages. I would like to thank other individuals who positively influenced me during my doctoral studies or contributed to my research: Dr. Jonathan Zimmerman, Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Dr. Ian McLeod, Dr. Olivier Bouin, Dr. Alessandra Benedicty. Dr Charlotte Collet; Jonathan Collet, Maggie Liston, Marshall Thomas, Zehra Hashmi, Alissa Rae Funderburk, Tieisha Tift, Edith Bon, Bruce and Darcey Hale, Jane Ross, and a particular thank you to Jack Klempay.

Appreciation is also expressed to those who opened their archives and records and gave of their time in granting interviews, in making information for this study

available. Appreciation is expressed in particular to Dr. Sue Grant-Lewis, Jonathan Friedman, Andrea Johnson, and Megan Lindow.

Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my wife and daughters who brought me the extra strengths to complete this project, and to my parents who have always believed in me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF FIGURES ix

CHAPTER

I – INTRODUCTION

Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education 1
Foundations & the Institutionalization of Higher Education in the U.S. 4
Higher Education in Africa and the Presence of U.S Foundations 9
Organization of the Dissertation 18

.

II – THE LEGITIMACY OF PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

Defining Organizational Legitimacy 22
Institutional Legitimacy vs. Environmental Legitimacy 26
Legitimacy and the Participation of Individual Actors 30
Collaborative Isomorphism vs. Institutional Differentiation 32
The Legitimacy of Foundations in Question 38

III – MEASURING THE DYNAMICS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

Mixed Quantitative-Qualitative Approach 46
Data Instruments 50
Operationalization of Qualitative Data 52
Data Analysis Methodologies 56

IV – COLLABORATIVE LEGITIMACY IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

A Partnership of Foundations 61

Continued

Organizational Boundaries & Rationalization of Collaborative Action 66
Collaborative Engagement and Individualistic Interests 81
Convergence and the Probability of Collaboration 104
The Maximization of Collaborative Legitimacy 122

V – NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY AMONG GRANTORS AND GRANTEES

A Partnership of Flesh and Bone 126
Diverging Perspectives between Grantors and Grantees 136
Charismatic Legitimacy and Foundation Presidents 153
Foundations Partnership vs. Partnership of Foundations & Universities 174
Normative Legitimacy in an Unequal Relationship 193

VI – ENVIRONMENTAL LEGITIMACY AND THE ECOLOGY OF HIGHER EDUCATION DEVELOPERS IN AFRICA

The Ecology of U.S. Foundations in Africa 196
The Rhetoric of Capacity Building 225
Influence Strategy and High-Impact Philanthropy 236
Legitimizing the Role of Foundations in African Higher Education 251
Environmental Legitimacy and Higher Education in Africa 264

CONCLUSION

Research Findings 267
Unequal Partnerships, Dependency, and the Discourse on Priorities 272
The Myth of Capacity Building vs. the Myth of Equal Participation 276
General Reflections 282

BIBLIOGRAPHY 285

APPENDICES
A. List of Grantors Interviewed 301
B. Grantors Interview Questionnaire 303
C. List of Grantee Transcripts 305
D. The Partnership's Top 50 Grants 309
E. Definitions of Measures and Codes 314
F. Top 100 U.S. Foundations by Asset Size 319
Continued

G. Top 25 U.S. Foundations in Total Amount of Grant to Africa 323
H. Top 50 U.S. Foundations in Number of Grants to Africa 324
I. List of Top Higher Education Grant Recipients in Africa 325
J. List of Higher Education Grant Recipients in Africa 329
K. Foundation Grants to African Higher Education Organizations 335
L. Top 50 Grants to Africa by U.S. Foundations 343

LIST OF TABLES

1. Neo-institutional and resource dependent measures and sub-measures 54

2. Descriptor categories and descriptor choices 55

3. Comparison between the Partnership's seven foundations 109

4. Frequency of co-occurrence of partnership foundations 117

5. Probability of collaboration between partnership foundations 118

6. PHEA's foundations' presidents 155

7. Top grant recipients in Africa 204

8. Top university recipients 206

9. Countries of focus of U.S. foundations in Africa 208

10. Comparison of PHEA & country spending in higher education 211

11. Top U.S. grant-makers to African higher education institutions 219

12. Grant classification 221

13. Foundation funding by category 222

14. Seven foundations' approaches in African higher education 226

Figure M1

Map of U.S. foundation grants to higher education organizations in Africa 213

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Number of code applications per sub-measure 58

2. Total contribution & proportion of grants made by each foundation 67

3. The spectrum of engagement 69

4. The Partnership's strategic alignment model 77

5a. Grant value per year (millions of dollars) 81

5b. Resource expansion by founding and added members 83

6. Total grant disbursement per year (thousands of dollars) 84

7. Grant disbursement by foundation 85

8. Total disbursement per year (millions of dollars) 86

9. Distribution of joint and individual grants by foundation 87

10. Evolution of individual and joint grants (2000-2010) 88

11. Proportion of code application per sub-measure by foundation 99

12. Probability of collaboration and total grant disbursement 114

13. Distribution of large grants by foundation 115

14. Summary statistics for grants by foundation 116

15. Grantees by country and status 131

16. Grantees by institution 132

17. Grantees by area of expertise and gender 133

18. Grantors by status 134

19. Grantors by institution, residency and gender 135

20. Grantee-grantor variation by sub-measures 136

21. Evolution of code applications for grantors & grantees 137

22. Comparison of measures per individual grantors 140

Continued

23. Comparison by individual grantees 143
24. Code applications for grantors and grantees by status 144
25. Percentage of resource dependent descriptors by status 146
26. Percentage of neo-institutional descriptors by status 146
27. Variation of sub-measures by status 147
28. Likeliness of linear progression per neo-institutional sub-measure 150
29. Likeliness of linear progression per resource depdt. sub-measure 150
30. Comparison of sub-measures by residency 183
31. Areas of focus of foundations in Africa 201
32. Countries of focus of foundations in Africa 207
33. PHEA grant distribution per country 210
34. Comparison of PHEA & country spending in higher education 212
35. Foundation funding per category 222
36. Evolution of foundation funding 223
37. Distribution of grants per recipient type 229
38. Distribution of grantee type codes by foundation 230
39. Foundation spending by keyword 230
40. Distribution of areas of focus by foundation 231
41. Distribution of countries of focus by project phase 233
42. Distribution of areas of focus by project phase 234
43. Comparison of sub-measures by country 237
44. Comparison of sub-measures by university 253
45. Comparison of public policy codes & PHEA spending per country 256

To give away money is an easy matter and in any man's power. But to decide to whom to give it and how large and when, and for what purpose and how, is neither in every man's power nor an easy matter.

-- Aristotle

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education

Philanthropic foundations have been active participants in the construction of higher education since the end of the 18th century. They have played a formative role in the creation of modern colleges and universities—a task that has far exceeded the borders of the United States to become a global quest for the development of human capital. Originating from private fortunes, independently managed and subject to few legal restrictions, private foundations are enterprising entities that sit between the public and the private. Their role in society is legitimized in part because they are expected to serve the public good, advance a variety of social objectives, and expand the fruitfulness of modern civilization. By expanding their scope and expertise to higher education in developing countries, foundations have asserted their role in the building of knowledge societies[1] on a global scale, providing support to academic institutions, research centers, and scholastic networks. They have also pushed the boundaries of their legitimacy and accountability by extending their philanthropic activities and their own views of knowledge production to the rest of the world.

[1] In "Towards Knowledge Societies" (2005) UNESCO defines knowledge societies as societies which foster knowledge-sharing, and for which the diffusion of information and communication technologies creates new opportunities for development.

In a climate of criticism regarding how the shaping of development priorities are often set by various Western governmental and international agencies, U.S. foundations have positioned themselves in a special niche by providing innovative solutions, spearheading new possibilities in development work, and promoting knowledge societies. In doing so, they are mitigating the criticism leveled at international aid providers. This special positioning is not achieved by accident, as impact-seeking foundations play particular attention to their image, reputation, and legitimation of their work. These foundations' influence is particularly noticeable in areas such as health, human rights, and secondary and higher education both at home and abroad. The particular focus of this study is on the ways in which foundations legitimize themselves, particularly when they concentrate their efforts on the development of higher education in Africa.

The issue of foundations' legitimacy and accountability surpasses their complementary role of delivering social services outside of the public sector that governmental authorities cannot or will not provide. Yet, few studies have examined the processes of legitimation that are intrinsic to high impact philanthropy, and the strategies put in place by international foundations to maximize the impact of their work in comparison to other organizations or governments. Foundation critics pinpoint the arrogance of funders, their poor planning, unresponsiveness, lack of ethical conduct, and compromised work, as the following chapter explores in depth. As these issues are raised locally in the

U.S. with reference to school reforms, similar issues could easily be raised with regard to U.S. foundations' funding of education initiatives outside of the United States. Yet, these foundations' accomplishments are particularly remarkable in light of the relatively small sums that are involved and which produce considerable leverage. The importance of foundation grants has far exceeded their dollar share of the total income of higher education. Thus, foundations have demonstrated certain know-how in maximizing their investments, impact, and influence, particularly on institutions of higher learning. Arguably, the critique leveled against foundations for their work in the U.S. does not apply to their work abroad.

Moreover, with more U.S. foundations turning their attention to global issues, partnerships and strategic collaborations between private funders have gained ground. They have emerged as an approach filled with promises for impact-seeking philanthropists. However, partnerships do not always produce valuable results. In a famous 2006 essay entitled *On Collaboration (Or How Many Foundations Does It Take to Change a Light Bulb?)*, Paul Brest, former president of the Hewlett Foundation, wrote that foundations can work together to generate better ideas and build broader constituencies as well as increase the amount of money available to address common goals. But he warns about the relative drawbacks that collaborations may generate:

> Collaboration has inevitable up-front costs in the time and effort spent in communicating and making decisions

> together with one's partners. The process can often be frustrating, and a beneficial outcome is hardly assured. At the end of the day, the extra effort is justified only if it has greater impact in improving people's lives. (p 1)

These drawbacks are caused by factors that lie at the foundations' institutional, intra-organizational and environmental levels. Strategic partnerships require an understanding of these factors to avoid derailment, or damage to the foundations' reputation. Moreover, additional factors stem from the relationships between foundations and their grantees. These relationships form intricate mechanisms through which foundations leverage their legitimacy and maximize their influence. This is particularly important in the case of foundations interacting with universities, and even more so when these universities are located in the global south. In order to comprehend the work of private U.S. philanthropic foundations in higher education abroad it is necessary to look at their role as main supporters of higher education in the United States.

Foundations and the Institutionalization of Higher Education in the United States

Foundations' considerable influence, accumulated over decades of strategic grant-making in the field of U.S. higher education, remains unrivaled and remarkable considering the relatively small size of their investments to academic institutions. As such, they occupy an important space among the shapers of American higher education. The literature abounds in examples. Hollis (1938), for instance, described the role of the General Education Board, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation in the early part of the 20th

century as having had a widespread influence in the development of colleges, even indirectly by forcing those whom they never granted any funding to adapt. Curti and Nash (1965) echoed this aspect of indirect influence, stating that foundations raised the standards of higher education in the United States by concentrating on a select number of institutions. This forced others to reform in a "survival of the fittest" race that they saw as "thoroughly compatible with the social ideas of the industrialists-philanthropists responsible for the foundations" (p 262).

The current backdrop of foundation patronage in higher education has changed enormously; the main grant-makers in the field represent an array of actors with social objectives far different from those who invested in colleges and universities in the early twentieth century. But, the method of concentrated support on a favored group of institutions has remained constant throughout the years. In their study of foundation grants in 2001 Frumkin & Kaplan (in Hammack & Anheier, 2010) indicate that almost "twenty-five hundred organizations involved in higher education received a foundation grant in 2001, but twenty-five of them—1 percent— accounted for almost 30 percent of the money" (p105). This group includes the most respected private research universities in the United States: Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Yale, Columbia, Penn, Duke, Johns Hopkins and New York University, among equally prestigious public institutions.

This approach of targeted selection has remained central to the strategies of development-oriented philanthropic foundations, even in African higher education as the following chapters demonstrate. Yet, it creates a divide between elite institutions and the others, and arguably affects the quality and delivery of knowledge throughout the higher education system, putting pressure on less endowed institutions, overwhelming professors, and impacting both academic excellence and college affordability. Arum and Roksa (2011) highlight this point in their recent study of four-year colleges and universities in the United States. Their findings show that undergraduate students do not demonstrate significant improvement in learning when they finish college, leaving a significant proportion of the student population "academically adrift", and most certainly crippled with debts.

Much to their credit, foundations have been highly influential in the development of student financial aid, libraries, and adult education. They have pioneered in the field of educational opportunity for minorities; have fashioned standards for courses and credits, have helped create new disciplines, and have encouraged improvements in faculty compensation. On this particular aspect, Cheit & Lobman (1979) note that foundations supported academics to "escape from subservience to patronage." Until the foundation grants of the 1920s, the only faculty members who could pursue research were independently wealthy. These authors conclude that the foundations' funding and vision had a profound impact on the structure of higher education in transforming it into a modern form:

> Foundations have helped – and more often led – the colleges from a somewhat disorganized collection of institutions into a modern, diverse system of higher education that is admired throughout the world. (p 2)

The foundations' leadership role arose over decades of strategic grant-making to higher education when academic institutions were still in their infancy, and the role of government in higher education was almost non-existent. Without other competing financial contributors or governmental constraints the foundations were effective in asserting their leadership in the field of higher education. For instance, by accompanying grants with conditions such as higher admission requirements or a retirement system for professors, the early foundations succeeded not only in shaping higher education in the United States but also reinforced and legitimized their role as developers of knowledge-producing institutions.

Early education-oriented foundations such as Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Phelps Stokes, among others, played a significant role in structuring state responsibility for public schooling. They helped put in place the organizational structures of public schooling that remain perceptible today. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching allocated its funding exclusively to higher education and shaped college admissions requirements, which, in turn, changed and standardized high school curricula throughout the country (Condliffe Lagemann, 1983). Rockefeller expanded state responsibility for public education in the South by using evidence-based, social research to influence education

policy in the country. Thus, private funds were used to leverage public funding and to influence the development and structuring of secondary and higher education nationwide. Yet, these foundations' influence over education provoked harsh denigrations - illustrated by vehement critics such as Horace Coon (1938) who coined the infamous "When the State steps in, the foundation steps out" (p 55) - which reflected both the spirit of the time and the foundations' tendency to pull back from their engagement when public funds were successfully leveraged.

In current philanthropic practice, foundations continue to use grants to leverage funds from private and public donors. Leveraging presupposes that a foundation has established a healthy conversation regarding possible areas of impact, one that has included the beneficiaries. The dialogue between foundations and universities in the United States has been steady and vigorous, and typically emphasizes the symbiosis between both parties which share more similarities than differences as Frederick Keppel had already noticed in 1930:

> It is an interesting coincidence that the aggregate endowment of our foundations and of our colleges and universities is approximately the same… The responsibilities of the trustees, both in the control of finances and in the general direction of activities, are the same. In both, important decisions are based on group rather than individual judgment and derive their significance from this fact. Almost without exception permanent foundation executives have had their training in universities… Furthermore, whenever a foundation needs temporary help, it turns uniformly to the university. (p 10-11)

The close relationship between foundations and universities described in this quote suggests that both institutions have influenced each other for a long time and established positive processes of partnership and collaboration in support of high impact change. But, grants may also have the opposite effect of disrupting practices and equilibriums in the systems targeted for change, as many scholars have noted throughout the years (Hollis, 1938; Wormser, 1958; Curti, 1963; Cheit & Lobman, 1979 O'Connell, 1987; Nielsen, 1996; Dowie, 2002). These authors, whose criticisms are discussed at length in the following chapter, question the adequacy of foundation-supported solutions in the U.S. context. The following section opens this discussion by transposing it to the context of African higher education.

Higher Education in Africa and the Presence of U.S. Foundations

Higher education has a much older history in Africa than is generally realized. It long antedates the establishment of Western-style universities in the 19th century. From the Alexandria Museum and Library in the third century B.C. to Christian monasteries in Ethiopia and other countries, there were many centers of higher learning influenced by religion. Africa claims distinction as the center of the world's oldest Islamic universities and some of the world's oldest surviving universities: Ez-Zitouna madrassa founded in Tunis in 731; al Qairawiyyin mosque university in Fez in 859; Al-Azhar mosque university in 969 in Cairo; Sankore mosque university in Timbuktu in the 12th century. These centers of high learning influenced the world as Lulat (2005) argues:

> The modern university that was brought to Africa by the colonial powers is as much Western in origin as it is Islamic. The Europeans acquired from the Muslims … a huge corpus of knowledge… Second, they learned rationalism combined with…the secular investigative approach typical of Arab natural science… a sophisticated disciplinary map of knowledge… a host of academic subjects. (p16)

Lulat's conclusions not only provide perspective on Western models of higher education, which were themselves beneficiaries of North-African and Middle-Eastern knowledge-producing institutions, but also puts forth a critical view of Western models by an African scholar - a view which is echoed by other African scholars (Mamdani & Diouf, 1994, Ajavi et al., 1996, Assie-Lumumba, 2006; Afolayan, 2007, Mamdani, 2012).

Scholars observed that vocational education increased in several parts of central and southern Africa in part due to Christian American women in the second half of the 19th century who increasingly formed their own foreign missionary societies (Curti, 1963). A myriad other religious proselytizers developed vocational schools for boys and girls, training the local peoples in agriculture and industry. Similarly, modern Western-style colleges and universities were founded in the early 19th century by missionaries and were largely concentrated in European settler colonies of South Africa and Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia's newly established territories of African diaspora resettlement. In colonial Africa, the development of higher education was limited until World War II because authorities were generally suspicious of and opposed

to the modern educated African elite and their nationalist demands for equality and freedom. Moreover, colonial civil servants feared African competition. At independence, higher education was a key challenge for the new independent States. The few existing universities were patterned on European models and elitist. There was a need to make higher education more relevant to Africa's developmental needs and sociocultural contexts, as well as more accessible to students of different socio-economic backgrounds. At that time, universities were central to national prestige, training a highly skilled labor force, for creating and reproducing a national elite. Universities became larger in size than their colonial predecessors and broader in mission. They expanded disciplinary and curricula offerings from the arts and social sciences to include professional fields of study (business, medicine, and engineering) and graduate programs.

U.S. private foundations were early pioneers in the endeavor of educational philanthropy in Africa. The Rockefeller Foundation's international activities between 1913 and the 1980s had placed the foundation as an indisputable pioneer of technical assistance, and a proponent of institution building and university development throughout its history (Coleman & Court, 1993). The Carnegie Corporation of New York initiated a program in support of educational development in British colonial Africa as early as 1926. The Kellogg Foundation introduced its first international programs in 1941, starting with Latin America, soon to be followed by the Ford Foundation which launched its Overseas Development Program in 1950. Foundations were heavily involved with

African higher education in the 1960's and 1970's. Carnegie conducted a university development program that spanned from 1953 to 1973 and made a variety of grants to African universities. Rockefeller was also very involved with steady contributions and a commitment to university development as Coleman and Court (1993) demonstrate. Yet, the field of higher education in Africa witnessed a dramatic shift - as both experts note - as a "pendulum swung away from universities to rural development, informal and vocational education, and the poorest of the poor as top priorities" (p16). The following two decades focused almost exclusively on basic education, higher education being perceived as a luxury which African nations could not afford. The field of African higher education was simply ignored by all foreign donors, as most U.S. foundations had left the field in the early 1980s.

The philosophy of the time assumed that the rate of return on investments made in basic education was more important than in higher education. Therefore, developing countries should not divert their scarce resources to higher education. This belief was championed by the World Bank and the IMF, among others. However, the end of the 1990s experienced a shift from this policy to a new understanding of the impact of higher education on the development of basic education and other areas. Thus, a holistic approach to education was promoted as a pre-requisite to creating change in specific areas of human development. In the words of Samoff and Carroll (2004) higher education in Africa went "from favored focus to disparaged wastrel to development engine in two decades"

(p201). At the turn of the new millennium higher education in Africa was characterized by a small number of universities per country and low enrollment ratios at all levels. The sector was plagued by challenges such as an aging faculty and lack of incentives to attract younger staff. Not to mention the continued brain drain which sees countries in Sub-Saharan African lose a tremendous amount of their educated and skilled population as a result of emigration to more developed countries.

Moreover, scholars such as Benneh, Awumbila & Effah (2004) have argued that inadequate financial and logistical support from national governments, along with weak private sector support and few private contributions to universities were all insurmountable obstacles to any form of institutional development. To some extent, the limited resources of universities made them vulnerable, dependent and susceptible to the influence of various stakeholders. Although there can be a positive exchange between donors and beneficiaries, their relationships are nonetheless unequal, as Coleman and Court (1993) stated:

> Within limits imposed by political circumstance and university support donors can assist in creating a favorable environment for academic freedom. By the same token they can help to weaken or constrain it. In some measure this negative contribution is inevitable not simply because the institutionalization of academic freedom has to be an internal process, to which external donors can make a limited contribution, but also because of the inherently unequal nature of the relationship between donor and recipient. (p332)

In this passage the asymmetrical relationship between grantors and grantees is described as an inevitable obstacle to institutional change, and thus puts a limit on the legitimacy of grantors considering their influence and relation domination over their beneficiaries. As such, the connection between legitimacy and the inequality between grantors and grantees is worthy of further exploration.

Although higher education is being transformed in several African countries, their socio-political heritage and current power struggles still plague African universities by constraining academic freedom and potential support from more external donors. Furthermore, the recent literature on African higher education confirms that African scholars are calling for more ownership in the inception and implementation of programs (Tiyambe Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004; Afolayan, 2007; Moja, 2007). As John Ssebuwufu, director of research programs at the Association of African Universities in Ghana writes:

> The African institution must fully own the programs, and not be left feeling that the programs are an imposition with minimum input from their side[2].

A point of view that is shared on both sides of the grant-making process as confirmed by this quote excerpted from James Coleman and David Court's 1993 analysis on university development in the third world:

> Because academic freedom in a given context has to be embedded in the institutions and forms of that society, an external agency can contribute only partially to the process

[2] Fisher Karin & Lindow Megan. Africa Attracts Renewed Attention from American Universities in The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 18, 2008.

> of institutionalization which builds academic freedom. Being inextricably linked with the development of a sense of national identity, institutionalization of anything is a process in which there are obvious inherent psychological limitations to external assistance. By its very nature, an institution is something a people must feel is their own, an integral and distinctive part of the fabric of their society. " (p331)

This notion of program ownership is an underrated and understudied aspect of the institutional interaction between donor and beneficiary, particularly in the field of international development. The desire to own a project, a concept, or an institution reflects a resistance to an undesired transformation, which also questions the legitimacy of a donor's intentions. Moreover, this resistance to transform also reflects the universities' inability to generate an endogenous model out of an inherited one. Echoing Eric Ashby's 1964 reflection on the mechanism for the inheritance of the Western style of civilization contemporary African scholars still ask how universities are to be made African such that they provide African development, not Westernization (Cloete, Moja et al, 2002; 2006).

U.S. foundations have been involved extensively with African universities and higher education networks, some for almost a century. Similarly they have had to deal with issues of legitimacy, ownership and Westernization from the beginning. In a December 1927 report to the Board, Keppel and Bertram expressed a series of both negative and positive considerations for the Carnegie Corporation of New York to adhere to when entering the field of African education. The Corporation should:

> Avoid relieving either public or private agencies from their own duty. Avoid taking steps which would involve the Corporation in current political controversies, especially in Kenya and South Africa, where political questions arouse the strongest feelings. Avoid entering fields which could better be dealt with by other non-African agencies [they meant the Rockefeller foundation and public health work among the natives]. Avoid embarking upon a program involving a group of specific grants in any field before a foundation has been laid in informed public opinion and representative group organizations. (p 9)

This prescient quote expresses both the potential risks of mindless philanthropy and a strategy to avoid these risks. It also shows how Carnegie's savvy foundation officers gauged the presence of other players in the field before designing their own plan for Africa. More importantly, it underlines the role of multiple social agents, which could maximize or denigrate the foundation's legitimacy in the field. These included local public and private agencies, local representative group organizations, governmental and political bodies, non-African agencies and public opinion. Additionally, it shows how Carnegie's board functioned as an ultimate legitimation agent by approving and enforcing the program officers' recommendations, and therefore legitimizing the foundation's course of action, staff time, and investment in such or such operation.

This study examines the strategic collaboration and programmatic initiatives undertaken by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation. Together, these trend-setting, private

foundations sought to turn the spotlight of international grant-making onto the development of higher education in Africa. They also wanted to strengthen African universities and place them at the center of Africa's economic development. In 2000, they formed the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (PHEA) to reach these goals. The partnership ended in January 2010 after ten years and more than $400 million invested in the field of higher education in Africa. Interestingly, these seven foundations all contributed in varying degrees to the development and structuration of U.S. higher education presented in the previous discussion.

The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa thus offers a rich case for analyzing U.S. foundations vigorously at work in a field as critical as higher education in Africa. From a researcher's perspective the collaboration offers many opportunities, particularly with the number of accessible documents that were produced, the openness and professionalism of the participants, all of whom accepted to be interviewed, and access to well-organized archives and innumerable interview transcripts from its grantees. The rich data aided this study in establishing an analysis of philanthropic foundations in action. It allowed an exploration of their strategic collaboration, their thirst for legitimacy, and the influence of their environments and institutional culture over their work. Although this study included grantee perspectives, it did not exhaustively survey the Partnership's 296 grantees, nor did it evaluate the impact or the outcome of its 1,432 grants made during its existence. It focused on explaining how the

partnership came about and identified factors influencing legitimation and interactions between partners, grantees, and international donors. Due to the Partnership's geographic focus, this research concentrates on universities and higher education organizations in nine African nations.

Organization of the Dissertation

The analytical process adopted in this research aims at investigating these private foundations, their strategy, collaborations, and environmental conditions. The following research questions target U.S. international foundations in Africa. They focus on the importance of institutional, inter-organizational and environmental factors in legitimatizing the foundations' role in African higher education. By conducting an in-depth investigation of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, its seven foundations, collective action and participants this research answers the following question and sub-questions:

Considering organizational contexts - particularly the influence of institutional culture and collaborative processes on the one hand, and the importance of institutional environments on the other – what factors contributed to the legitimacy of U.S. foundations in African higher education?

1- How did the dynamics of collaboration operate in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa?
2- How did the collaboration serve the foundations involved?

3- What can the Partnership's individual and collective perspectives reveal about the discourse of philanthropic foundations in African higher education?

4- How did collaborative, environmental and institutional factors contribute to legitimizing the foundations' work in higher education in Africa?

5- To what extent does high impact philanthropy need elaborate legitimation mechanisms?

Answers to these questions determine the extent to which the mechanisms of philanthropic collaboration contribute to maximizing legitimacy in impact-seeking philanthropic foundations. These answers form an interpretation of foundations based on the tension between the institutional and environmental factors that shape collaborative actions and philanthropic strategies. These factors include the norms, processes, powers and resources that pressure foundations to maintain legitimacy and rationalize efficient forms of collaborative action. Furthermore, the study examines the rhetoric of capacity building among influential foundations. It also pays attention to the perspectives of the foundations' grantees. Thus, a multi-dimensional understanding of the Partnership's dynamics of collaboration produces a clearer picture of the trans-organizational influences and institutional forces at play when foundations seek to impact a field as complex as African higher education.

The following chapters frame the discussion within an institutional lens in

order to provide an original perspective on private foundations, and the complexity of philanthropic action. Chapter 2 delves into the literature on philanthropic foundations and institutional theory to explore the question of legitimacy. Chapter 3 describes the study's mixed quantitative-qualitative methodology and introduces various data instruments that were designed for measuring legitimation in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The ensuing empirical chapters present and discuss the findings. They examine the multiple relationships that informed the given foundations' engagement with the Partnership: the relationship on-the-ground between the foundation and the given university, the rapport amongst the various foundations both in Africa and in the U.S., and the relationship between foundations and their dynamics of legitimation. As such these chapters gauge the types of relationships that determine collaboration and generate legitimacy. They trace the contours and identify the various institutional factors shaping collaborative, normative and environmental legitimacy. This study argues that, in order to influence higher education in Africa, high-impact foundations constantly leverage legitimacy. It analyzes sources of legitimacy and legitimation mechanisms to demonstrate that foundations such as those engaged in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa use collaboration as a strategy to generate and maximize legitimacy, which in turns help them justify their choices, world views, practices, or what Hammack and Heydemann (2009) call their "philanthropic projection of institutional logic abroad." The study examines how these foundations negotiated between mutual

support and their common cause to generate added value without sacrificing the quintessential independence and permanency which are their trademark and legacy. A final discussion on the legitimacy of U.S. foundations in the development of higher education in Africa concludes the dissertation. This study's findings offer funders, the entities that enter into partnership with them, and the beneficiaries of foundation grants, new light on how legitimacy can be negotiated, maximized, utilized to one's advantage, or withheld. These findings are also important to the field of education development, as they encompass the specifics of partnerships. Furthermore, this discussion is of interest to social scientists and historians as it underscores the potentially rich field of international philanthropy. Indeed, the need for more empirical explorations and comparative examinations of foundation-led social change abroad is clear.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGITIMACY OF PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS

Defining Organizational Legitimacy

In his foreword to Hammack and Heydemann's *Globalization, Philanthropy and Civil Society* (2009) Kenneth Prewitt called for more theoretical inquiry into the study of grant-making foundations, particularly from the institutionalists among social scientists. Organized philanthropy, he states, "is not only in and of the civil society sector; it has a vital interest in expanding that sector. This is where philanthropy finds the institutions which, for their part, legitimate philanthropy by carrying out philanthropic missions" (p viii):

> These institutions need client grantees as recipients to absorb obligatory spend-out funds, but more importantly as the real and symbolic expressions of what philanthropy is supposed to represent – the attachment of private wealth to public purpose.

Without this institutional logic, which foundations project abroad, philanthropic action cannot occur. Thus, the following chapters explore organizational legitimacy, philanthropic foundations, and the context of African higher education according to two disciplinary methods of research and analysis that helped clarify these institutional logics: resource dependency and neo-institutionalism.

Because U.S. foundations are organizations stabilized by deeply institutionalized rules (federal tax laws, tax reform acts, income tax exemption reports, charters, by-laws, codes of conduct, whistleblower policies, guidelines, and guiding principles), and because their actions and legitimacy are subject to their environmental, structural, normative and procedural constraints, this research adopts an institutional lens based on the theoretical discourses of neo-institutionalism and resource dependency. Neo-institutionalism lays emphasis on internal social rules and expectations, cultural norms, and values as sources of pressure on organizations to conform. Resource dependency focuses on external material conditions of the institutions' environment and constraints imposed by the environment on an organization's structures and practices. It pays particular attention to issues of power, interests, and to the potential for legitimation. Therefore, a more institutionally-focused framework can potentially offer a clearer interpretation of foundations and the dynamics of legitimation that guide their action. Both neo-institutionalism and resource dependency approach the concept of legitimacy from internal and external angles. Thus, the following discussion compares and confronts these theories' main concepts, the tension that separates them, and their interpretation of legitimacy, while reviewing the body of scholarship on philanthropic foundations. The foundations examined herewith are defined as entities established under private auspices, privately governed, which use the income generated by their endowment, or their endowment itself, to

support various educational, cultural, scientific and other public charitable objectives.

Definitions of organizational legitimacy have highlighted legitimation as arising from consistency in sociocultural values. Neo-institutionalists defined organizational legitimacy as "the adequacy of an organization as theory" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983), referring to the cognitive dimension of legitimacy. One of the most commonly used definition is in Suchman's (1995) pivotal article, in which he referred to a "generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (p 574). Suchman sought a definition of legitimacy broad enough to encompass both the 'Resource Dependency school' (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) as well as the 'Neo-Institutionalism school' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). For Meyer and Scott (1983), organizational legitimacy is a condition reflecting cultural alignment and conformity with rules and laws:

> Organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization—the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction. (p 201).

Legitimate organizations meet and conform to societal expectations. As a result, they are accepted, valued, and taken for granted as right, fitting, and good.

Legitimacy and legitimation are conceptually close to institutionalization.

Institutions, by definition, have a high degree of legitimacy, thus assessments of legitimacy can be used as one measure of institutionalization, particularly in the context of international donors whose focus is on institution building and institutional development. Following Brinkerhoff (1986), institutional development combines "links to the underlying principles that define and support a society's ongoing configuration of norms and values; and actions designed to induce changed activity and behavior patterns in the society" (p 15). Hence, the difference between institutions and organizations is often distorted, but the focus on positioning the two in the social fabric incorporates legitimation as a key element in the process. Legitimacy is a fundamental concept of institutional theory, which has investigated the underlying forces of institutional fields and their interactions with organizational behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

From an institutional standpoint, inter-organizational collaboration is remarkable precisely because it connects both the field and the organizational levels. Inter-organizational collaboration can be seen as a phenomenon positioned at the border between field-level institutional trends and organizational-level dynamics. Institutional pressures favor or hinder inter-organizational collaboration and shape to a certain extent the behavior of each organization in the collaboration process. As stated by Phillips et al. (2000: 29), "the participants in a collaborative process bring with them various institutional affiliations and the institutionalized rules and resources that this implies."

Scholars commonly distinguish between different types of legitimacies based on the avenues through which compliance occurs. Aldrich & Fiol (1994) oppose cognitive legitimacy and sociopolitical legitimacy. The former describes as taken-for-granted the legitimacy of the organization, while the latter underscores its compliance with laws and norms. Suchman (1995) and Scott (1995) break up the latter into two categories and suggest a broadly similar typology consisting of three types of legitimacies: pragmatic or regulative legitimacy (compliance induced by a regulatory entity and/or motivated by access to resources and advantages), moral or normative legitimacy (compliance with norms and values) and cognitive legitimacy. Each of these legitimacies is again subdivided into a range of sub-categories. Archibald (2004) groups normative and cognitive legitimacy, labeling it as cultural or constitutive legitimacy, which he distinguishes from sociopolitical or regulative legitimacy. Legitimacies are also commonly distinguished based on the level of analysis: individual, organizational, and field legitimacy. The following section explores two types of legitimacy which play an important part in organizations. These can be applied specifically to the world of large philanthropic foundations.

Institutional Legitimacy vs. Environmental Legitimacy

Sociological institutionalists such as March and Olsen (1989) define institutions as collections of interrelated rules and routines to which actors respond appropriately. Others like Scott (1995) confirm such a view by describing

institutions as non-material entities shaped by values, norms, habits and ideas embedded in the institutional context. This is internalized by actors who behave, bounded by their cultural environment, to conform to existing rules or values in order to legitimize their role. Neo-institutional theorists posit that action does not occur in an institutional vacuum and that institutions offer a context for legitimizing action. Institutional legitimacy represents a force in an organization. This force is felt on individuals' actions and outcomes, and on collective decisions. Furthermore, neo-institutionalists underline the issue of uneasy coexistence, which stems from the tension between institutions with distinct, even opposite, patterns of reproduction and legitimation. Institutions erected in different socio-cultural eras, reflecting different interests and identities coexist uneasily (DiMaggio, 1982), and as such assess legitimacy differently.

On the contrary, resource dependency theorists such as Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that to understand the behavior of an organization one must understand the context of that behavior. How an organization learns about its environment, how it attends to the environment's legitimation forces and how it selects and processes information to give meaning to its environment are all important contextual aspects affecting an organization. Environmental legitimacy includes every event in the world which has any effect on the activities or outcomes of the organization. Environments can change, and when they do organizations face the prospect of either not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these environmental factors. Environmental legitimacy

shapes the activities and structures of formal organizations which conform to its norms.

Environmental constraints on behavior are often considered to be undesirable, restricting creativity and adaptation. Recent studies discuss the activities of U.S. foundations abroad in relation to environmental forces (Kiger, 2000 & 2008; Sanborn & Portocarrero, 2005; Karoff, 2008; Friedman & McGarvie, 2003). For instance, Kiger (2008) provides a historical account of U.S. foundations' international work and assesses the impact of globalization on foundations and philanthropists. But its conclusions only briefly address the absence of environmental restriction on the foundations' liberty to act, which benefits their operations and reputation. Lester Salamon (in Hewa & Stapleton, 2005) highlights that foundations and civil society in general are "both a consequence and a cause of globalization. More precisely, many of the forces driving the contemporary process of globalization are also contributing to the growth of the civil society sector internationally." (p137) Peter Frumkin (in Hewa & Stapleton, 2005) summarizes the limited extent of overseas funding by American foundations (less than 12 percent of grant dollars during 1990-1998) and delineates four periods in international grant-making. He stresses that four purposes of foundation grants (social/political change, innovation, redistribution, and pluralism) are likely to involve funders in notably different dynamics from those of domestic grants. He concludes that "the most important thing for international grant-makers to remember is that the potential for major and sudden

impact increases as one moves up from micro to macro levels – from individual to organizational to network to policy levels" (p 113).

Foundations obtain reputational value through performance and effective grant-making which contribute to accountability. In this manner, reputation enhances strategic managerial space and room to maneuver. Deephouse and Carter (2005) demonstrate that legitimacy and reputation have a close connection and are equally influenced by environmental and institutional forces. They also stress that an organization with a strong reputation is able to deviate from standard practices and still maintain status and legitimacy. Prewitt (in Prewitt et al., 2006) argues that foundations should be analyzed for what they have "effectively achieved rather than what they have been unable to accomplish" (page 29). Most researchers do not account for the internal and environmental dynamics that influence foundations. They also fail to emphasize that performance and accountability are essential for a grantor's reputation and legitimacy.

Foundations can also leverage reputation and legitimacy through strategic partnerships, particularly when foundations take on high-impact missions. Brinkerhoff (2005) highlights several strategic options for reputation enhancement which directly lead to legitimacy. These options include partnering with other foundations that already possess the desired forms of legitimacy or maximizing reputation within the foundation. A partnership of foundations with comparable

reputations has the potential to maximize each partner's reputation as well as other organizational elements such as legitimacy. This again underscores the need for a more institutionally-focused approach to the study of foundations, one that simultaneously assesses and compares factors motivating foundations whether they are institutional, environmental or actor-based.

Legitimacy and the Participation of Individual Actors

Neo-institutionalism – in particular actor-oriented research - has the potential to help us understand the mechanisms of legitimation which surround foundations' dynamics. This particular approach argues that actors adjust their behavior to existing institutional frameworks. It also contends that actors adapt imperfectly to legitimation processes and with much delay to whatever occurs in their organization, sometimes even resisting change. Sociological institutionalists, such as Ingram & Clay (2000), claim that institutions affect not only strategies and interests, but also patterns of relationships between actors, preferences, objectives, and identities. These actor-centered institutional theories place institutions not simply as representations of constraints or opportunities for action, but as "central markers in the process of preference formation" (Lecours, 2005). For instance, the institutional incentives approach and the 'choice-within-constraints' approach claim that institutions have a mediating effect on the calculations of actors; they shape action because they offer opportunities for action and impose constraints, and grant legitimacy.

Foundation officers with specific capabilities, perceptions, and preferences interact according to different patterns, or modes, depending on their foundations' legitimation mechanisms. These patterns can also be observed among officers working in international organizations (Atlani-Duault, 2009; 2011). Diana Leat (in Amheier, 1999) examined the organization and management of British foundation grant-making. She interviewed staff in a representative sample of 30 fund-raising and endowed foundations in Great Britain that fund primarily social welfare. After describing different styles of grant-making, Leat argues that foundations work under a number of unique constraints. If there is an endowment, foundations are legally bound to respect the wishes of the donor. While this sounds straightforward, the initial donor's wishes are often broad (e.g., promote the well-being of humanity; diffuse knowledge) and therefore difficult to fulfill.

Trustees who have the responsibility of carrying out the donor's wishes often have interests that diverge from the donor's, and because trustees are not accountable to any one person, the organization can easily drift away from its original mission. Furthermore, both endowed and operating foundations almost always rely on third-party service providers instead of carrying out the task at hand, making evaluation problematic. Organizations frequently pursue legitimacy through a variety of substantive and symbolic practices (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). But, as these authors stated, legitimacy is always problematic. It is a social judgment that is ultimately conferred to the organization by its leader, who can confer or withhold legitimacy. Thus, this study proposes to see how foundation

staff navigates their foundation's processes of legitimation, and how foundation leaders play a part in enforcing these processes.

Collaborative Isomorphism vs. Institutional Differentiation

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) conceptualize institutional isomorphism whereby coexisting institutions tend to look alike. They describe three mechanisms to explain this phenomenon: coercion, which involves explicit pressures from other institutions, as well as from the cultural environment; mimesis, where standardization ensues from uncertainty; and norms, which legitimize autonomy. As institutions legitimize similarities, coercive regulations, mimetic processes, and normative pressures not only result in isomorphism—as DiMaggio and Powell have stressed—but also lead to social differentiation among organizations when they tend to resist standardization. On the other hand, Resource Dependency theorists such as Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that institutional differentiation has important consequences in creating a hierarchy of status among organizations and in affecting organizational success. These theorists predict that status is determined by the status of the other organizations with whom the organization interacts. Network relations and social ties are essential for status. There is little incentive for high status organizations to form alliances with their lower status counterparts. Organizations act strategically to manage their resource dependencies. The dynamic interaction and evolution of organizations with their environments can help explain inter-organizational relations over time as various

social actors maneuver for advantages. This notion is also important for understanding how external resource dependence affects internal and trans-organizational mechanisms of legitimation.

Collaboration results in easier, faster and more coherent access to services and benefits, and in greater effects on systems. They can also maximize legitimacy for all partners involved through cumulative assimilation. Scholars argue that collaboration offers communities a tool to help them improve themselves (Gray, 1989, Mattessich et al., 2001). For these scholars, the ability to get certain results can happen predominantly through joint service efforts. The synergistic efforts of the collaborating partners often result in resourceful ways to overcome obstacles. Organizations can join together in creative techniques to tackle issues that lie beyond the scope of any single organization.

The process of collaborating may potentially increase the amount of grantee participation. It may help tackle social problems that matter both foundations and grantees. It may legitimize the choices made by funders via collective decision-making and peer review. These issues have ramifications for so many aspects of society that they are inherently multi-organizational. In his case study of the Chicago Initiative, a partnership between foundations and community organizations that worked on issues concerning poor youth and social inequality, Ira Silver (2006) concludes that "collaboration between funders and grantees may well become an institutionalized feature of American philanthropy."

(p121) Comparing the rhetoric and the reality of philanthropic collaboration Silver concludes by urging foundations and philanthropic collaborations to "create contexts for power sharing that do not have pre-defined limits… Foundations need to make themselves amenable to embracing "partnership" in the fuller sense of the word, which entails mutual decision making between foundations and community-based organizations." (p122) Power sharing and mutual decision making can maximize legitimacy and create a virtuous circle between legitimacy-seeking grantors and legitimacy-conferring grantees.

Borrowing from collaboration theorists (Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey, 2001), this study used several factors and sub-factors commonly found in collaboration studies and adapted them through a neo-institutionalist / resource-dependent lens:

Neo-Institutionalism

1- Factors Related to Process/Structure: (a) Members share a stake in both process and outcome; (b) Multiple layers of participation; (c) Flexibility; (d) Development of clear roles and policy guidelines; (e) Adaptability; (f) Appropriate pace of development.

2- Factors Related to Communication: (a) Open and frequent communication; (b) Established informal relationships and communication links.

3- Factors Related to Membership Characteristics: (a) Mutual respect, understanding, and trust; (b) Appropriate cross section of members; (c) Members see collaboration as in their self-interest; (d) Ability to compromise.

Resource Dependency

4- Factors Related to the Environment: (a) History of collaboration or cooperation in the community; (b) Collaborative group seen as legitimate leader in the community; (c) Favorable political and social climate.

5- Factors Related to Purpose: (a) Concrete, attainable goals and objectives; (b) Shared vision; (c) Unique purpose.

6- Factors Related to Resources: (a) Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time; (b) Skilled leadership.

Both neo-institutionalism and resource dependency emphasize the effects of the social environment on legitimizing the work of organizations. On the one hand, neo-institutionalism lays its emphasis on social rules and expectations, cultural norms, and values as the source of pressures to conform on organizations. On the other hand, resource dependency focuses on the material conditions of the institutions' environment and the constraints it imposes on their structures and practices, paying particular attention to issues of power, interests, and to the potential for strategic choice to leverage legitimacy.

Arguably the strength of neo-institutional theory lies in its ability to explain institutional change or, conversely the resistance to change which, historical institutionalists argue, is often embedded within the institutions. Pierson (2000), for instance, suggests that institutions have overwhelming influence and that the autonomy of actors may be severely limited due to the logic of institutional development and reproduction. Institutionalists describe organizations in terms of norms and values whose importance is a function of the

material institutions from which they emanate. In this light, institutions appear to have a logic of their own; their creation and growth result in consequences unintended and unpredicted by actors. Neo-institutionalists argue that institutions embody the societal situation prevailing at the time of their inception. Once created, they have autonomy from society and their development follows a largely independent pattern. Therefore, foundations would appear attached to internal and historical strings, which hamper their relationship with other foundations.

On the other hand, resource dependency theory claims that organizations must interact with other elements in their environment to acquire needed resources. Problems arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their environment, but because this environment is not dependable. The need for resources, financial and physical - alongside information obtained from the environment, make organizations potentially dependent on these external factors. This view suggests that organizations are embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships. As organizations try to alter their environments, they become subject to new and different constraints as the patterns of interdependence themselves change.

Organizations attempt to manage the constraints and uncertainty resulting from the need for external resources by using various co-optive strategies. Because of external constraints on revenue and autonomy of decision-making, organizations possess both the desire and the ability to negotiate their position

within those constraints using a variety of tactics (strategic choice). Co-opting sources of constraint for more autonomy and in order to pursue organizational interests is therefore central to understanding an institution. For instance, Clotfelter (in Baccheti & Ehrlich, 2007) concludes that both the foundation and its grantee benefit from the relationship, particularly when the interests of grantees are defended by foundations. Fleishman (2007) asserts that most large foundations that are serious about their fields of grant-making already focus on strategies aimed at building prior experiences in the same field. They prioritize accumulating knowledge as they go forward. However, in doing so, they often do not practice much transparency with the outside world.

These strategies take into account the pressure of environments and institutions that foundations interact with. Bacchetti and Ehrlich (2007) suggest that, in shaping strategies for education grants, foundations should make the building of "educational capital" their goal —that is, the generation and culmination of knowledge towards the best solutions for the problems at hand. Moreover, the authors strongly urge that such strategies be developed jointly by individual foundations in partnership or in collaboration with other foundations and with groups of beneficiary educational institutions. Bacchetti and Ehrlich make a persuasive case that, in order to do so, foundations must first become "relentless learning organizations," by continuously studying their own impact and the processes that produce it. Moreover, they correctly point out that foundations cannot become "learning organizations" without becoming more

public, visible, and transparent about their work, without subjecting it to critical review and discussion, and without building on their own and on others' learning in guiding future practice in the field. Both the dialogue with beneficiaries and the learning process that is entailed not only increase transparency but can increase a foundation's legitimacy, as the following sections demonstrate.

The Legitimacy of Foundations in Question

Several researchers have described the accomplishments of U.S. foundations with skepticism - from the professionalization of public health to strengthening the non-governmental organization sector and many research institutions (Clotfelter & Ehrlich, 1999; Nielsen, 2004). There is often uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of philanthropy, particularly when it is strategically oriented towards high impact. As Claire Gaudiani writes:

> Donations become dangerous when they encourage dependence or entitlement, when they engender deep bitterness, or when the donor's courage or good judgment fails and politics and ideology are permitted to transform the gift into an embarrassment or a burden. Some donations are destructive because of the causes they fund, campaigns against the very democracy and equality that we need to balance capitalism. (2003, pxx)

Many acts of charitable giving fail in their stated goals and some are actually harmful, as foundation critics have pointed out over and over (Wormser, 1958). Yet, unlike a business firm, foundations do not have products, services, customers, authorities, or even competitors to be accountable to (Gaudiani, 2003).

However, foundations, like businesses, require legitimacy to attract constituents' support and continue to exist. Yet, the legitimacy of foundations is still intensely debated, particularly with regards higher education and international development.

Recent studies on foundations and higher education analyze whether foundations have become patron or bully in their recent relationship with universities. For instance, Baccheti and Ehrlich (2007) argue that in order to build educational, social or cultural capital, foundations tend to "reinvent the wheel" and hardly adapt to local conditions and customs. Although these authors do not discuss directly the importance of legitimation in the foundations' operations, they do highlight the importance of local environments as a source of public recognition and acceptance. But, more importantly, the extensive literature on philanthropic foundations has questioned and continues to question the legitimacy of foundations, particularly when grants are used to transform institutions or entire fields.

The literature on philanthropic foundations questions the aspirations of international foundations, particularly U.S. foundations involved in capacity development in developing countries. At times, foundations are found to be working both with and against U.S. foreign policy, seizing opportunities to operate internationally. For instance, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded grants for sending medical literature and small items of equipment to Soviet institutions

in the 1920s (Rosenbaum, 1989). Similarly, during the Cold War, the Ford Foundation put into operation a non-governmental cultural diplomacy program to offset Communism (Dedrick, 1997; Dowie, 2002).

The United States' influence abroad developed between the 1890s and the interwar period, revealing its full force after 1945. This influence helped to spread Western medicine around the world, including the establishment of medical schools in China (Bullock, 1973), thus promoting international relations. Increasingly, during that time, foundations took a more activist role to initiate change (Hewa & Stapleton, 2005). For instance, Ford's funding of intercultural publications, with a publishing house established in 52 countries, was the first major effort demonstrating a determination to play a role in international relations (Gregory, 2000; Tournès, 2002). The question of ideology, coercion and foundation activity has been debated repeatedly by scholars who often pinpoint the foundations' fostering of pro-U.S. values and its reinforcement of the U.S. hegemonic construction over developed or developing nations.

Joan Roelofs (2003) concludes that foundations are prime constructors of hegemony because they promote consent and discourage dissent against capitalist democracy. This obscures the frontiers of power and influence; instead it supplants democratic institutions with a "new feudalism." Thus, partnerships coerce opposing views. This belief echoes earlier studies which often considered foundations as relatively unfettered and unaccountable concentrations of wealth

and power. Foundations were perceived as entities able to buy intellectual capital, advance causes and delineate a society's focus (Whitaker, 1974; Arnove, 1980). Darknell (in Arnove, 1980) even argues that Carnegie's programs in higher education have been consistent with the interests of U.S. corporations. Other studies on U.S. foundations question, through the lens of cultural hegemony, the benefits and drawbacks of foundation work (Berman, 1971; Whitaker, 1974; Arnove, 1980; Brison, 2005).

These views often conclude that older foundations such as Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford have been accused of having a corrosive influence on society. Arnove (1980) depicts foundations as pervasive infiltrators of policy infrastructures in university systems, public health, and the social sciences. According to this particular scholar, foundations, on an international level, "help maintain an economic and political order which benefits the ruling-class interests of philanthropists and *philanthropoids*." His claim criticizes foundations for promoting set agendas, serving the interests of industrial capitalism, acting, in a sense, like "agencies of hegemony, imposing cultural imperialism on minorities and subordinate classes at home and abroad." Berman (1983) questioned the role of foundations such as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford as proponents of U.S. hegemony overseas, but he also pinpointed the important role played by the foundations in their support of universities "whose activities help to legitimate the system of state capitalism."

More recently, Brison (2005) discusses the hegemonic influence of U.S. foundations over Canada's higher education institutions where "scholars were not free to pursue the full range of intellectual curiosity" (page 12). Masseys-Bertoneche (2006) argues that the foundations' networks of influence over higher education institutions are reinforcing the elite's grip over the sector. In his study of Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie, Parmar (2002) concludes that these foundations developed international knowledge networks and exercised intellectual influence over the research agenda "to build policy-relevant research and training institutions that would produce graduates with skills and ideas that fit Western notions of development." Parmar (2012) even suggests that a "globally hegemonic mindset is revealed in the foundations' funding strategies" in Africa (p178). For this scholar, U.S. foundations in the 1960s were engaged in "developing and implementing a hegemonic project involving the state, corporations, and intellectual elites."

But are U.S. foundations always fostering a pro-Western agenda? Do their grant recipients perceive their interventions as hegemonic? The hegemonic approach to the study of foundation work does not seem to account for the complexity of the grantor-grantee relationship. As Kenneth Prewitt describes in Hammack and Heydemann (2009) institutions such as foundations have no overt coercive powers, "they cannot tax, regulate, legislate or perform the functions of the State" (p viii), nor do they offer profits or return on investment like commercial institutions. Yet, the question of their influence on society and in the

world is important and has been commented upon extensively (Berman, 1983; Hammack & Heydemann, 2009; Parmar, 2012).

By focusing on the question whether U.S. independent foundations' involvement with African universities is a form of hegemonic influence, most studies tend to disregard the particular dynamics that operate between both sets of institutions. Taking a different route for researching the role of U.S. foundations abroad is not only necessary to avoid the limitations of a hegemonic interpretation, it also offers the potential to unveil new ground for research on the field of educational philanthropy. For instance, Nigerian scholar Christiana Tamuno (1986) concludes that "there is nothing wrong in incorporating into the Nigerian university foreign models of education" (p 137). Although she acknowledges that not all programs carried out by the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford foundations were successful in the development of Ibadan University, her empirical study, which included scores of interviews with administrators, faculty and students at Ibadan, did not uncover any form of hegemonic control associated with the grants received from foundations. She also suggests that these foundations were legitimate as active participants in Nigeria's higher education development.

Moreover, reorganizing an educational system according to norms of efficiency and cost efficiency may have the effect of stymieing social mobility. This was suggested by scholars who applied a Gramscian lens of ideological and

cultural hegemony to the work of foundations (see Darknell in Arnove, 1980). However, it is wrong to make inferences about motives based on these possible effects. In a review of Arnove's *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism* Paul DiMaggio (1983) commented on these studies' functionalist bias as one that "blinds the authors, at times, to the reality of organizational life in foundations: too often, foundations are conceived as purposeful and rational unitary actors." This tendency, he says, is reinforced by the disappointing absence of interviews with officers, grantees, and unsuccessful applicants, and by an overreliance on official documents. DiMaggio concludes that much of the discussion of foundation behavior in the less developed world suggests the "thoughtless application of Western models, rather than conscious efforts to impose hegemony":

> In some instances, as in African education, the importation of Western ideologies may well have increased the autonomy of local university systems. While such organizational factors as problemistic search or dependence on routine information channels are clearly conservative in their effects, a greater recognition of the role of organizational concerns and internal conflict would have helped the authors consider the limits and opportunities for foundation autonomy from capital or the state.

Thus, this study offers to explore foundations seeking to impact a field as complex as higher education in Africa by bypassing the hegemonic discourse, and examining the work of philanthropic foundations through an institutional lens. This study proposes to question how internal and external mechanisms resources,

governments, and other actors influence the foundations' actions, legitimize their role and constrain their strategies.

CHAPTER III

MEASURING THE DYNAMICS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

Mixed Quantitative-Qualitative Approach

To better understand the mechanisms of legitimation surrounding the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa this study combines quantitative and qualitative data to model the relationship between partnering foundations and their grantees. Thus it builds a deeper analysis of collaboration by exploring perspectives from all actors. By proposing a mixed method, this study follows what Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) define as "an approach whose time has come" which combines the complementary strengths of quantitative and qualitative analyses - the deficiencies of one approach being offset by the advantages of the other. Quantitative and qualitative methods are inextricably intertwined, not only at the level of specific data sets but also at the levels of study design and analysis. The broad reasons for linking quantitative and qualitative data in this project include:

- Complementarity: a complementary approach allows better elaboration and clarification of the study's results. For instance, a qualitative analysis of the interviews and archival data contributes to explaining and interpreting the quantitative findings, as well as enhancing and clarifying their meaning.

- Triangulation: gathering data using different methods from a variety of sources enables this study to confirm and corroborate the results obtained from the different instruments.

This mixed method allows for a better analysis of the strategic mechanisms put in place by the Partnership's foundations and the dynamics of legitimation that surrounded them. A set of measures inspired by neo-institutionalism and resource dependency were designed to determine which factors (internal according to the neo-institutionalists or external according to resource dependency theorists) most affect legitimation in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa.

Four measures are presented below: two characterized by neo-institutionalism (Processes & Structures and Membership) and two characterized by resource dependency (Environment and Resources). These measures help identify the mechanisms of legitimacy and accountability which influence organizations such as philanthropic foundations:

- Processes & Structures correspond to a neo-institutional measure that focuses on the level of institutional constraints, bureaucratic and collaborative processes, and power inequalities among organizations.

- Membership corresponds to a neo-institutional measure that focuses on affinity and isomorphism, motivations to collaborate, cumulative gains, and the degree of individuality among organizations.

- Environment corresponds to a resource-dependent measure that focuses on the degree of contextual constraints and conformity that an institutional environment imposes on organizations.

- Resources correspond to a resource-dependent measure that focuses on interdependency between organizations and their beneficiaries, sustainability, competition and resource.

In proposing these measures, this study reveals the dynamics at play within the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. It also offers a visualization of the actors' perspectives. Comparing perspectives allows one to identify the mechanisms of legitimation shaping actors' relationships. Most Partnership documents and interview transcripts shared both neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics. Counting the number of times each of these measures appears in these primary sources reveals the most prevalent factors and themes. In order to assess the significance of internal and external factors within the broader context of the Partnership the above measures were tracked across a series of descriptors to identify patterns of association:

- Descriptor A represents the various possible interrelationships between foundations, and was used to identify how specific foundations affected Partnership dynamics.
- Descriptor B represents the country of focus, and was used to identify how geographic location affected Partnership dynamics.

- Descriptor C was used to identify how regional location affected Partnership dynamics.
- Descriptor D represents grantee types, and was used to identify how grantees affected Partnership dynamics.
- Descriptor E represents the area of focus, and was used to identify how grant purpose affected Partnership dynamics.
- Descriptor F represents the year of the award, and was used to identify how Partnership dynamics evolved over time.

Although the majority of source data was qualitative in nature (archival and interview data far outnumbered numerical statistics on the Partnership's activity), the analysis was quantitative in that it tracked ratios and frequencies of neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics over the vectors listed above. This chapter further defines these characteristics and descriptors. It explains the data collection methods, sampling, and analysis methodologies utilized in the study. In proposing the mixed quantitative-qualitative approach, this research exposes the dynamics at play within the Partnership. It also highlights the neo-institutional and resource-dependent factors that impacted organizational legitimacy among U.S. foundations.

Data Instruments

For this research, four instruments were created from which quantitative and/or qualitative data could be extracted and used: (a) a grant dataset; (b) an archive dataset; (c) a grantor interview dataset; and (d) a grantee interview dataset. The study's combined qualitative data represents a set of 5,487 excerpts with 12,379 code applications tagged in 295 documents. These excerpts present multiple perspectives from foundations, grantees, and observers which then offer the possibility to draw comparisons.

The Partnership's grant database includes 1,432 grants made to 296 recipients during its ten-year existence from January 2000 to January 2010. This dataset included information about regional focus, country focus, area of focus; foundation, funding type, grant amount, year, start/end date; grantee name, categories, location; keywords. Over the period of ten years, out of a total of 1,482 grants, approximately 253 (17.1%) were made as Joint Partnership grants to 44 recipients, and 1,229 grants were made as Individual grants. Joint grants had a total value of $65,859,737, or 15.0% of all grants during that period. Additionally, this study surveyed the Foundation Center's online grant database of U.S. foundations, which reported grants to Africa between 2003 and 2012. Based on this survey, 10,760 grants to African institutions were identified, and near 600 U.S. foundations made grants to Africa during this time-frame.

The archive dataset included 189 memos corresponding to 189 folders accessible in the Partnership's archives. This instrument was built by extracting

data from relevant quotes and summaries of partnership meeting minutes, email correspondences, notes, evaluation drafts, reports and publications. These documents depicted the numerous interactions between partnering foundations, and between grantors and grantees.

The Grantor interview dataset included 20 interviews of individuals directly involved with the Partnership and its seven foundations. Interviewees included seven program officers, six directors, four advisors/associates, and three vice-presidents/presidents. These individuals were the main actors involved in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The qualitative data was based on actors' retrospective accounts of partnership activity. Subjects had previous or current affiliation or involvement with the selected institutions, including those who dealt with grant application and requirements within the said institutions. Subjects were interviewed in their official capacities (whether past or present). In addition, the twenty interviews were fully transcribed. The respondents are listed in Appendix A and the questions asked are listed in Appendix B. The questions centered on the neo-institutional and resource-dependent measures discussed above: processes and structures, membership, environment, and resources. The interviewees were informed that the interview was going to be recorded, transcribed and coded. They were able to opt out of the interview at any time and for any reason, as well as listen to the interview should they require and request deletion of the interview in parts or in full if necessary. They were asked to sign a consent form. All but one interviewee accepted the protocol.

The Grantee interview dataset included 131 interview transcripts discovered in the Partnership's archives. The interviews were conducted in 2010 by a consultant paid by the Partnership. It included both identified and unidentified interviewees located in several African institutions that partnered with the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The interviews included reflections on the grantees' broader perspective on higher education in their country. They were asked to comment on things that might have changed as a result of the relationships and processes that took place between their institution and the foundations. The respondents included students, professors, researchers and research assistants, grant administrators and university administrators in various universities in several countries (see full list in Appendix C).

Operationalization of Qualitative Data

When quantitative data was not available in the Partnership's grant database, archival documents and interview transcriptions were used to detect the presence of neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics. These characteristics were then coded using Dedoose, a qualitative and mixed-methods research application. This allowed for quantitative measures and variables through nominal, ordinal and ratio measurements of qualitative data (e.g. archival or interview data). The ratios and relative frequencies of these measures were compared over the vectors described earlier in this chapter. The application permitted the user to apply user-defined tags, or "codes", to any given excerpt of text. Thirty-six codes were created. Each one was associated with a measure of

neo-institutional or resource-dependent characteristics (processes and structures, membership, environment, or resources). Each measure was associated with three sub-measures, and each sub-measure was associated with three codes. These associations are summarized in table 1.

Deployed comparatively between grantors and grantees, these measures helped visualize the influence of internal or external factors on institutions, the mechanisms of convergence and divergence among participating institutions, and among individual actors. This visualization was achieved by tallying and creating a numerical summary of the number of times each code was applied to a certain document, as well as the number of times two codes are applied within the same excerpt. In total, 295 documents were tagged and produced 5,487 excerpts which generated 12,379 code applications. Detailed definitions of these codes are given in Appendix E.

	Measures	Sub-Measures	Associated Codes
NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM	Processes & Structures	Culture & Values	Historical Connections; Culture & Values; Mission & Vision
		Processes & Bureaucracy	Coordination Process; Communication Process; Contract
		Power & Leadership	Conflict Management; Governance; Veto System
	Membership	Incentives & Value-added	Risk Reduction; Knowledge Transfer; Resource Expansion
		Affinity & Collaboration	Collaboration; Affinity; Networks
		Consultation & Ownership	Ownership; Consultation; Borrowing & Lending
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY	Environment	Policy & Context	Global Context; Norms & Trends; Public Policy
		Efficiency & Accountability	Accountability; Efficiency; Authority
		Competition	Societal Drivers; Synergies; Rivalries
	Resources	Assets & Resources	Financial Resources; Human Resources; Organizational Memory
		Leverage	Advocacy; Leveraging; Output
		Sustainability	Empowerment; Perception of Impact; Sustainability.

Table 1: Neo-Institutional and Resource Dependent Measures and Sub-Measures

To model the grant parameter vectors, an indexing function called "descriptor categories" was used. Each document's descriptors were fixed by the parameters of the associated grant, and included: date, country of focus, region of focus, foundations involved, grantee type, and area of focus. Table 2 summarized the descriptor categories and the descriptor choices within each category:

Descriptor Category	Descriptor Choices
Date	Pre-PHEA (before 2000), First Phase (2000-2005), Second Phase (2005-2010), Post-PHEA (after 2010)
Country of Focus	South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda, Egypt, Madagascar, Tanzania
Region of Focus	North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Africa-wide
Foundation(s) Involved	PHEA, Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, Mellon, MacArthur, Kresge, Hewlett
Grantee Type	African Universities, Networks and Research, International Organizations, Foundations and NGOs, Government, Libraries, Museums and Arts, Parks and Wildlife, Multiple.
Area of Focus	Academic and Research Development, Access to University, Administrative Staff Development, Information and Communications Technology, Institutional and Capacity Development, Scholarships and Fellowships, Gender and Equity, Governance and Democracy, Health and Population, Library Support, Outreach and Advocacy, Program and Curriculum Development, Technical Assistance and Evaluation, Multiple Areas

Table 2: Descriptor Categories and Descriptor Choices

Data Analysis Methodologies

The codes used during the operationalization of qualitative data are defined in appendix E. They are grouped by measure and sub-measure to reflect the tension between neo-institutionalist and resource-dependent characteristics in the Partnership's data. After all the documents were tagged and indexed, a search for patterns of association between codes and descriptors was done. This tracked measures of neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics over one or more parameter vectors. Three kinds of charts were generated (accompanied by raw data): quantitative, qualitative and mixed.

Quantitative charts

The study's quantitative charts only deal with descriptor data that is fixed by the parameters of the grant. They do not include subjective code application and measures of qualitative data. The quantitative charts include:

- Descriptor ratios – the charts illustrate the distribution of descriptors in each descriptor category, enabling this study to determine which descriptors were most or least common.
- Descriptor Field vs. Descriptor Field – these charts plot the frequency of co-occurrence of descriptors in the same or different descriptor categories, enabling this study to detect associations between individual descriptors.

Qualitative charts

The study's qualitative charts are purely qualitative, in that they only deal with user-applied code data. They provide a quantitative representation of the Partnership's qualitative data.

- Code Co-Occurrence – this matrix illustrates the frequency with which pairs of codes were applied within the same document excerpt, enabling this study to detect associations between individual codes.
- Code Application – this chart tracks the frequency with which each code was applied to each document.

Mixed-method charts

This mixed quantitative-qualitative approach combined code and descriptor data to track patterns of association between measures and vectors as explained at the beginning of this chapter.

- Codes by Descriptor – these charts plot the relationship between a single code and a single descriptor, enabling the study to track how any one measure evolves along any one vector.
- Descriptor by Descriptor by Code – these charts plot the relationship between two descriptors and a single code, enabling the study to track how any one measure evolves along two vectors simultaneously.

Plotting codes against descriptors introduces a statistical bias because some descriptors were applied to more documents than others, creating more

opportunities for code application. To correct this bias, the number of code applications per descriptor category was converted into the number of code applications per document within that same descriptor category.

This approach offers a visualization of grantor and grantee perspectives across the study's various instruments by measuring the number of code applications for each qualitative sub-measure by the total number of documents. By tallying code occurrences for each sub-measure the following graph underlines the repartition of neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics across the study's instruments.



Figure 1: Number of Code Applications per Sub-Measure

The grantee instrument, which included retrospective accounts from selected actors in grant-receiving institutions, showed a prevalence of resource-dependent characteristics. On the other hand, the grantor instrument, which included retrospective accounts from foundation staff, was dominated by neo-institutional characteristics. These characteristics also dominated, although in a lesser degree, the archive instrument, which included the Partnership's correspondence, evaluation, minutes of meeting, among many other documents. The measures compared in this manner introduce a variation between grantors and grantees. On one hand, the funders' profile is dominated by internal and collaborative processes. Indeed, "affinity & collaboration", "culture & values", "processes & bureaucracy", and "power & leadership" are most prominent in grantors. This suggests that grantors focused primarily on making the Partnership function and on adjusting to each other's institutional prerogative. On the other hand, the grantees' collective profile is dominated by environmental characteristics such as "policy & context", "competition", and "sustainability." In contrast, these three measures received the lowest score in the grantors' profile.

As a methodological caveat, this variation can also derive from an unintended consequence of measurement error related to the different sources and types of data. Yet, these results suggest that the Partnership's bureaucratic processes became a central preoccupation for the participating foundations while grantee preoccupations appeared to be related to issues of institutional survival. This clear discrepancy in perspectives and expectations between the two parties

emerges consistently across all of the study's findings. Arguably, this discrepancy could be interpreted as the locus where legitimacy was created leveraged, managed, maximized or withheld. It was both a controllable and malleable source of legitimation as well as an indispensable resource for the study's impact-seeking foundations.

CHAPTER IV

COLLABORATIVE LEGITIMACY IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA

A Partnership of Foundations

The following chapter investigates the collaboration of seven major foundations which joined forces to form the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. Between 2000 and 2010 the Partnership provided funding to higher education institutions in nine African nations: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Madagascar and Egypt. It supported regional and sub-regional organizations as well as consortia that furthered the development of higher education in Africa. The foundations included the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation. These foundations had two clear goals. As clearly stated on the Partnership's website, the first was to advocate for the "indispensable contribution of higher education to social and economic development" in Africa. The second goal was to accelerate the "processes of comprehensive modernization and strengthening of universities in selected countries."[3] The scope of these goals, which none of the foundations could accomplish alone, necessitated an efficient inter-institutional

[3] See "About PHEA" on www.foundation-partnership.org

collaboration. This would develop the ability to serve mutually beneficial goals and priorities.

Wood and Gray (1991) define collaboration as a process that "occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain" (p146). Collaboration implies sharing processes and mechanisms; it creates terrain for institutional interdependency, compelling partners to share authority and responsibility in order to fulfill their common mission. Although scholars such as Fleishman (2007) and Bacchetti (2006) argue that foundations are both wary and very selective about engaging in partnerships, foundations nonetheless seem to recognize the need to collaborate with others to surmount obstacles that they could not overcome alone.

Yet, there is a tension between sustainable results and expectation of impact and recognition which undergirds the dynamics of inter-organizational collaboration, particularly among larger foundations. In a famous essay on collaboration, Paul Brest, former president of the Hewlett Foundation, wrote that foundations can work together to generate better ideas, build broader constituencies and increase the amount of money available to achieve common goals. Reflecting on the motivations of funders he also underlines the dangers that lie in working with others:

> Some donors seem more interested in funding innovative programs with immediate visible impact than in achieving

> long-term, sustainable results. Some have low expectations of nonprofit organizations and treat an honorable mission as a substitute for impact. And doubtless some donors are motivated more by relationships and recognition than by achieving results. More fundamentally, personal philanthropy may sometimes be so profoundly emotional as to be invulnerable to rational analysis. (Hewlett Foundation, Annual Report 2006, p xv)

As Brest indicates, the relationship between expectation and recognition is not always harmonious, and often finds its disharmony at the human level. This is an important aspect of philanthropy, which the present study took into consideration.

Moreover, this study argues that in order to build a strong case for higher education in Africa the Partnership's foundations had to deploy collaboration to reinforce their status as convincing advocates. Thus, the Partnership's image was intricately tied to the foundations' reputation as credible players among international and human development actors. The results produced by the Partnership generated bonus points for foundations in return. Arguably, this virtuous circle was an important legitimation mechanism for the foundations' work and choices in Africa. It suggests interesting connections between collaborative action and organizational legitimacy.

By looking at institutional dynamics and organizational interdependencies among the seven foundations, this study investigated the factors influencing legitimation in the Partnership's collaboration. The Partnership's collaborative dynamics are examined here through the institutional lens introduced in Chapter 2. Using an institutional lens to examine the connections between collaboration

and organizational legitimacy, this research was able to question if and how these factors constrained inter-organizational collaboration among the Partnership's foundations. While this chapter mainly focuses on the institutional-level dynamics of the Partnership, the study's previous chapters hypothesized that multiple factors contributed to the legitimation process. Additionally, these factors can help better understand how private foundations operate.

Furthermore, through its institutional lens this inquiry determined whether the foundations' alignment and collaboration showed signs of institutional convergence. This in turn can help explain how organizational legitimacy operates. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) two types of isomorphism co-exist: competitive and institutional. These make "organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness." Given that a foundation partnership is in and of itself an institutional process that requires partners to unite around shared values and goals for their action, the Partnership's inter-organizational exchanges can be potentially informative about the relationship between isomorphism and collaborative legitimacy.

The neo-institutionalism school of thought indicates that it is not so much individual organizations that are legitimized, but rather organizational forms, structural elements, technical procedures and rules. What follows is a narrative arc from goal-making, to strategic collaboration, to legitimacy maximization, all

with an emphasis on two concepts: collaboration and legitimacy. While the Partnership's stated objective was to aid African universities, the foundations also paid close attention to collaborative legitimacy, and built an inter-organizational structure that suited their individual strategy. Arguably, rational choices shaped the Partnership and these indicate when the foundations manipulated the collaborative structure to generate and maximize legitimacy.

An analysis of these choices helped identify the various elements interfering with this collaboration. The study's sample was extremely large, and the following qualitative and quantitative measurements enabled the visualization of the Partnership's technical procedures and structural elements. The data included interviews with individuals directly involved in the Partnership and grants made during the collaboration. The results presented below might not generalize to other foundations or collaborations. They illustrate how a group of respectable foundations orchestrated processes of legitimation to substantiate individual and collaborative choices and to promote their international philanthropy. As a result, there were multiple relationships that informed the given foundations' engagement with the partnership: the relationship on the ground between the foundation and a given university, the rapport amongst the various foundations both on the ground and in the U.S.; and the relationship between the foundation and its dynamics of legitimation. As such this chapter gauges the types of relationships that determine collaboration. It traces the contours and identifies the various institutional factors that maximized

collaborative legitimacy in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa.

Organizational Boundaries and the Rationalization of Collaborative Action

In a partnership, foundations can bring intellectual and reputational capital as well as dollars to the table. Since foundations are essentially investors, the most regular form of collaboration is the aggregation of funds with other foundations, governmental institutions or grassroots organizations. Indeed, between 2000 and 2010 the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, which included seven foundations, provided $439.9 million in funding to higher education institutions in nine African countries. Figure 2 illustrates how each foundation contributed to this total.

Figure 2: Total Contribution and Proportion of Grants made by each Foundation



Grants Total= $439,939,624



Between 2000 and 2010, Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller and MacArthur invested an aggregate of $348.4 million as partners in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. Between 1990 and 1999, the same foundations invested a total of $103.7 million to African universities and research centers. Thus, by working collaboratively the foundations assembled a significant amount of funds - more than what any U.S. foundation or group of foundations had ever assembled for higher education in Africa.

The processes of collaborative engagement and fund aggregation are closely related to those of legitimation. Through the Partnership, the foundations became an influential player in the field of African higher education. They not only increased their respective funding to African institutions, they also formed a unified group of grant-makers whose collective power could change an entire field. By doing so, they drew attention as legitimate higher education developers. They carried this legitimation power to their beneficiaries. By promoting their collaborative engagement publicly and receiving media attention the foundations highlighted a field worthy of investment. Recipients of their grants gained in prestige and capitalized on this recognition to then attract more funds. Thus, understanding the Partnership's mechanisms and the financial engagement of its funders helps map the rationalization processes and strategic delineation of boundaries put in place by impact-seeking philanthropic institutions to leverage legitimacy.

There are many types of partnerships and possibilities for collaborative engagement, spanning from a mere exchange of ideas and co-learning to more hybrid and organized structures such as strategic alignments, targeted collaborative funding, or the creation of a separate pooled fund. In figure 3, the spectrum of collaborative engagement illustrates the continuum of partnership models.

Figure 3: The Spectrum of Engagement (The Philanthropy Initiative, 2009)

The Partnership offered an interesting case of formal strategic alignment. The alignment allowed greater flexibility and control for the foundations while ensuring their full commitment. The Partnership was not a separate entity with its own charter, identity, pooled fund and grant-making programs. Initially it was an informal relationship that grew out of discussions between the presidents of the four founding foundations and several senior staff. The Partnership eventually

became a more elaborate structure which sought to go beyond the mere exchange of information and collaborative learning. It was formalized by an official agreement signed by the four foundation presidents. The following quote was excerpted from an interview with Raoul Davion, Program Officer at The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Raoul Davion joined MacArthur in 2001, co-chaired the Foundation's initiative in higher education in Africa and represented MacArthur in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. He also served on the steering committee of the Africa Grantmakers Affinity Group.

> The design and structure [of the PHEA] was a semi-formal collaboration amongst the four foundations where the initiative really grew out of discussions among the foundation presidents, the presidents of the four founding foundations and staff was then asked to operationalize this idea of working together in support of higher education. It grew out of shared recognition of commitment and interest in the field of higher education among the foundations. And, in that sense, it was launched before it was designed, in terms of how it actually operates. (July 12, 2011 phone interview with Raoul Davion, Chicago)

As the quote illustrates, the Partnership's announcement preceded the Partnership's planning and design. Also, a strategic alignment model was preferred over other possible forms of collaboration.

Aligning strategies and retaining separate grant-making mechanisms thus seemed to offer fewer constraints than creating a pooled fund. The following quote offers an explanation as to why a separate entity could not have been created. It was excerpted from an interview with Joyce Moock, former Associate Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation, who served as lead program officer

for the Partnership and as special advisor to the president on higher education and human capacity building. During her tenure at the Foundation, Dr. Moock also served as assistant director for social sciences, associate director for agricultural sciences, and acting director for global environment. As an anthropologist, Dr. Moock served on the Board of Governors at the Rockefeller Archive Center, the Board of Directors for the African Economic Research Council, and the Steering Committee for the Association for the Development of Education in Africa, among others:

> Now there have been partnerships on housing, transport, health issues, in which you simply go in and create a new entity, and everybody gives money to that entity, the entity has a secretariat, and it has whatever its own configuration is, and it forms a single funding pot. This couldn't happen in this field, it was too close to the bone, and no foundation wanted to give up its interpersonal relationship with universities it has been working with for years and years, and have something bump up in between. (June 24, 2011 phone interview with Joyce Moock, New York).

A separate entity was seen as detrimental to the privileged relationship between foundations and grantees. Arguably, the consequence of creating a separate fund would have forced foundations to relinquish control and power, reduced their individual visibility and disrupted their other initiatives in Africa.

Introduced as an informal collaboration, the Partnership was actually formalized as a strategic alignment operation. This soon required even further formalization and organizational rationalization, as the administrative burden of seven of the largest foundations in the United States working together grew. The

strategic alignment initiated by the four founding partners - Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford and MacArthur in 2000 - was later reinforced by Mellon and Hewlett who joined in 2005, and by Kresge in 2007. The partners also decided on a set of countries that would become Partnership countries in which at least one foundation had previously worked. With no other clear goals decided at the time of the launch, the mission of making the partnership function was thus left in the hands of program directors and officers in each foundation. Andrea Johnson, a program officer in the Carnegie Corporation of New York's Higher Education and Libraries in Africa team, worked closely with colleagues at other participating foundations to develop and implement strategies for the Partnership while improving its efficiency. In her own words the Partnership was envisioned as an informal structure and a platform for information exchange among grant-makers:

> The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa started out with no structure, essentially it was just people from each of the foundations and there were negotiations that had to go on inside of each foundation to figure stuff out. Ford was particularly dramatic in how they had to negotiate in house because Ford was decentralized in a major way and they had the four Africa field offices, the headquarters and the relationship and all of that. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Andrea Johnson, program officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

In this quote, Andrea Johnson highlights the lack of initial structure in the Partnership. She points to the institutional differences that separated each foundation and made negotiations even more complex:

> When we were negotiating the partnership statement, the document that sort of formed the organizational core of the partnership, I remember being at that meeting. It might have been early 2000 when that happened, before the 2000 launch in April. I remember being in that meeting and every single word of that statement was examined. The four foundations all had high ranking people their Vice Presidents and what not, and then Pat Rosenfield was there for Carnegie and I was there. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Andrea Johnson, program officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

In this passage, she mentions several documents that were closely scrutinized from all individuals involved with the Partnership, underlining the fact that very complex negotiations were needed for agreement on the terms of the Partnership.

Indeed, unclear decision-making and communication processes burdened the program officers and generated collaborative inefficiency. Narciso Matos, who was instrumental in the construction of the Partnership, and served as Vice-Chancellor of Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, Secretary-General of the Association of African Universities, and Program Director at Carnegie confirmed this point in a phone interview from Maputo:

> Sometimes very simple decisions, because it had to be consultative, were so cumbersome and they took so many emails and comments, over comments, until we reached an agreement. It was complicated. It was not from the very beginning, for example, that we had a full time coordinator. I think that came later on where we started an office for coordination and that helped us to streamline decisions. So, I think internally, it was messy. Effective but messy. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos,

> former program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

These unproductive processes were explained by a lack of clarity in the Partnership's original agreement. John Butler-Adam, Ford's Program Officer for Higher Education in the Office for Southern Africa between 2005 and 2012, suggested in a phone interview from Johannesburg:

> If there was a disadvantage it was probably the fact that right from the beginning there had not been clear agreement as to what the objectives of the partnership should be and what areas should work and what their program design would be. So there was a disadvantage from what arose from that initial lack of foresight and planning in that we did spend more time reaching decisions than I think was necessary. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with John Butler-Adam, program officer, Ford Foundation's Office for Southern Africa)

The vagueness of the Partnership's objectives is underscored in "Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative", the Partnership's final report:

> In 2010, at the formal close of the Partnership, original and former participants in the Partnership reflected on their experience of working in such a large and long-running collaborative. They noted the following key challenges: Ten of the 30 people interviewed for this case study said that the lack of clear goals and measureable outcomes from the start was one of the most challenging aspects of participating in the Partnership. Several participants said that while they understand that presidential initiatives by their nature typically have broad objectives, the Partnership could have benefitted from more clarity and specificity in trying to determine what the collaborative was meant to accomplish (p 30)

This passage indicates that unclear goals and a lack of measurable outcomes

affected the Partnership's efficiency and threatened its legitimacy. This inefficiency materialized as a result of indecision, slow decision-making processes, and negotiations which were hindered by the foundations' respective internal politics:

> It took forever to make decisions and negotiating when some, many if not most, of the partners would not be completely up front about what was behind their own decisions. Not wanting to air their foundations internal politics in the discussion. So we would run into bottlenecks or outright walls without understanding why the wall was there or what was causing the bottleneck. We only knew that so and so was not agreeing to something, that everyone else was, or was hesitant or was throwing things back into the conversation that we thought had already been dealt with. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Andrea Johnson, program officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

This quote suggests that the Partnership's actors were not at liberty to have an open discussion with their peers; they carried their respective foundation's internal politics to the Partnership's table. These institutional constraints stalled the Partnership's decision-making processes and overall performance. This situation went against the foundations' expectations for efficiency and accountability, which are sources of legitimacy.

The tension between collaborative legitimacy and the Partnership's efficiency translated into rationalizing an increasingly complex collaborative mechanism. The quest for efficiency resulted in the organization of a strategic alignment presented below (Figure 4), which was designed as a result of constant rationalization. The objective of this strategic alignment was to ensure greater

coordination, better decision-making, and a separation of individual and collective boundaries. Possibly, this structure was meant to generate more collaborative legitimacy by allowing the foundations to perform their individual grant-making and justify the involvement of numerous staff in the Partnership. Figure 4 depicts the strategic alignment in its final stage circa 2008.

Figure 4: The Partnership's Strategic Alignment Model



During a decade, the Partnership's foundations interacted with 296 grantees, which included universities, research centers, and academic networks, among many others. The dynamics involved were rich with multiple trans-organizational exchanges between foundations, between The Partnership's secretariat and its committees, between foundations and their grantees, and between the Partnership and the grantees. Rationalizing the Partnership's efficiency also meant clarifying and controlling the flow of information. The strategic alignment generated multi-level communication channels orchestrated efficiently by the secretariat. In the Partnership's previous forms, the flow of information between foundations was originally an issue for overcommitted foundation staff.

Furthermore, this rationalized alignment maintained hierarchical orders, as Figure 4 indicates. The Partnership was organized in sub-strata with presidential meetings, executive and advisory committees, working groups, and a secretariat. The foundations functioned both individually and collectively. More importantly, the grantees were separate from the Partnership and the foundations maintained a direct link with them. This added to the complexity of the structure and to confusion among grantees, as the following excerpt confirms:

> The vice chancellors also raised a number of issues, including the nature of the Partnership and where it resides. There is the Partnership, an initiative of the four foundations, and there are activities carried out by the foundations for which there are partners, including the African universities being funded by these foundations. Further complicating matters, the Partnership is directed by staff of the four foundations, but there is a facilitator and an office. (April 11, 2003, Notes. PHEA archives)

In this passage the confusion among Vice-Chancellors about the nature of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa is connected to questions regarding the place of African universities in the Partnership. For some, the Partnership's model was the best status quo that the foundations could reach. It fit multiple target environments, as the following quote from Njabulo Ndebele, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town confirms:

> The foundations, although they have pooled this money into the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, they still operate very much as individual foundations. I used to think that that was a problem, but looking back, I think that it was important for them to remain to follow their funding objectives. Now I know that what is lacking, what is missing, is not that the foundations chose to work differently within the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa framework, but where they sought to make an intervention, there wasn't a flexible policy environment for the foundations to plug in from the perspective of their own difference, but within the framework of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa to achieve certain objectives. (Interview with Njabulo Ndebele, vice-chancellor, University of Cape Town, South Africa. PHEA archives)

In this quote, separating individual and collective objectives was seen as a good choice for the foundations, considering the unwelcoming policy environment of South Africa.

Arguably, the Partnership's alignment model was the product of individual idiosyncrasies among philanthropic foundations which preferred to maintain a significant degree of independence by diminishing the collaboration's isomorphic processes. Nigerian sociologist Tade Akin Aina, Program Director at Carnegie

Corporation of New York and a former advisory to various international organizations, offered the following interpretation:

> What the foundations did, you can call it confederation because it is not like partners in a legal practice, or a medical practice or a firm of architecture. Because there is a whole legal definition of partnerships, it exists as a norm. Partners can be dissolved, there is a right of veto, there is all of it. So, a confederation - and it was better than what I would have called a trust fund. A trust fund would have created a completely independent foundation or fund from the seven foundations. Because it will develop its own bureaucracy, it will have its own governing structure, maybe its board of directors or will haggle at that level, it will have its own manager but then that really strains. (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

This quote is indicative of the Partnership's un-isomorphic equilibrium. It functioned as a confederation, one in which the foundations had equal rights and veto, a guaranteed seat, and no obligation to pool funds. The partnership was neither a legally-binding arrangement that could dismiss partners through a vote, nor was it a separate entity with an independent governing structure. Each foundation retained power and independence. Individualistic interests were served while benefitting from the cumulative value of the Partnership.

Collaborative Engagement and Individualistic Interests

Through the delineation of boundaries described in the previous section, this confederation-like structure resulted in a greater proportion of individual grants than joint grants during the 10-year collaboration. There were two funding vehicles for Partnership grants: joint Partnership initiatives and individual foundation grant-making. However, joint initiatives amounted to 15% of the overall partnership's grant total. The majority of grants were made by each individual foundation outside of the partnership.



Figure 5: Grant value per year (millions of dollars)

Figure 5 plots the value of grants (both joint and individual) over the ten year duration of the partnership. Each point represents the value of a single grant, adjusted for inflation and plotted on a logarithmic scale. The apparent upward trend in grant value is statistically insignificant because of the low coefficient of correlation ($R^2 = 0.0266$), meaning that even after ten years, collaboration did not significantly increase the size of Partnership grants. In other words, there is no significant correlation between grant value and the length of the collaboration, and so the Partnership did not stimulate foundations to increase the size of individual grants. Instead, the PHEA was able to expand its resources by adding new foundations to the confederation. Figure 7 shows that the total disbursement of PHEA grants was much greater after 2005, when Mellon, Hewlett, and Kresge joined the founding members. Indeed, the average yearly disbursement from 2000 to 2004 was just over 30 million dollars; from 2005 onward, this value nearly doubled. This is a significant level of resource expansion.

Figure 5b: Resource Expansion by Founding and Added members



Figure 5b illustrates the change that took place between these two phases (2000 to 2004 and 2005 to 2009). The total grand disbursement increased by over $135 million in the second phase. The resource expansion of the second phase can be explained by two factors: additional resources contributed by the founding members (the combined contributions of Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, and MacArthur increased by more than $45 million during this second phase), as well as new resources contributed by the added members (from 2005 to 2009, Mellon, Hewlett, and Kresge contributed over $90 million). Thus, two thirds of the Partnership's second phase resource expansion was due to the addition of new members.

Figure 6 plots total yearly grant disbursement for both the founders (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, and MacArthur) and the Partnership as a whole. The dataset isolating the founding members does not display a statistically significant correlation between years of collaboration and total grant disbursement (R^2 = 0.282). The holistic PHEA dataset, on the other hand, supports evidence of a slight but significant linear relationship between these two variables (R^2 = 0.282). This means that the observed expansion of resources can only be satisfactorily explained by the inclusion of additional members in the Partnership from 2005 onwards.

Figure 6: Total Grant Disbursement per year (millions of dollars)



In Figure 6, it is clear that most of the resource expansion per year occurred through the addition of other foundations (67%). Thus, the Partnership's collective mechanism had a positive impact on making founding partners invest

more funds per year, particularly when new members were added to the Partnership.



Figure 7: Grant Disbursement by Foundation

Figure 7 illustrates how this mechanism affected the disbursement of grants between 2000 and 2010. It confirms how resource expansion was achieved. The founding foundations appear to have increased their involvement when other foundations joined (around 2005 for Mellon and Hewlett and 2007 for Kresge). Admitting new members did stimulate the expansion of resources or the amount of available funding. But an unclear tallying of Partnership and foundation grants made the distinction between joint funding and individual funding difficult.

Figure 8 illustrates the amount foundations contributed on average per year after the 2005 turnaround. The total funding per year increased from $30 million to $57 million, nearly a 90% increase. Of that $27 million increase, $9 million (33%) came from the founders and $18 million (66%) came from the additional foundations. Thus, 67% of resource expansion came from adding foundations and 33% came from the leveraging of funds. Carnegie, on average, contributed $5.4 million per year more in 2005-2009 than in 2000-2004, an increase of nearly 55%.



Figure 8: Total disbursement per year (millions of

Rockefeller, on average, contributed $0.4 million less, a decrease of around 4%. Ford, on average, contributed $0.7 million less, a decrease of around 7%. Macarthur, on average, contributed $4.7 million more, an increase of 138%. Thus, Carnegie and Macarthur were incentivized to give more when new partners were added, whereas Ford and Rockefeller were not.

Figure 9 presents the proportion of joint vs. individual grants for each foundation. All data is drawn from the original grant dataset.



Figure 9: Distribution of Joint and Individual Grants by Foundation

It is interesting to note that very few joint grants were made by Mellon, and very many joint grants by Kresge. Kresge's participation to joint activity might be explained by the fact that they joined the Partnership last, in 2007. Whereas Mellon, with a leaner bureaucracy, was probably less interested in joint-funding as the process may have required too many administrative processes. Mellon also concentrated its work with a narrow focus on South Africa as the following quote confirms:

> Mellon's work in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa is driven by a narrow focus. It is not a big part of the foundation's effort and it is unlikely to grow. The success of South Africa is crucial to the success of the continent. ... The Next Generation of Academics is exactly what we are about... but it is important that we have a light weigh structure. It requires communication and coordination but not a major institutional creation (June 26, 2008 minutes).

The quote illuminates the burden of the Partnership's bureaucratic structure. This also explains the Partnership's limited joint funding over time, as the following graph introduces.



Figure 10: Evolution of Individual and Joint Grants (2000-2010)

Figure 10 indicates that over time the number of joint grants did not significantly increase - in fact, the proportion of joint grants seems to stay constant. The 2004 evaluation highlighted this paradox and even questioned the validity of labeling certain joint grants as "joint":

> These joint grants are actually individual grants as far as the grantees are concerned. The dividing line between joint and individual grants is not always clear – either to us or to the Partnership. There is evidence of considerable discussion between the foundations and the Facilitator about whether certain grants are to be categorized as joint or individual. (Moja T., Reddy J., White A. Evaluation of the Partnership for Higher Education, November 2004. p 15. PHEA archives).

Several interviewees commented upon this paradox between individual and joint grant-making. For some, whether joint funding was achieved or not was irrelevant:

> I think there's much too much made out of this notion of 'what was communal and what was an individual foundation.' That's just money. It's just the way the money was handled. What was important was that the principles of what we're doing were shared. (June 24, 2011 phone interview with Joyce Moock, Former Associate Vice-President, The Rockefeller Foundation)

This quote minimizes the significance of joint funding and evokes the sharing of principles as a more important value. This was confirmed in some of the Partnership's activities such as supporting advocacy networks that furthered the cause of African higher education in Africa, as the following quote illustrates:

> The Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa has required something of the order of two to two and a half million dollars. Ford would never have been able to put that amount of money in. That's more than my entire annual budget. So, we would never have reached the eight African countries in which the research and advocacy is being carried out without that being a partnership project. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with John Butler-Adam, Program Officer at the Ford Foundation)

This quote underlines the paradox between foundations engaged in a partnership to pursue ambitious goals by leveraging other funds, while maintaining joint funding practices to a minimum. It also insinuates that more joint funding could have been possible and even beneficial. This particular aspect is echoed by the grantees, as the following quote from Loyiso Nongxa, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand indicates:

> The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa could look at the individual projects that were funded by the foundations and see whether you could bring them together and find some synergies. (June 2010 interview with Male Vice-Chancellor, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa).

In this quote a South African vice-chancellor encourages the foundations to find synergies. This lack of synergy was acknowledged by program officers:

> With the knowledge of a ten year time horizon I think we could have done longer term planning. I think that one specific gap that the partnership was a victim of… was not putting more money into the Association of African Universities earlier on. We did some funding with the Association of African Universities, but we could have done more and really tried to build it up as a regional focal point for higher education issues. (July 12, 2011 phone interview with Raoul Davion, Program Officer, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago)

This quote suggests that, in retrospect, investing collaboratively – perhaps through a pooled fund - in an African organization such as the Association of African Universities would have had a greater impact on the field of African higher education. This would have involved relinquishing power and ownership to the AAU and its members, and reinforcing the role of the Association as a re-grantor in Africa.

Instead, the foundations maintained this line of grant-making throughout their time as Partnership members. The mid-term review found that the partner foundations did not realize the full potential of working together, as the following quote confirms:

> While the Partnership exhibits... a good understanding of the issues and challenges confronting higher education, its activities tend to rest on unrealistic assumptions about what is needed to bring about sustainable institutional change... The pattern of grant-making reflects much less strongly the intention of leveraging change by working in partnership... jointly programmed grants have made up only a small proportion of the total value of the Partnership's investments through 2006. In this aspect of partnership funding, there has been no steadily rising trend over the past seven years. (April 23-25, 2008, Notes from Catherine Gwin, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist. PHEA Archives)

This quote suggests that stronger results could have been achieved if the partner foundations increased joint partnership activities. Indeed, the benefits of collaborative grant-making were not always clear. Stuart J. Saunders, Mellon's Senior Advisor for the South Africa program, and emeritus vice-chancellor of the University of Cape Town, offered the following comment:

> I think the advantages were to get a better understanding of what the other foundations were doing and what their approach was. Each foundation has a different way of doing its business and it did not affect our grant giving. We were giving grants in South Africa in the same way we would have done if there hadn't been a partnership. So, it did not influence our grant giving. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with Stuart J. Saunders, senior advisor for South Africa, The Mellon Foundation)

The Partnership did not impact Mellon's activities in South Africa. Grants from the Mellon Foundation, a member of the Partnership since 2005, supported capacity in South Africa's higher education by providing opportunities for disadvantaged individuals and higher education institutions. The boundary

between joint funding and the foundations' respective initiatives was unclear, as the following comment illustrates:

> Like all the gender funding was really Carnegie so that wasn't really a partnership, it would have happened without the partnership. So it's hard to make the distinction between one foundation and what the partnership did. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Claudia Frittelli, program officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

The Partnership's gender funding was a Carnegie lead initiative and would have happened even if the Partnership had not existed.

By working together the foundations expanded their monetary power to impact the field of higher education in Africa. Yet, they achieved this expansion by mostly making separate, individual investments which were counted as Partnership investments, not by making joint funding around shared activities. For this reason, the line between joint and individual grants was blurry. A 2006 evaluation pointed to this issue, acknowledging that there was "evidence of considerable discussion between the foundations and the Facilitator about whether certain grants are to be categorized as joint or individual" (p. 15). In this vein, communicating about joint and individual achievements was even more complex, as the final Partnership accomplishments report demonstrates. Although the report captures key collective accomplishments in the first 10 pages, the remaining 80 pages provide a per foundation description of each partner's contributions. Communicating individual results thus served the goal of preserving the foundations' legitimacy in the face of a collaboration that did not yield significant joint results.

The foundations rationalized a form of collective action which allowed them to manage legitimacy and maintain a mutually beneficial Partnership despite their inability to achieve joint funding. This rationalization also emerged from a tension between the individuality of foundations and their desire to reap the advantages of collaboration. It tested their capacity to maneuver around the Partnership's requirements while serving their own priorities. This statement is illustrated by the following quote excerpted from a presentation made by Dr. Sue Lewis, the Partnership's Coordinator. A Harvard faculty member for nine years, she co-developed and directed the International Education Policy Program. Her role as the Partnership's Coordinator was uniformly praised in interviews and archived documents:

> Differing objectives among foundations can be smoothed over but never resolved. This can be a healthy tension in a collaborative, where different foundations bring different perspectives. However, if the partnership goals are not perceived as immediately relevant to a particular foundation's objectives, it makes it difficult to sustain organizational commitment to collaborate. (Suzanne Grant Lewis, Presentation Notes, November 2009, PHEA archives).

This quote confirms that the Partnership's main obstacle was the enduring clash between the foundations' objectives and priorities. The value-added of working collaboratively was questioned. Partnership participants unanimously acknowledged the immediate advantages of the partnership, such as sharing information and goals, aligning strategies and expanding the breadth of one's grant programs. But rationalizing the Partnership's strategic alignment served

other purposes. It provided a mechanism that sustained the credibility of the collaboration and managed the foundations' legitimacy, particularly when organizational inefficiency threatened the Partnership's equilibrium.

In a seminal article Meyer and Rowan (1977) state that "attempts to control and coordinate activities in institutionalized organizations lead to conflicts and loss of legitimacy, elements of structure are decoupled from activities and from each other." This statement resonates well with the alignment model chosen by the Partnership's foundations, one which triggered a decoupling of strategies to preserve organizational efficiency. On one hand, it constructed more bureaucratic and centralized coordination processes, by which all foundations tried to conform, while maintaining separate strategies. For Greenwood et al. (2008) decoupling "enables organizations to seek the legitimacy that adaptation to rationalized myths provides while they engage in technical 'business as usual'."

In the case of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, integration was avoided and joint programs were minimal; individual activities were assimilated and communicated as partnership activities. Arguably, decoupling did not function as an operational obstacle. It was a logical adjustment, a strategic response to organizational and environmental rigidity, and a way to manage legitimacy. It echoes Meyer and Rowan's proposition that decoupling is a pragmatic response to the conflicting pressures of legitimacy and technical efficiency. Yet, decoupling had a bearing on the partnership's efficiency, particularly in terms of coordinating participants, delegating power and clarifying

decision-making processes. The following quote by Raoul Davion, program officer at the MacArthur Foundation illustrates this point:

> Another challenge that I would point to is the difficulties of serving both the collaboration and… an institution. Ultimately, each person is a representative of an institution. I think the staff greatly enjoyed the opportunity to collaborate and learn from colleagues, but it didn't change the reporting relationships and requirements that we each had internally. And, so, balancing the desire to take the ideas and move forward on a collaborative basis with the constraints imposed through the institutional structures that we each came from, that constant tension was a challenge that I'm not sure ever worked within the partnership. (July 12, 2011 Interview with, Chicago)

In this excerpt, the program officers express that serving both the Partnership and one's foundation was a challenge.

Each foundation president delegated one or several representatives, sometimes with varying decisional power and a reporting system that would ensure continuous commitment. Consequently, the meetings were staffed with unequal decision-makers which, in turn, hampered the speed of the collaborative process. The following comment by educational researcher and policy analyst Janice Petrovich, who served for more than eleven years as director of the Ford Foundation's global work in education, and who now works as coordinator for the International Education Funders Group, confirms the complexity of this situation:

> The difficult role that the people who sat around the table had is that they were able to discuss ideas but often were not able to come to a decision at the table because they needed to go back to their foundations and check. And that was because they were representing the presidents and they

> needed to make sure the president was okay with everything that was happening. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director at the Ford Founda1tion)

The unequal delegation of power described above was played heavily as a factor on the Partnership's fluidity. It slowed down the decision-making central to the collaboration and motivation of its participants.

The addition of a secretariat to facilitate operations reinforced this tension between collective efficiency and strategic individuality. However, coordinating the Partnership via a secretariat nonetheless became the favored model for all members. Reasons for this choice vary from one foundation to the next. Some claim that lengthy approval processes and the foundations' distinct missions were contrary to the establishment of an independent structure. However, the collaboration's decoupling dynamic was reinforced through the notion that foundations were reluctant to give ground on certain aspects of their philanthropy, such as long-established relationships with their grantees. The following quote from Stuart Saunders illustrates this tension:

> None of [the foundations] knew what the others were doing outside of the cooperative [initiatives] of the partnership. And, you know, there weren't a lot of cooperative things. I think we could have achieved a lot more if we had a policy where we shared all the information, everything we were doing in Africa, and discussed that. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with Stuart Saunders, advisor to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)

This passage indicates that there was a tendency to remain secretive about one's activities even among partnering funders.

Arguably, this negative dynamic tested the foundations' compatibility in cultures and values. It also hampered various decision-making mechanisms as the following excerpt shows:

> It is important to develop more clarity regarding the objectives and more importantly how decision making processes unfold. I say this because we tend to have proposals put forth and depending on its content as well as outside circumstances and internal schedules of executive committee members there is not always full representation among the Partnership. I think this is certainly an issue related to the 'labor intensive' nature of the partnership. (Claudia Frittelli, Executive Committee Meeting Evaluation, PHEA archives).

Claudia Frittelli is an officer in the African Higher Education program at Carnegie Corporation of New York who oversees institutional strengthening support at public universities in Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa and Ghana. Her remarks identified a tension between obscure objectives and complicated decision-making processes. They also highlight issues of full participation of members, which appeared to be a consequence of burden-some collaborative and bureaucratic processes which might have discouraged several program officers.

This bureaucratic burden was commented upon by several program officers. The following comment by John Butler-Adam, program officer for the Ford Foundation office in South Africa illustrates the situation:

> During 2005, there were regular meetings at two times, three times a year I went to New York for meetings, and those meetings were pretty well organized. But, in between, the communication was by email. It wasn't chaotic; it was just overwhelming because everybody copied everybody on everything. Suzanne Grant Lewis got it really well organized so that emails tended to go to people who really needed to know the information or whose response was really required. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with John Butler-Adam, program officer, Ford Foundation's Office for Southern Africa)

The issue with communications was a challenge from the very beginning, as demonstrated by the following extract from a report on information and communications strategies for the Partnership:

> From discussions at all the Partnership's foundations in the U.S. and field offices in Nairobi, it is clear that there is a pressing need for better management of intra-partner communications and information exchange... Some of the problems repeatedly cited were: Wastage of time as everyone either archives (or doesn't archive) key partnership e-mails and documents… Lack of full consultation on important substantive matters… Insufficient information exchange among the Partners about grants in progress (August 2001 Report by Dr. Nancy Hafkin, PHEA archives).

This quote describes the chaotic beginnings of a partnership lacking coordination and clear communication protocols.

Furthermore, the efforts to achieve collaborative rationality increased homogeneity between foundations, despite the foundations' respective institutional constraints. Isomorphism in the Partnership occurred, despite various constraining factors. The foundations were collectively inclined towards internal,

procedural processes, an inclination which reflected a significant homogeneity among them. Testing whether the prevalence of neo-institutional characteristics was equally strong for each of the seven foundations, the following graph illustrates the Partnership's homogeneity.

Figure 11: Proportion of Code Application per Sub-Measure by Foundation



Figure 11 shows evidence of homogeneity among all partners, although there is a slight but nonetheless interesting distinction between the four founding foundations and the new members. This confirms that neo-institutional measures dominated across the foundations, and that these measures were distributed equally among founding members and new partners. The data also confirms the predominance of certain characteristics: Affinity and Collaboration, Processes & Bureaucracy, and Culture & Values. This homogeneity can be seen as the result

of the foundations' strategic alignment. Yet, in contrast with previous graphs which highlighted a discrepancy between joint and individual funding, this graph illustrates a tension between the Partnership's homogeneity and the foundations' heterogeneous tendency to preserve their individual strategy and grant-making. This tendency was commented upon by various Partnership actors and evaluators. The following passage exemplifies this tension. It is excerpted from an interview with Neil Grabois, former Vice-President of Carnegie Corporation of New York. A mathematician, Dr. Grabois is also the former president of Colgate University, and currently serves as Dean of the Milano School of International Affairs, Management, and Urban Policy at The New School:

> There's a natural tension in the foundations in part because they do very different things. Also because each one, even though it is never said, wants to be proud of a certain kind of accomplishment. And sometimes that pride can be swallowed in the sense that you can accomplish more if you do something together and then all take credit for it, but other times there are individual programs and you want to be able to say 'we were responsible for Sesame Street.' (August 19, 2011 Interview with Neil Grabois, New York)

This quote highlights an important motivation for foundations, namely the amount of credit they could receive for their initiatives. It also implies that the foundations had issues with sharing credit for initiatives that they owned and sought to maximize though the Partnership. Hence, ownership, pride, credit sharing, and maximization negatively impacted the equilibrium and homogeneity of the Partnership.

Indeed, the limits of the Partnership lay in the individual culture of each participating foundation, particularly the foundations that were not part of the founding structure. They resisted the intrinsic homogeneity that the core group had succeeded to establish and limited their commitment in response. The following correspondence reflects this situation:

> Trying to repeatedly revise a proposal in order to get every foundation on board has resulted in weakened proposals that few wanted to support... We are committed to collaborations across 2, 3 or 4 foundations, rather than trying to get 6 (and now 7) foundations on board... There is resentment towards some foundations, either because of the limited programming scope (Mellon, MacArthur) or lack of staff commitment (Mellon, Hewlett). (Suzanne Grant Lewis, email to John Butler-Adams, 4/5/07. PHEA archives).

It pushed Hewlett to become a silent partner, which created unrest. Hewlett no longer attended executive committee meetings and gave away their decision-making power while staying true to their commitment, which was a financial commitment to the secretariat and to several joint initiatives. Each foundation followed its own agenda, which hampered coherence and efficiency. In the words of David Court, a member of Kenya's Commission of Higher Education, formerly a teacher and researcher in the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, and a long-time East African representative of the Rockefeller Foundation, the issue of reaching coherence in the Partnership had a bearing on the overall structure of the collaboration:

> The extent to which the individual partners were pursuing their own agendas, getting coherence proved to be a very tricky exercise; it wasn't simple and obvious in its occurrence as it might have been. Partly, because of their historical focuses which differed and partly because you've got individual careers on the part of the individuals involved, and even the countries in which they think the organizations should work in. So, that became trickiness, and reaching coherence in those issues turned out to be much more difficult than was expected. (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer at The Rockefeller Foundation)

In this passage, the lack of coherence is described as founded in the foundations' respective history, focus and agenda. This lack of coherence was also related to the addition of new members which ultimately complicated the collaboration.

> I don't think, frankly, I would have expanded the partnership beyond the first four foundations. Looking back I think that added complications, except maybe Kresge. Kresge we talked about earlier because of what they did at that time. They were doing a lot of buildings, which of course none of the rest of us did and all of the universities wanted. But Kresge had a higher education, they weren't really Africa except for because Bill Moses was interested but until their president changed that wasn't possible. Hewlett never should have been at the table. They didn't do higher education. That was a miscalculation I think and Mellon didn't really bring anything. Mellon doesn't collaborate and so there were all kinds of forces at work on that one. (August 10, 2011 Interview with Andrea Johnson, Program Officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York, USA)

The above passage suggests that the addition of new members in later stages of the Partnership did not necessarily add value. It perhaps even created tensions that ultimately wore out the collaborative good-will of founding members.

The missions, preferences and styles of the partner foundations differed widely. In appreciation of these facts, the evaluations took pains to recommend strengthening of desirable properties such as transparency, ease of management, communications, and junctures with the decision making of individual foundations. The difficulties encountered in the evaluations also echoed what Meyer and Rowan (1977) stated with regards to institutionalized organizations; namely that they seek to minimize inspection and evaluation by both internal managers and external constituents. Yet, despite its imperfections, the confederation was solidly grounded on the proximity of values and norms shared among the partner foundations, and it enhanced the exchange of knowledge and information among the partners. It maximized the foundations' initiatives and expanded their financial power, giving them an opportunity to impact the field of African higher education in unprecedented ways. The following section examines the foundations' points of convergence, affinities, shared values, interests, and historical connections. These points of convergence are important to explain inter-organizational dynamics that animated these foundations' collaboration.

Convergence and the Probability of Collaboration

Foundations are non-material entities shaped by values, norms, habits and ideas embedded in their institutional context. These are then internalized by their personnel who behave, bounded by their cultural environment, so as to conform to existing rules or values. The foundations' cultures were sometimes portrayed as rigid orders:

> I think first and foremost the biggest problems we have is that foundations come with their cultures...and these traditional cultures can be as rigid as any bureaucracy. In fact, can almost be beyond, in terms of the rigidities, almost like a culture, it's almost like different princely orders. (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

This view is echoed by Kole Shettima's following comment - Kole Shettima is Director of the MacArthur Foundation in Nigeria. A Political Scientist by training, he studied at the University of Maiduguri, Ahmadu Bello University and the University of Toronto. Prior to joining the MacArthur Foundation in 1999, he taught at Ohio University, University of Toronto and the University of Maiduguri.

> So, I think that we learned some things that we didn't know before, working with other organizations in terms of even their own process of grant-making, their own processes of decision-making, I think we learned a lot about that. I think we appreciated that motivations are different; the way people do some things are different from others. So, it's not a question of which one is better, but it's a question of, yes we are all different and therefore we need to appreciate and understand our differences. And, I think that we are much different also in terms of the image and the perception of the foundations on the Continent. (June 22, 2011 phone

> interview with Kole Shettima, program director, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Nigeria office)

These values and processes played an important part in defining the Partnership's mission. It also preserved a spirit of collaboration, even if that fluctuated among certain partners during different stages of the collaboration. This can be explained by the fact that foundations are collections of interrelated rules and routines to which actors respond appropriately. These rules can be traced back to the origins, historical path and institutional structure of each foundation. This can also be explained by the managerial philosophy of the time. During the Partnership's existence Ford, Hewlett, Mellon and Kresge, had a decentralized structure, with the presidents giving their staff general instructions and autonomy. MacArthur, Carnegie and, to some extent, Rockefeller had a more firmly organized culture in which the presidents were watchful of the decision-making processes.

Furthermore, as endowed, independent foundations governed by trustees - their respective founder being no longer alive - the Partnership's foundations shared the commonality of being defined by a charter. They all had a constitution and by-laws, these often dictate each foundation's mission in broad terms, and in accordance with the founder's wishes. Phillip Griffiths, Senior Advisor to The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, a Carnegie Fellow, and a Professor of Mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Study, where he served as Director from 1991-2003 confirms this statement:

> Any sort of joint funding is going to be very complicated because you have to have joint approvals by the board of several foundations and from a practical point of view that's just going to be very time consuming and very complicated. It's not really practical. That's the reason that the foundations could not just put aside a certain amount of money that goes into a common pooled fund and fund joint projects out of that. It's inconsistent with the charter of foundations. (July 20, 2011 phone interview with Phillip Griffiths, senior advisor to The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation).

These legal documents dictate geographic and thematic restrictions when needed – for instance, Carnegie's charter limits its international grant-making to Commonwealth countries. Each foundation's constitution is enforced by a board of trustees that appoints the foundation's president and approves strategic orientations. Dealing with the Board added complexity to the Partnership, as the following quote illustrates, citing the Rockefeller Foundation's president:

> Judith Rodin explained the Rockefeller's whole approach, including within the Partnership, is focused on leveraging and she was concerned that we had not done very well at this in the Partnership. This makes it difficult when dealing with the Board, since they have fully bought into the leveraging concept... Judith said she is also looking for high impact. The Bandwidth Consortium was a great initiative for high impact but what is the next big thing? (Suzanne Grant Lewis, June 26, 2008 Minutes. PHEA archives)

Whether dictated by a charter, imposed by a board or inherited from decades of foundation history, the rules and norms that each foundation representative carries to the partnership's table influence the overall equilibrium of a partnership. This was the case for the Partnership.

The following table (Table 3) draws a comparison between these foundations and helps contrast their size, grant making abilities and interest in both higher education and Africa. There are certain factors that can help understand the foundations' affinity. For instance, as was described earlier, the foundations were not governed by a living donor per se, unlike, for instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. There are also some important historical connections to consider. Several foundations share decades of cooperation in African higher education, as is the case of Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford. These connections fluctuate over time. The following comment by John Butler-Adams, Program Officer at Ford Foundation's South Africa office demonstrates this aspect:

> In 2005, Ford's priorities meshed very well with Rockefeller and Carnegie, not so closely with MacArthur. In the second phase, particularly as Rockefeller had a new president who was changing directions, I would say that our values and priorities were to a very large extent coincident with those of Carnegie and to a lesser degree but not in any seriously lesser degree with Mellon. And, then when Kresge joined, for the most part, our values and priorities in grant-making were very similar to those of Kresge. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with John Butler-Adams, program officer at Ford Foundation's South Africa office)

This quote indicates that the affinity factor between foundations fluctuates over time and with the individuals who lead them. It also suggests that geographical factors do not necessarily explain certain affinities. Indeed, while four foundations are headquartered in New York fluctuation in affinities still occurred.

There are important monetary symmetries that help understand the foundations' like-mindedness, starting with the size of their respective endowment - the seven foundations rank among the 25 largest in the nation. Size matters in the world of foundations, and it is clear that the financial assets of each partner were a factor upon which affinity was determined. Yet, there are other important factors that explain the basis of foundation partnerships. Table 3 compares the seven foundations by age, location, size and ranks among U.S. grant-makers, and foci in Africa and higher education.

	Ford	Hewlett	MacArthur	Mellon	Rockefeller	Kresge	Carnegie
Established	1936	1966	1978	1969	1913	1924	1911
Located	New York, NY	Menlo Park, CA	Chicago, IL	New York, NY	New York, NY	Troy, MI	New York, NY
Total assets ($) [4]	10.5 billion	7.38 billion	5.67 billion	5.46 billion	3.59 billion	3.1 billion	2.5 billion
U.S. rank by asset size [5]	2nd	5th	9th	11th	15th	16th	20th
Total grants approved ($)	525.9 million	207.1 million	243.77 million	222.2 million	141 million	158 million	96.7 million
Grants awarded [4]	1,487	526	455	463	382	481	210
Average grant ($) [4]	353,665	393,726	535,758	479,913	369,109	328,482	460,476
Number of employees [4]	370	104	193	77	190	70	65
Offices in Africa	Cairo, Johannesburg	n/a	Abuja	n/a	Nairobi	n/a	n/a
Funding to Africa by $ [6]	6th	8th	9th	11th	2nd	15th	4th
By number of grants [7]	1st	21st	13th	14th	5th	29th	17th
African Higher Ed. Focus	Since 1950s	Since 1970s	Since 1980s	Since 1990s	Since 1913	Since 1990s	Since 1927
Areas of focus in Africa other than Higher Education	Economic prospect for communities. Democracy, rights, justice, education, creativity, free expression. Reproductive health.	Development, population policy. Transparency. Education. Think tanks. Reprod. health.	Human rights, international justice. Population, reproductive health.	South Africa initiative. Conservation, environment. Arts & the humanities.	Agriculture, climate, environmental & social responsibility, public health. Evaluation practices.	South Africa initiative.	Libraries.
Areas of focus in higher education in the U.S. and other parts of the world	Advancing higher education access & success.	Open educational resources.	Higher education in Russia.	Higher educ. scholarship, information technology. Humanities, social sciences. Partnerships.	Philanthropy, poverty, environment, urban innovation, government, transportation. Health. Fine arts.	Higher education productivity. Institutional support. Pathways to college.	Higher education in Eurasia. U.S. urban & higher education.

Table 3: Comparison between the Partnership's Seven Foundations

[4] Based on each foundation's annual report and grants reported for 2010.
[5] Foundation Center (2013) – See Appendix F for Top 100 U.S. Foundations by Asset Size.
[6] See Appendix G for Top 25 U.S. Foundations by total amount of grants to Africa (2003-2012).
[7] See Appendix I for Top 50 U.S. Foundations by number of grants to Africa (2003-2012).

In the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, the factors that determined membership included the foundations' track record, longevity, grant-making strategies, and the diverse areas of expertise in Africa and higher education. The Partnership also benefitted from its members' individual name and reputation which, put together, gave the Partnership a significant reputational aggregate to draw legitimacy from. As such, the connection between affinity and reputation in the Partnership is an important mechanism to explain how collaborative legitimacy was maximized. Whether one looks at the seven foundations' combined type, size of endowment, cultural adequacy or interests, there is explicit indication that legitimacy was maximized through the aggregation of reputation and the association of prestigious names: the names of prestigious philanthropic institutions which are all ranked in the top 20 of U.S. foundations (see Appendix F for the Top 100 list), and the names of the major business leaders which these foundations inherited. Combined under the same Partnership, this aggregation of names and reputations formed an impressive legitimacy machine designed to send a strong message to the world.

The differences of foci and approaches bought both advantages and challenges. On the one hand each foundation could offer and gain new perspectives on the field of African higher education:

> The Ford foundation, because of its emphasis on reproductive health and rights might be making a grant that is actually related to working with that university or that institution from the perspective of its own interest in the

> building of capacity for the production and reproduction of professionals in that field. Whereas Carnegie might be looking at it the different point of view of how do we build capacities of masters and PhDs in general for the next generation of academics including those working in reproductive rights. (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

Thus, aligning strategically reduced the level of disruption that a one-size-fits-all approach would have generated. For instance, Ford's African Higher Education Initiative was operating through its regional offices at the time the Partnership was created. It was partially superseded by the Partnership but without disrupting AHEI's operations which involved other countries:

> There is close alignment of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa and Ford's own African Higher Education Initiative with three major differences. The AHEI is slightly broader than the PHEA as it includes all higher education grant-making by the Middle East North Africa Office. Second, the PHEA and AHEI vary somewhat in the focal areas or themes. Finally, Ford places significant emphasis on collaborations across its regional offices and the AHEI funds can only be used for grants reaching across two or more offices. In some ways the AHEI is a partnership within the PHEA partnership. (Suzanne Grant Lewis, 9/6-9/07 meeting report. PHEA archives).

On the other, each foundation operated with a specific set of rules and grant-making mechanisms which hindered joint funding strategies:

> Now when you proceed from there then you realize that a lot of problems might emerge, with differences in opinion, differences in projects, and maybe different cycles of grant making. Some foundations might do three years, some

> foundations might do two years, and some foundations might do renewals. Some of the foundations we know today are not doing renewals. (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

While remaining within a strategic and collaborative alignment, the Partnership's foundations sought to expand their collective resources with a competitive-collaborative approach.

> The consortium, at first, was designed as I saw it to have two purposes. First to demonstrate to Africa that American foundations were really eager to be supportive. That we felt if we did it one at a time we wouldn't have the same psychological impact... The other impact was through a kind of competition to set a total amount of money that would be assured… That would in some sense prod the individual foundations to push as hard as they could in their African support. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with Kole Shettima, program director, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Nigeria office)

The positive or negative impact of this competitive-collaborative approach on the Partnership's grants disbursement, or on the likelihood of collaboration among the foundations, is echoed in several interviews. An example of which is as follows:

> One dimension was a sense of competitiveness in terms of grant dollars that each foundation could put into [the Partnership], and that served the goal of promoting higher education in Africa well, because the leadership was committed to matching what the other foundations were willing to do. So, I think, just in terms of level of funding, it had a positive influence. (July 12, 2011 phone interview with Raoul Davion, program officer, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation)

Moreover, examining the probability of involvement and collaboration among foundations elucidated that they did not act as a united effort but as a composite of multiple strategies and agendas. Thus, the Partnership acted as a confederation with concurrent agendas, interdependent dynamics and limited joint funding. Furthermore, the data shows no signs of isomorphism in the seven foundations studied - in their grant-making or in their approach.

The foundations retained a high degree of individuality and often conflicted. Isomorphism was resisted and the urge for institutional differentiation dictated the format of collective action. This in turn impacted efficiency. Interdependency to reach scale and tackle big issues was very visible but there was no resource expansion per se, rather the addition of individual and joint grant-making led to a de facto resource expansion. Arguably, this situation benefitted the smallest foundation – Carnegie – which dominated the collective grant-making through a large-grant strategy.

Figure 12: Probability of Collaboration and Total Grant Disbursement



There seems to be a correlation between total value of grants and the probability of collaboration among foundations. This suggests that collaboration leads to resource expansion (this does not, however, mean that the Partnership was a collaborative organization; rather, resources did expand when the foundations chose to collaborate). Furthermore, collaboration increased when new foundations were added in 2005-2009, a fact that perhaps denotes a change in strategy at the 2005 turning point.

Looking only at large grants, which in this case are defined as grants greater than $675,000, can help visualize the foundations' overall grant-making strategies. The following graph (Figure 13) visualizes each foundation's

individual grant-making pattern. This pattern reflects the specificity of each funder and their respective financial engagement with the Partnership.

Figure 13: Distribution of Large Grants by Foundation



Carnegie appears to be the most active grant maker in terms of large grants, while Ford preferred a small grant approach. This contrast in grant-making cultures suggests that there were multiple concurrent approaches and no specific, uniformed grant strategy in the Partnership. Whether the size of the grants reflected the level of trust between grantors and beneficiaries, the efficiency of a foundation's operation, or the level of risk-taking and commitment from the partners, the Partnership's irregular grant strategy did not affect its equilibrium. Whether it provided an edge over the agenda and decision-making, or provided more veto power for whoever made the largest commitment, is not clear. No

particular foundation appeared to be imposing its model over the Partnership. However, the foundations showed a tendency to collaborate in smaller groups of preferred partners, as the following summary statistics demonstrate.

Figure 14: Summary Statistics for Grants by Foundation



This box and whisker plot marks the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of grant values across all seven foundations. Visibly, there is no significant difference in the median grant size across foundations. Every foundation's median grant value falls within the interquartile range of every other foundation (with the

exception of Kresge). However, foundations clearly pursue different grant-making strategies, particularly with respect to the spread of grant values. For instance, the interquartile range of Carnegie's grants is nearly four times that of Ford's. This means that Carnegie's grants came in many shapes and sizes, whereas Ford's grant-making pattern was more consistent. Also, some foundations were willing to make larger grants than others. For example, Carnegie's 90th percentile ($5,000,000) is four times greater than Ford's ($1,250,000). Hence, choosing a specific grant-making strategy pertains to the institutional culture of the foundation.

The reason foundations collaborate with each other illustrates their proximity. Table 4 illustrates the overall composition of the Partnership' activity and compares the frequency of co-occurrence by foundation.

	Ford	**Carnegie**	**MacArthur**	**Mellon**	**Kresge**	**Hewlett**	**Rock.**
Ford							
Carnegie	77						
MacArthur	60	65					
Mellon	40	40	38				
Kresge	23	23	22	21			
Hewlett	33	33	30	28	20		
Rockefeller	80	77	61	42	20	30	
PHEA	85	107	73	47	25	42	88

Table 4: Frequency of Co-Occurrence of Partnership Foundations

Each cell gives the number of times the two corresponding foundations were indexed in the same document. For example, Ford and Carnegie collaborated 77 times. The number of collaborations between Carnegie and MacArthur (60) is high and denotes a strong relationship. The number of collaborations between Carnegie and Rockefeller (80) is expectedly high. The following "Probability" table lists the probability of the row/column foundations' collaboration (i.e., according to "Probability of Foundation Co-Occurrence," Carnegie and Ford collaborated in 26% of grants).

	Carne	**For.**	**Rock.**	**MacAr.**	**Mellon**	**Hewlett**	**Kresge**
Carnegie							
Ford	*0.26*						
Rockefeller	*0.26*	*0.27*					
MacArthur	*0.22*	*0.20*	*0.21*				
Mellon	*0.14*	*0.14*	*0.14*	*0.13*			
Hewlett	*0.11*	*0.11*	*0.10*	*0.10*	*0.10*		
Kresge	*0.08*	*0.08*	*0.07*	*0.08*	*0.07*	*0.07*	

Table 5: Probability of Collaboration between Partnership Foundations

Probability values were calculated by dividing the number of documents in which the two foundations were tagged (in the overall dataset) by the total number of documents. Each cell gives the over probability that the two corresponding foundations converging. The probability of convergence between Carnegie and

the Partnership (36%) is unusually high. There are higher rates of convergence between Ford, Carnegie, and to some extent MacArthur and Rockefeller (it makes sense that major foundations should be listed as collaborators in a larger percentage of documents). This table also shows that the four founding foundations were more likely to converge with each other than with Mellon, Hewlett and Kresge. It shows how the founders dominated the Partnership. The underlying dominance can also help explain why foundations were reluctant about working jointly and kept their distance.

Among the processes that may have increased the probability of collaboration, knowledge transfer appears to be the most salient. Knowledge transfer materialized in most exchanges between foundations and was used to share valuable information among partners. This allowed for disclosures about each foundation's strategy, helped reduce risks, and increased efficiency in grant-making. These factors contributed to producing collaborative legitimacy for each foundation. The connection between knowledge transfer and legitimacy suggests that knowledge sharing was one of the greatest incentives associated with being a member of the Partnership. Indeed, it was a significant motivator for the members involved, as the following statement by Janice Petrovich, former program director at the Ford Foundation confirmed:

> Clearly the collaborative was very rich in that there were a lot of very smart people with expertise in different sorts of things. There were Africa experts, there were people who were experts in technology, there were folks who had a

> better idea of how this might fly within their own foundations, there were people who had better knowledge about how things might fly within the context of Africa. There were people who knew about relationships between African universities and so it was very enlightening to go to these meetings and to understand the complexity and identify those areas that might be difficult to try to work through or how to operate within a difficult environment. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director at the Ford Foundation)

Knowledge transfer accelerated and expanded the possibilities that the foundations could trigger. It multiplied the number of organizations that they could target, as David Court, former Program Officer at The Rockefeller Foundation indicated:

> It brought a lot of contact with other organizations, it accelerated contact with what others were doing, and initially at least expanded what my ideas about what could possibly and conceivably be done, if the amount of funding was greater, and the involvement of other organizations and institutions was going to happen. It strengthened my own sense that this needed to be done by quite detailed knowledge about what's happening on the ground, and that it needed to give more emphasis to triumph, involvement and assessment than it had done in the past. (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer at The Rockefeller Foundation)

Interviewees also commented on the possible association between the Partnership's knowledge transfer and the expansion of human resources. The following quote by Janice Petrovich confirms this point:

> Had the partnership not been there, I'm not sure that Ford would have given as much money to African higher education. At Ford it inspired the creation of new positions so when the partnership began… there were only two

> higher education program officers at Ford, one in New York and one in South Africa. When the partnership ended, there were those two positions, plus there was a position that had been created in Egypt, plus there was an education position that had been created in Kenya… and then there was a consultant that was working in Nigeria. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, program director, Ford Foundation)

This excerpt indicates that the multiplying effect for Ford's membership in the Partnership was to expand its human resource in the field of higher both in the headquarters and field offices, but also by created positions in new countries (Kenya and Nigeria).

There was also an apparent connection between knowledge transfer and time justification. Commenting both on knowledge transfer and time invested, Narciso Matos offered the following confirmation:

> I don't think any of our foundations would have had the knowledge that we were able to collectively acquire in that time simply by working together and having all of these meetings and workshops that I talked about. I think that was a major advantage to all of us. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos).

As this quote confirms, knowledge transfer justified almost by itself the amount of staff-time invested by each foundation. As such, knowledge transfer was an important return on investment for the members, adding value to the Partnership and providing legitimacy for the foundations. Finally, there was a connection between knowledge transfer and risk reduction. Investing in weak institutions represents an important risk for all philanthropic investors. Reducing this risk

factor by collaborating with others was also an incentive for the Partnership's foundations.

The Partnership was created to push the foundations to interact more frequently with each other, particularly with those foundations that were already actively involved in African higher education. It also helped expand their investment and knowledge while reducing risks. The partnering foundations were dependent on each other to maximize their impact. They were also reliant on each other to be efficient and acquire more legitimacy. The Partnership's complex organizational form preserved the foundations' individual choices and grant-making strategy, and accelerated knowledge transfer while reducing risks and increasing collective legitimacy.

The Maximization of Collaborative Legitimacy

The comparison drawn between the Partnership's foundations provided an insight into the role of U.S. philanthropic foundations in higher education in Africa and revealed the complexity of foundation collaborations. The mechanisms of collaboration implementation as discussed in the previous sections helped comprehend foundations' institutional characteristics, strategic grant-making, and collective and individual actions in relation to the development of higher education in Africa. This chapter concludes by answering how the dynamics of collaboration operated in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa and ways in which the collaboration served the foundations involved.

The study underlined the issue of uneasy coexistence among foundations. This uneasiness grew out from the convergence of institutions with distinct, even opposite, patterns of reproduction and development. The Partnership's foundations were established in different socio-cultural eras, reflecting interests and identities that grew out of different contexts. This study argues that these large foundations resisted pressures towards convergence, and navigated between collaborative and individual constraints with a view to maximizing their legitimacy. The tension between differentiation and alignment, or decoupling and isomorphism, had a bearing on both the Partnership's legitimacy and the legitimacy of its members.

Indeed, although the Partnership presented the seven foundations with an opportunity to improve their philanthropy and to have greater impact on the field of higher education in Africa, their synergy did not succeed in delivering the full potential of the Partnership's promise. Instead, several institutional challenges plagued the Partnership. These included unclear objectives, technical obstacles to achieve joint funding and resource expansion. There was limited consensus and probability of collaboration with few initiatives that did involve more than two or three foundations.

Moreover, the safeguarding of boundaries within the Partnership constrained the foundations' collective action. The rational choices shaping the Partnership's structure reinforced the foundations' idiosyncratic individualism and diminished the collaboration's delivery. A decoupling mechanism was used

as a strategic response to the foundations' individualistic preferences and tendencies. This ultimately injected uncertainty and negatively influenced the Partnership's dynamics while reducing the amount of collaborative legitimacy that it could generate.

Finally, the study finds that collaborative legitimacy did occur in the Partnership and was carefully controlled. The foundations surmounted the Partnership's challenges with constant rationalization in order to gain from their collaborative effort. Adapting the organizational and operational modalities of the Partnership generated more collaborative efficiency, particularly in the aggregation of reputation, knowledge transfer, and risk reduction. These elements maximized legitimacy for the foundations. Indeed, the foundations rationalized a strategic alignment form that suited their prerogatives. This strategy allowed them to preserve both independence and protection from collective failure, while benefitting from legitimacy maximization. As such, the foundations' management of collaborative legitimacy increased protection against unproductive collaboration outcomes and the loss of validity that those outcomes entailed. Undeniably, the consequence of this loss would have impacted each foundation as well as the field of philanthropic foundations considering the cumulative prestige of the Partnership and trend-setting power of its members.

The pressure for positive outcomes and accountability among Partnership members required the addition of tighter and better legitimacy management processes. This pressure also highlighted the role of foundation managers in the

normalization of these processes. Thus, understanding how the actors behind the Partnership interacted with each other is important for grasping the mechanisms of collaborative legitimacy among large foundations. For this reason, the following chapter goes further into exploring the mechanisms of legitimacy management by analyzing the role of foundation managers in these processes, and comparing voices from grantors and grantees.

CHAPTER V

NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY AMONG GRANTORS AND GRANTEES

A Partnership of Flesh and Bone

The previous chapter underlined the issue of uneasy coexistence in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, stemming from the juxtaposition of seven foundations with distinct, even contrasting, institutional cultures, missions, strategies and philosophies of development. To echo Powell and DiMaggio (1991) institutions formed in different socio-cultural eras, such as the Partnership's foundations, coexist uneasily as they hold different interests and individualities and thus struggle to work collaboratively. This chapter further explores the aspect of coexistence by focusing on the actors involved in the Partnership. Collaborations, foundations and academic institutions are all made of flesh and bone. Thus, emphasizing the importance of the human factor in the Partnership's activity offers the potential to examine the normative impact of institutional culture on individuals.

This is particularly relevant when benefactors of foundations, such as the ones examined in this study, view collaborating with other grantors, and grantees as a new philanthropic practice as opposed to a one-time short-term scenario only initiated to respond to an ambitious goal such as developing higher education in Africa. According to Frumkin (2006) grant-makers no longer aim to keep grant recipients at arm's length, separate and unequal. Instead, they seek to foster

engagement and greater equity between funder and grantee. In order to legitimate their actions foundations need to change the basic terms of power sharing with grantees, particularly if these grantees are in a developing stage. Collaborations can create configurations of power sharing that do not have pre-defined limits.

Collaborative action in the case of the Partnership did not occur in an institutional vacuum devoid of outside factors. The interactions between the Partnership's actors and their beneficiaries offer an opportunity to examine the role of legitimacy-conferring processes. Ingram & Clay (2000) stated that institutions affect not only strategies and interests but also patterns of relationships between actors, preferences, objectives, and identities. By focusing on interpersonal dynamics, in particular those of grantors, this chapter depicts the interactions that occurred between foundation leaders, program officers, directors, and advisors. This depiction includes grantee perspectives and the testimonies of university vice-chancellors, administrators, researchers and students in Africa. Arguably, these actors assessed their participation in the Partnership, as well as the Partnership's strategy and potential impact, in terms of their social suitability and desirability both internally by their foundation's standards, and externally by their grantees'. Thus, certain intra-organizational processes and target audiences conferred and collectively normalized legitimacy - or were perceived as such by the actors within the Partnership. These processes of legitimation reflected socially acceptable and desirable norms, standards and values among the

Partnership's participants and grant-recipients. They also provided justification and accountability for these actors' choices.

Suchman (1995) delineates normative legitimacy as stemming from four different sources: 1) the production of outputs, 2) the validation of practices and procedures, 3) the participation in categories and structures, and 4) the charismatic authority of organizational leaders and staff. The first type refers to organizational accomplishments, results and measurable or non-measurable outputs. In the case of foundations this would correspond to the number of grants made, total amounts disbursed, or particularly in the case of the Partnership, the joint funding achieved.

The second type of normative legitimacy described by Suchman is obtained by following societally valued and validated practices and procedures. This type of normative legitimacy is more complex for foundations as it is usually formalized in accreditation, regulatory oversight and licensure. Foundations neither have nor need this in order to practice their grant-making. Yet, validation can come from the grantees themselves, particularly in a context of unequal relationship between large U.S. foundations and non-metropolitan, global south institutions. There is an asymmetry of power when a well-established institution gives money to a less endowed one, but at the same time foundations also know that grantee consultation and participation is both a norm of good grant-making and a factor of legitimation.

The third source of normative legitimacy is actors' perceptions of the organization. Through its structural characteristics, an organization is classified within a category of organizations, broadly identified as appropriate for a particular task. With their status as organizations that serve the common good, foundations are validated for their participation in a category of organizations accepted as pursuing communally valuable goals. This is different from perception based on any specific results achieved. Arguably, in international development, foundations would capitalize on the legitimacy accorded to the non-profit and voluntary sector to add significance and precedence to certain causes.

The following chapter pays close attention to the fourth type of normative legitimacy defined by Suchman. Reminiscent of Weber's charismatic authority type, this variant of normative legitimacy derives from the personal status, reputation and authority of certain individuals in leadership positions. In the case of foundations, this type of legitimacy would define the organization through the characteristics of its leaders. Thus, foundations would be attributed legitimacy not because of what they do or how they do it, but as a function of the perceived legitimacy of their representatives and presidents.

Yet, in a collaboration such as the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, which was led by the foundations' presidents, charismatic authority was indeed powerful but not unencumbered by the formalities and intra-organizational

arrangements of bureaucratic forms. Program directors and officers on the one hand, and university vice-chancellors and grant administrators on the other, played an active role in the foundations' quest for legitimacy. Normative legitimacy in this case would not solely rest on the authority of the foundations' presidents but also on interpersonal exchanges at all levels.

Before examining the mechanisms of normative legitimation, it is important to introduce in greater detail the various actors whose testimonies were used to build the chapter's analysis. This study produced or collected 151 interview transcripts of Partnership grant-makers (20) and grantees (131). First, figure 15 provides background information on the grantees' countries and status. All interviewees reside in or are from Africa.

Figure 15: Grantees by Country and Status



Out of 131 grantee transcripts five main categories of interviewees can be discerned: faculty, administrators, students, researchers, and vice-chancellors (equivalent to university presidents). All of the Partnership's nine target countries are represented, although some more than others, namely Nigeria and South Africa. Figure 16 shows their institutional affiliation. Some of the foundations' historical beneficiaries are well represented. They include universities such as the

University of Jos, Ibadan and Obafemi Awolowo in Nigeria, the Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand in South Africa, University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Makerere University in Uganda, the University of Cairo in Egypt among several others. The sample also includes a few administrators from academic and research networks.



Figure 16: Grantees by Institution

Based on the data extracted from the transcripts and on an extensive internet search for confirmation purposes, these interviewees were linked to an area of

expertise. The sample as illustrated in figure 17 displays an interesting diversity of sectors, and includes slightly more males than females. Yet, it is dominated by individuals involved or interested in information and communication technology and gender equity. As discussed later on in this chapter, these two groups are central to understanding the power relationship between the Partnership's grantors and grantees, particularly the contrast between the universities' most urgent needs (information and communication technology) and one of the foundations' long-term goals (gender equity).



Figure 17: Grantees by Area of Expertise and Gender

In contrast, the grantors interviewed in this study totaled 20 individuals which were divided into four main categories: program officers (7), program directors (6), vice-presidents/presidents (3), and advisors or associates (4). (See figure 18).



Figure 18: Grantors by Status

They included eight females (40%) and twelve males (60%), as illustrated in figure 19 which echoes the larger proportion of males in figure 17. These male-female differences highlight even further the role of gender equity in the Partnership. These individuals were then divided between U.S. residents (14) and those who were either from or resided in Africa at the time of the interviews (6).

Figure 19: Grantors by Institution, Residency and Gender



The goal of this chapter is to establish the connection between personal interactions and the formation of legitimacy – in particular those interactions of individuals working for the Partnership's foundations and their beneficiaries. It is important to understand how the dynamics of collaboration and interpersonal exchange contributed to producing legitimacy. The following three sections explore how legitimacy became normative among the grantors and grantees involved in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The first section establishes the extent to which grantor and grantee perspectives diverged. To do this, it presents a visualization of the data produced by the study's

neo-institutional (NI) and resource dependency (RD) grid, and provides an interpretation for this data. The ensuing sections confirm these findings by delving into the transcripts of grantors and grantees to analyze the discourse of Partnership participants.

Diverging Perspectives between Grantors and Grantees

In order to establish the connection between personal interactions and legitimacy formation in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, it is relevant to first identify the variations between the discourse of its actors and beneficiaries. The discrepancy among perspectives and expectations between both parties is the locus where legitimacy is created, leveraged, managed, maximized or withheld. This locus is both a controllable and malleable source of legitimation as well as an indispensable resource for impact-seeking organizations. This section provides visualization and interpretation to the data produced by the study's neo-institutional (NI) and resource dependency (RD) analytical grid. Figure 20

Figure 20: Grantee-Grantor Variation by Sub-Measures



Figure 20 isolates differences between grantor and grantees. Neo-institutional characteristics are more present for grantors as opposed to resource-dependent ones for grantees. The exception is, interestingly, "consultation & ownership", which are slightly more salient in grantees than in grantors. Although this is a characteristic that belongs to the NI group. Similarly, "assets & resources" are slightly more noticeable in grantors than in grantees, although the characteristic is more common to RD. Yet, these two differences are exceptions to the general rule. Grantees, as a group, show an inclination towards resource-dependent discourse, whereas grantors show an inclination towards neo-institutional discourse. This trend is consistent throughout the entire duration of the Partnership, as figure 21 confirms.

Figure 21: Evolution of Neo-Institutional & Resource Dependent Code Applications for Grantors & Grantees



The evolution of code co-occurrences by project phase for grantors and grantees confirms the domination of neo-institutional characteristics for grantors, and of resource-dependent characteristics for grantees. This could be explained by

grantors being more concerned with the internal structure and organizational equilibrium of the Partnership. On the other hand, grantees were concerned with resources and environmental constraints immediately connected to their institution. However, figure 21 indicates an increasing inclination of grantees towards Membership characteristics, demonstrating the domination of "consultation & ownership" codes in grantees described earlier. This difference can be interpreted in several ways. One of which is that the grantees' heightened involvement with the Partnership necessitated consultation & participation, or underscored the lack thereof.

Distribution of neo-institutional and resource-dependent characteristics for grantors remains fairly constant over all four project phases. The distribution for grantees, however, tends towards neo-institutional characteristics (that is to say that the percentage of neo-institutional characteristics increased during each project phase). Figure 21 suggests that grantors' and grantees' perspectives (i.e., the application of NI and RD codes for both groups) regressed towards the mean. Neither group had more influence over the other, or forced the other to conform to its perspective; there was give and take on both sides. This triggers questions regarding the Partnership's termination for it was decided at a time when better interrelations were occurring between grantors, as well as between grantors and grantees. Considering the amount of time it took for the Partnership's foundations to reach this cohesion one wonders what pushed its termination.

The dichotomy highlighted by the previous graphs introduces a difference in perspectives between U.S. grant-makers and their beneficiaries in target universities in Africa that is worth examining. Starting from individual perspectives, figure 22 charts these divergences by comparing grantor and grantee viewpoints. When used comparatively per individual, the Neo-Institutional (NI) and Resource Dependency (RD) measures illustrate the importance of internal or external factors on institutions, the mechanisms of convergence and divergence among participating institutions, and among individual actors.

Figure 22: Comparison of Neo-Institutional & Resource Dependent Measures per Individual Grantors



This visualization was achieved by tallying and creating a numerical summary of the number of times each code was applied to a certain document. The added lines illustrate the overall grantor distribution of descriptors, showing how individual grantors compare to their peers. Figure 22 introduces an overall homogeneity towards NI among grantors, with the exception of three individuals at par with or inclined towards RD. When grouped by institution there are internal differences among grant-makers with sometimes striking gaps, as can be observed in the case of Ford, Mellon, and to a certain extent, Carnegie and Rockefeller. Although the Partnership was the sum of the individuals that composed it, these individuals also negotiated between the collective interests of the Partnership, those of their respective institution, and their own as individuals.

Similarly, there is a contrast among grantees, as the following graph shows. The graph examines the numerical summaries of 50 out of the 131 individuals interviewed and categorized as grantees. This sample included the interview transcripts that produced the largest number of codes. The grantees' individual perspectives clearly leaned towards RD, with the exception of 8 individuals who provided mitigated views. While it is clear that grantors were more concerned with structural, procedural and collaborative characteristic, and that grantees were more inclined towards environmental and resource-oriented factors, it is nevertheless important to temper this view with the fact that some level of variation did occur among grantors and grantees. Several interesting testimonies highlighted characteristics that belonged to the other group. These

differences called for closer examination: the study's analytical frame and descriptors could be used to determine other factors that could explain this variation. Examining the data by occupation offers striking contrasts.

Figure 23: Comparison by Individual Grantees



Figure 24 determines whether these variations could be explained by occupation. The study's 151 actors were categorized along a spectrum of nine occupations: grantors (F) were regrouped in four categories - program officer, program director, associate, advisor, president / vice-president; and grantees (U) in five categories - vice-chancellor, administrator, faculty, researcher, and student. The number of codes were then tallied and attributed to NI or RD.



Figure 24: Code Applications for Grantors and Grantees by Status

This simpler graph shows a clear pattern in the distribution of NI and RD characteristics with a gap widening between occupations. Although there is only a 10% variation within each group, there is a clear difference of up to 40% between the (F) group and the (U) group. During the Partnership, there was marginal disparity in perspective between faculty, administrators, and vice-chancellors.

Similarly, there was marginal disparity between associates or advisors, program officers, and program directors. However, this variation was more significant between the president, vice-president category and the other (F) categories. It was also significant between the student category and the other (U) categories. This variation is even more substantial between the two ends of the spectrum. The following two graphs provide more convincing evidence that there exists a NI/RD spectrum between grantors and grantees.

Figure 25: Percentage of Resource Dependent Descriptors by Status



Figure 26: Percentage of Neo-Institutional Descriptors by Status



The graphs illustrate the trend in NI/RD across the hierarchical spectrum. The R-squared value is fairly high (0.83), meaning that there is likely a linear progression in NI/RD from grantors to grantees. Meanwhile, the b-value (i.e., the slope of the line) is .05, or 5%. In other words, every time we move one level down the hierarchical ladder, NI decreases by 5% and RD increases by 5%.

The following graphs examined these findings by NI and RD sub-measures to further explore the variations between each occupation.



Figure 27: Variation of NI & RD Sub-Measures by Status

This graph offers a more specific distribution of NI and RD characteristics for each of the grantor and grantee statuses. First, these characteristics appear to be distributed heterogeneously within both groups. However, RD characteristics are clearly more dominant among grantees, and NI characteristics among grantors.

The divergence in grantee and grantor perspectives described in the previous sections showed that the "Consultation and Ownership" characteristic was more salient in grantees than in grantors, although it is a characteristic that belongs to the NI group. This was confirmed in other graphs by an increasing inclination towards Membership characteristics that heightened the presence of "Consultation & Ownership" in grantees. This difference should be interpreted as the grantees' heightened interest for involvement and participation in the Partnership's developments, and underscored the necessity of including them in the decision-making process. Furthermore, when examined thematically, the data showed that wide differences of perspective between grantees and grantors prevailed in the Partnership.

While sustainability, competition, consultation & ownership, policy & context were predominant with Partnership grantees, affinity & collaboration, culture & values, processes & bureaucracy, power & leadership primed with grantors. Thus, expectation discrepancy between grantors and grantees dominated the relationship. The following comment by Andrea Johnson, Program Officer, Carnegie Corporation of New York illustrates this difference:

> We wanted to be able to bring those vice chancellors together and have some very stimulating, visionary conversations. It turns out that in universities where it's hard even to keep the lights on; they're not really thinking long term vision for higher education. They're thinking about 'I need to have enough money available that I can keep the lights on.' So we were always disappointed with

> the quality of the participation of the higher education leaders. (August 10, 2011 interview, New York)

Arguably, the wide thematic divergence was an obstacle to obtaining legitimacy in the form of acquiescence and validation for grantors. But reconciling these perspectives were a common concern to the Partnership's actors.

To further explore these findings, the following graphs examine the likeliness of linear progression per NI/RD sub-measure for each occupation.



Figure 28: Likeliness of Linear Progression per NI Sub-Measures



Figure 29: Likeliness of Linear Progression per RD Sub-Measures

These two graphs clearly show that all but one NI sub-measures decrease with similar regularity and consistency between both ends of the spectrum. "Consultation & Ownership" followed an opposite trajectory. All but one RD sub-measures increase with similar amplitude while "Assets & Resources" shows a slight decrease.

NI characteristics were more visible at the top of the hierarchical ladder among grantors, while RD characteristics were more present in the student category in grantees. The data, however, shows more proximity between program directors and officers, and university administrators. While the latter can be explained by the frequent interactions between foundation staff and university administrators - who for the most part handled the grants for their institutions - the former shows a wider variation between one end of the spectrum than the other, namely between foundation leaders and students, thus emphasizing the extent to which both groups diverged.

Moreover, the data presented in the six previous graphs show "President/Vice-President" positioned at a level separate from all the other grantor occupations. This particular point calls for further examination because foundation leaders enacted the Partnership's vision, program officers and university administrators were conveyors of that vision, and students were its ultimate "target." The large divergence shown in the data between the two ends of the spectrum carries much weight for evaluating the adequacy of the Partnership

as a whole. It also highlights a significant gap between the expectations of foundation leaders and those of their beneficiaries. Moreover, conjecturing that foundation leaders and foundation staff had different, perhaps even opposite, views on the needs of their beneficiaries, raises questions about the level of negotiation this divergence must have preceded in.

Furthermore, when examined thematically, the themes of sustainability, competition, consultation & ownership, policy & context were predominant with the Partnership's grantees. On the other hand, those of affinity & collaboration, culture & values, processes & bureaucracy, power & leadership primed with grantors. This difference of perspectives between grantees and grantors suggests that the perspective of grantors dominated over the Partnership. Arguably, reconciling the choices of Partnership participants with the expectations of their grantees was a concern shared among all actors. However, inadequate bridges between the foundations' goals for African higher education and their grantees' priorities could have impacted the grant-makers' legitimacy negatively or positively.

Both the powerful weight of foundation leaders on the foundations' assets and strategy along with the consultation and ownership of grantees in the decision-making had significant bearing on normalizing legitimacy for the Partnership and its actors. In order to verify these claims and further examine, on the one hand, the influence of foundation leaders on the Partnership, and on the

other, the inclusion of grantee perspectives in the foundations' grant-making, the following sections examine two major sources of legitimation. They explore the charismatic authority of foundation leaders and its effect on intra and extra-organizational powers as retrieved from the testimonies of the Partnership's actors. They also examine the participation and perception of the Partnership's beneficiaries based on their interview transcripts.

Charismatic Legitimacy and Foundation Presidents

As observed in the previous section, the Partnership's foundation leaders, presidents and vice-presidents operated at a level separate from the other categories, namely program directors, officers, advisors and associates. It is relevant to take a closer look at these particular foundation leaders, and observe how their charismatic authority was channeled through the institutions they led, along with how their this authority was perceived by their peers and beneficiaries. The Partnership's actors were accountable to their respective presidents. Arguably, the charismatic authority of foundation leaders had an impact on the Partnership's intra and extra-organizational equilibrium, particularly as the Partnership was initiated by the presidents themselves in order to deliver a strong message regarding the importance of higher education in Africa. Thus, their relative power had significant bearing on normalizing legitimacy in the eyes of the Partnership's actors. Indeed, having their support meant that the time spent by program officers on a collaboration was valued within the foundation; the officers

were given funding to make the work of the collaboration worthwhile and potentially effective. In this sense, foundation leaders did not only instigate the Partnership's vision, they also served to legitimize the conveyors of their vision, that is, their staff.

Before going further into the president's legitimating role in the Partnership it is important to understand why they wanted a partnership of foundations dedicated to developing universities in Africa. As Hammack and Anheier (2010) observed, there has long been a close and symbiotic relationship between elite foundations and major research universities. According to these authors, this tight relationship cannot help but direct foundations toward grants that build capacity and support the capital infrastructure, rather than request increased access for underserved populations or stimulate sectorial changes. The foundation presidents in office at the time that the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa was launched were all former university presidents. And during most of the Partnership's existence, a majority of Partnership foundations were led by former university leaders. The Carnegie Corporation was led by the former president of Brown University. The Rockefeller Foundation was headed by the former president of the University of Pennsylvania. The MacArthur Foundation chose the president of the New School University. The Hewlett Foundation was directed by the former dean of the Stanford Law School. The Mellon Foundation selected the president of the University of Chicago as its new leader.

President	Foundation	Presidency	Previous Position
Jonathan F. Fanton	MacArthur	1999-2009	President, New School for Social Research
Gordon Conway	Rockefeller	1998-2005	Vice-Chancellor, University of Sussex
Vartan Gregorian	Carnegie	1997-now	President, Brown University
Susan V. Berresford	Ford	1996-2007	Executive Vice President, Ford Foundation
William G. Bowen	Mellon	1988-2006	President, Princeton University
Paul Brest	Hewlett	2000-2012	Dean, Stanford Law School
Judith Rodin	Rockefeller	2005-	President, University of Pennsylvania
Don M. Randel	Mellon	2006-	President, University of Chicago
Rip Rapson	Kresge	2006-	President, McKnight Foundation
Luis A. Ubiñas	Ford	2008-	McKinsey & Company
Robert L. Gallucci	MacArthur	2009-	Dean, Georgetown University, Sch. of Foreign Service

Table 6: PHEA's Foundations' Presidents

As this table shows, six university presidents and two university deans out of eleven foundation presidents were involved with the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. While we often hear about foundations influencing higher education, the Partnership offers a new dimension. One could say that with the presence of so many former university leaders heading the Partnership's foundations it was higher education (in the U.S. and the U.K.) that affected foundations - towards influencing higher education (in Africa).

Recalling how the idea of the Partnership for Higher Education first emerged, Patricia Rosenfield, director of Carnegie Corporation's Carnegie Scholars Program from 2000 to 2011, and chair of the Corporation's program on Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries from 1990-1998 as well as the program on International Development from 1998-2000, confirmed that the Partnership was triggered by a university-oriented conversation between the presidents of Carnegie and Rockefeller (in other words between the former president of Brown University and the former vice-chancellor of the University of Sussex):

> It was originally a Carnegie-Rockefeller partnership around Makerere and then we were thinking higher education… Allison Bernstein called up Joyce and said 'What's this, I hear the boys are getting together, (meaning Vartan and Gordon) why isn't Susan a part of this? So we were like 'okay, we don't mind Ford coming in'. (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Patricia Rosenfield)

Thus, the symbiotic relationship described above began with a personal relationship between individuals who had in common the desire and the drive to

orient their foundation into higher education development, and arguably input their vision of higher education on the initiatives that they supported, collaboratively or not. In the words of Gara LaMarche, the former president of Atlantic Philanthropies - who did not take part in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa although his foundation was very active in South Africa during the Partnership's existence - "collaboration has to be a useful tool for advancing whatever the foundations program interests are":

> Foundations don't have any market pressures, if you will, pushing them towards collaborations. They have accountable trustees. Trustees very often want novelty or their own stamp on things and they're not so interested. (October 13, 2011 interview in New York with Gara LaMarche)

In the Partnership's case, the pressure came from the presidents who instilled a high degree of priority and visibility at the formalization stage of the Partnership. As Janice Petrovich, former Program Director at the Ford Foundation, said:

> This was an initiative that was created among the presidents. The president of Carnegie took the lead in meeting with other presidents to help establish this collaborative. That first layer was the presidents. This made things a bit complicated because the presidents work at a very macro level and don't tend to give very detailed guidance to staff, so [we needed] to figure out what the presidents wanted. Staff had to go back and forth to their own presidents and then come together and try to figure out how to fit all these pieces together. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director for the Ford Foundation)

Thus, by taking the lead and playing an active role in the Partnership the presidents added significant weight both in the Partnership's visibility and prestige. They also contributed to the Partnership's complex power dimension, particularly with regards to attributing legitimacy, judging capacity and making their own assessments count the most. This delicate situation was commented upon by several program officers, including Raoul Davion, Program Officer at The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation:

> The leadership wanted to remain active and remained active in the partnership's operations and that was really an asset in terms of having the support and the commitment of the foundation presidents. But, also I think it encumbered somewhat the decision making processes that the partnership utilized. (July 12, 2011 phone interview with Raoul Davion)

This quote illustrates a program officer's dilemma between presidential support and accountability on the one hand, and interference and inefficiency on the other.

Apart from burdening the Partnership's decision-making processes, the legitimating power of presidents was regarded with varying weights by foundation officers. This weight was substantial on the areas of program prioritization, power distribution and delegation. The following quote by Bill Moses, program director for The Kresge Foundation's Education Program, illustrates this point (before joining Kresge in 1997, Bill Moses served as executive director of The Watson Foundation in Rhode Island, an analyst in the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, and held various administrative

positions in Alaska's state legislature and the federal government, including the U.S. Embassy in Cape Town):

> There were differences in people's relative powers at the foundations. One, of course, is that there's no clear power devolution in a foundation so it may be very clear at a specific foundation, but it's not like every foundation is alike and if you're this level you have this decision making and this level this. At this foundation, at a relatively low level you may be very autonomous, and at a relatively high level at another foundation you may not have very much autonomy at all, because of the nature of how they organize themselves. So I think what may have happened is sometimes people can green light things really easily, other times they could not… Over time it even changed because their programs changed or their position at the foundations changed so that they had more power (September 29, 2011 interview in New York with Bill Moses).

This situation was echoed in Susan Grant Lewis's interview which highlighted the frustration generated by this imbalance of decisional power:

> I think MacArthur was always a difficult partner in meetings because Raoul couldn't commit to anything without going through Jonathan [Fanton] because Jonathan really sort of controlled everything… Whereas the other three… had a better sense of what they could and couldn't commit to. So, it was frustrating for Raoul and it was frustrating for the group. (July 8, 2011 interview in New York with Susan Grant Lewis, PHEA coordinator)

This issue of power delegation described in this quote pinpoints how unequal accountability mechanisms hindered the Partnership's efficiency. The following comment by Janice Petrovich, former Program Director, Ford Foundation, confirms this point:

> The difficult role that the people who sat around the table had is that they were able to discuss ideas but often were not able to come to a decision at the table because they needed to go back to their foundations and check. And that was because they were representing the presidents and they needed to make sure the president was okay with everything that was happening. So they would go back and report. And it took a long time for any kind of joint product to emerge, because the presidents had to be on board. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director for the Ford Foundation)

This aspect was highlighted in the "Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative" report published in 2010 by the Partnership:

> Among the biggest challenges were the inability of many of the representatives of foundations to take a decision on behalf of their foundations without checking back with their superiors and often the presidents themselves. This requirement, imposed largely by presidents who did not delegate much authority to their program officers, greatly slowed down decision making. (p 31)

This passage takes a step further by qualifying the issue of unequal representation as a consequence of a requirement "imposed largely by presidents." Thus, the omnipotence of foundation presidents in the Partnership's decision-making and their implicit legitimation role meant that foundation staff had to manoeuver within the constraints set by their leaders, to whom they were ultimately accountable. In this sense, the concentration of powers in the hands of foundation leaders is an important element in understanding internal accountability and legitimation mechanisms in U.S. foundations.

Indeed, the Partnership was seen and judged by numerous inside and outside participants - with varying degrees - but none equaled the judgment of

foundation presidents. Presidents imposed other accountability mechanisms, such as evaluations. Although the presidents were predisposed to continue the Partnership and saw the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa favorably many still wanted to have third-party evaluations. However, determining the Partnership's goals and benchmarks became an issue among Partnership participants as many believed that the need to evaluate should not drive the goals of the Partnership. Several officers argued that the activities of the Partnership could not all be measured in numbers. Thus, formal evaluations tended to create internal disagreements in the Partnership. The foundations' staff contested the statement and validity of the evaluation's objectives. Perhaps as a direct result of this, the Partnership's evaluations were designed with the foundations' presidents as a distinct audience:

> There were internal disagreements among the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa foundation staff on the statement of objectives (within evaluation framework). It was argued that we need to decide what the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa wants to do with the evaluation and who is the intended audience? Two main audiences were identified: Partner foundation presidents, for accountability and staff of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. A caution was expressed that we not repeat mistakes made at last Presidents meeting, materials were put together in a short time, the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa staff did not have enough time to prepare and comment on the materials, and the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa staff didn't properly articulate new initiatives for which they hoped to gain support. (Minutes, October 31, 2006 meeting. PHEA archives)

The presidents were "identified" as an audience separated from other actors, particularly since they were the source of "accountability" and "support."

The pressure for accountability and the charismatic authority of foundation leaders had a significant impact on the Partnership's efficiency. The following excerpt not only offers a representative illustration of how presidents operated, showcasing the initiative of Judith Rodin, the Rockefeller Foundation's president, but it also underlines the level at which foundations presidents were micro-managing the Partnership:

> Judith Rodin continues to ask about the comparative advantage of the Partnership over the investments by individual foundations...Rodin is concerned about missed opportunities for the presidents to throw their full weight behind the Partnership. In this regard, I believe she is intending to stimulate a conversation with Jonathan, Vartan, Susan and Bill. (January 20, 2005 email correspondence between Joyce Moock, Andrea Johnson, and Narciso Matos. PHEA archives).

One reason for this micro-management was to control rivalry between the various program officers involved in the Partnership:

> This kind of interpersonal staff rivalry remained substantial in the partnership, even though as I said the leadership was able to put some of them down and operate independently, but nevertheless there were some awkward things. (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer for The Rockefeller Foundation)

Thus, the charismatic authority of the presidents played a significant part in the Partnership's equilibrium and legitimation, at times re-orienting the Partnership's course.

Certain initiatives were given prevalence based on the presidents' prerogatives. For instance, the presidents wanted more emphasis on economies of scale in ICT, or more detailed framing of higher education studies projects as the following excerpts illustrate:

> Bandwidth was the leitmotif of the meeting. It is clearly a concern of interests to the Presidents. Because we have limited resources, we suggest that we select one issue at the outset and recommend that it be bandwidth. (September 21, 2002 email correspondence, PHEA archives)
>
> The Higher Education Advocacy and Research Network project has been through various stages of being re-imagined following the unenthusiastic responses of the foundations presidents to the idea of supporting and strengthening higher education as a field of studies in Africa. The project has been discussed at a number of meetings of the Executive Committee, and progress has been slow (2008 Memo, PHEA archives).

Thus, the attribution of legitimacy was achieved through a process that would rest on the charismatic authority of the foundations' presidents. Moreover, this legitimacy was important at all levels. The dynamic, however, did suffer in cases where a new order was imposed from the top, as the following quote illustrates:

> Now consider the fact that in a decentralized organization like Ford the offices in Africa were given budgets and a very clear sense of responsibility over the countries in which they operated. And all of a sudden, from New York comes this initiative which is in essence created without a

> whole lot of consultation with our offices in Africa. It's a presidential initiative and so, as you can imagine, there were many ruffled feathers… It entailed having to reestablish trust and having… to not see it as an imposition but to actually see it as an opportunity. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director for the Ford Foundation)

In this passage, a presidential initiative superseded an existing, legitimized operation. It established a new set of priorities and produced a new process of legitimation, which was directly imposed on field officers.

The following excerpt describes how normative legitimacy can be negotiated between a program officer and a foundation president. In this case the objective was to make the Kresge Foundation (Kresge) focus on universities in South Africa, and join the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa:

> We had a change in leadership at the foundation, a new president in July 2006. I took him to South Africa to get a feel for what our programs were and he said, 'Could you maybe develop a program around work in South Africa that's not just this one sort of initiative?' and I said sure. And part of my case for that was, I was the only person at Kresge, which at the time had maybe only thirty staff, only person at Kresge who did anything with South Africa. We hadn't even broken up into specific divisions, because now I run the education program for Kresge. And I said, 'you know, it's a one man show, I need to work with experts and peers.' And we had informal relationships in the African Grant Making Affinity Group but what I wanted to do was be at the table with the best of the business and I think I learned more about the complexities of what their work is and how their work went. But I said we should be part of this because we're going to put in a fair amount of money and we want to do it well. We want to piggy back on their expertise. And so that's why we joined. (September 29, 2011 interview in New York with William Moses, program officer for The Kresge Foundation).

In this excerpt, legitimacy appears to be obtained first through the consent of the foundation president, and second by gaining access to a circle of experts, "the best of the business." The quote also indicates that the president was new and needed to be convinced about a specific area of funding, that is, higher education in Africa. This negotiation of legitimacy was at times encouraged by the presidents themselves as reflected in the following passage about Ford's president Luis Ubiñas:

> Luis expressed his commitment to the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa as he feels that the Partnership's values embody the values of Ford. He thinks that the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa should defend what they have done and challenge the presidents rather than petition them. (Minutes of June 26, 2008 meeting, PHEA archives).

This last sentence introduces the notion that between presidents and program officers multiple ways to obtain legitimacy coexisted; legitimacy solicitors could either challenge or petition legitimacy bearers.

Petitioning episodes accurately illustrate the divergence in perspectives between foundation leaders and program officers involved in the Partnership. When the Partnership first began, there was neither outside staff nor organization funded to oversee the work because the founding presidents were not interested in creating a "bureaucracy." However, that decision placed a large burden on already busy program staff and slowed down the work of the Partnership.

> We realize that several of the presidents have been reluctant to increase the staffing and responsibilities of a

> central coordination unit. As a group, however, they may be willing to agree to a joint recommendation of staff. Below are some starting ideas. (11/29/2004 memo from Joyce Moock. PHEA archives)

Petitioning episodes or the decision to not hire staff also brought to light some differing objectives between the presidents and program staff, as the following comment by Andrea Johnson indicates:

> The reason that we didn't have an office of secretariat was because the presidents didn't want it. They saw it as less operational and more as a learning group. The staff envisioned it as more operational - identify things to fund together, either jointly funded or aligned funding but heading in the same direction. That immediately ran into problems. (Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative - p 32)

Agreement among Partnership foundation staff became a pre-requisite for responding to the presidents' criticism and divergent views, as the following passage illustrates:

> The veto, I think that actually worked. The decision making kind of worked… well because we would make decisions amongst ourselves at the PO level [Program Officers'], then make recommendations to the presidents. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Claudia Frittelli, program officer for the Carnegie Corporation of New York)

This situation led to a rallying mechanism among program officers. Yet, sometimes they struggled to be systematic in their collective tactics to counter the presidents' views:

> As I reflect more fully on our proposed response to the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa presidents on their comment about asking partner universities what they are doing to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS, I have

> become increasingly uncomfortable with the "we can't agree and a survey won't work response.".. Now, maybe we cannot do a decent job at analyzing what is and is not working without an initiative or at least a consultant. However, we cannot very well go back to them [the presidents] and say we don't want to ask our grantees about this ... and then in the next breath say we want to jointly support the next generation of academics (April 27, 2007, email correspondence from Suzanne Grant Lewis, PHEA archives).

In this passage, disagreement among program officers puts their credibility and their initiatives at risk. The next excerpt shows presidents rejecting the program officers' joint proposal - developing education schools - and highlights the diverging views between the two groups of individuals:

> This was Judith Rodin's first hosting of the meeting and she seemed to have points to score and it was just an awful dynamic…. There was a proposal about helping to build a higher education studies program… We were proposing to help build the field of higher education studies on the Continent and the presidents hated that. They really showed a lot of prejudice against education schools. One of them said that the last thing we need to be exporting is our, meaning U. S. lousy education schools to Africa. And, here I am having gotten my doctorate from a school of education, coming from a faculty position in an ed school and I'm thinking, 'Uh oh, I'm in trouble.' (July 8, 2011 phone interview with Susan Grant Lewis, coordinator of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa)

As this quote indicates, education as a field of study was clearly not favored by foundation presidents who oriented the choices of the Partnership in the selection of universities and areas to prioritize. Furthermore, a clear gap in perspectives and approaches between presidents and officers seemed to have handicapped the Partnership:

> So there was not among the foundation presidents, a hands-on understanding, in my experience. They thought that the case for universities should be made on cultural grounds more than economic grounds. (July 20, 2011 phone interview with Phillip Griffiths, advisor for The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)

This gap can be explained by the formal hierarchical demarcations that exist in foundations such as those of the Partnership, but also in the way both groups communicated with each other.

> So, basically the presidents of the foundations would meet once a year. This was the only time in the year that they were collectively focused on the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The secretariat and officers would have three hours of time to present, then the presidents would go off and have a private lunch and the rest of us would have a lunch in a different room in which we would try to figure out what they were talking about. And then sometimes when Ford hosted the meeting, we actually got a written communication from the presidents, a collective communication explaining how they wanted us to proceed. Other times information would trickle in, we could be months not knowing where they stood on things. (July 8, 2011 phone interview with Susan Grant Lewis, coordinator of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa)

The lack of communication resulted from a lack of clarify or was perceived to be connected to it. It was associated with a lack of clarity in the president's directions, as the following quote by Phillip Griffiths, advisor for the Mellon Foundation, exemplifies:

> There were some exceptions. I think the most active of the foundation presidents were Gregorian from Carnegie and Jonathan Fanton from MacArthur. They, I think, gave

> much clearer direction to their staff than, at least in my observation, the other foundations didn't. That is to say Mellon pretty much ran its own thing in South Africa with Stuart… as I look back I would have said that from the beginning the presidents' commitment should not just have been 'X' amount of money but it should have been their personal involvement and the involvement of members of their board. (July 20, 2011 phone interview with Phillip Griffiths, advisor for the Mellon Foundation)

In this quote, more involvement from all the presidents and the foundations' boards would have clarified the Partnership's objectives and actions.

The issue of president turn-over was a recurring comment among the individuals interviewed in the grantors' group. For some, it precipitated the termination of the Partnership. The following comment by David Court illustrates this point:

> Foundations change when they get new presidents who want to create something totally different in structure and in focus. But, neither Ford nor Rockefeller changed their Presidents in the period in question, right until towards the end. It was towards the end of the second phase that Rockefeller and Ford changed, and that created an impossible situation for the Partnership. (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer for The Rockefeller Foundation)

Foundations are described as organizations which change significantly when their president change. The leadership changes at Ford and Rockefeller are described as detrimental to the Partnership. This phenomenon emerges in several interviews and is generalized to other Partnership actors such as program officers, as the following excerpt indicates:

> And then the turnover was an issue. Staff turning over, presidents turning over. Every time there was somebody new, if they had any power at all over their institution, we had to go over the same old ground, they would bring up the same questions that we had already. Sometimes people brought good things to the table, new contacts or new perspectives or new ideas that actually added something. But a lot of times it was just rehashing the same old stuff that we had already done. And then the presidents turning over ultimately led to the demise of the partnership because they just didn't have the commitment. Some were just not interested in higher education others were just not...it wasn't theirs. There was a real ownership question. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Andrea Johnson, program officer for the Carnegie Corporation of New York, USA)

In this quote, staff turnover is described as being a handicap for the Partnership. The turnover of presidents is associated with the issue of ownership which implies that foundation presidents need to possess an initiative. The following quote is from Dina El'Khawaga, former Program Officer at the Ford Foundation's office in Egypt, and now a professor in the economics and political science faculty of Cairo University and programs director at the Arab Reform Initiative in Paris*:*

> I think leadership change is the most critical challenge. But it is important that in the meantime over 2000 to 2010 many foundations have seen their leadership changing. We got a new president at Ford. At Rockefeller, they got a new president. At Mac Arthur, they left, dealing with an incoming new president. So, every single foundation president came and revisited the whole thing to make his or her own footprint. And it was challenging (August 16, 2011 phone interview with Dina El'Khawaga, former program officer for the Ford Foundation's office in Egypt).

Arguably, when a leader is the legitimate owner of an initiative he or she gains full authority and liability for the said initiative, and in turn receives full credit.

Furthermore, he or she acts as a carrier of charismatic authority and a provider of legitimacy to his or her subordinates.

In the case of the Partnership, the channels of legitimacy disappeared when the replacement of presidents signaled the demise of the collaboration - three of the four founding presidents retired (Susan Berresford, Jonathan Fanton, Gordon Conway). The following passage, extracted from the "Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative" report, confirms that the staff saw the foundations' change of presidents as a cause for uncertainty:

> One of the advantages of a presidentially directed initiative is that program staff know that their time and programs will likely be supported by their presidents—after all, they are the ones directing the work. But when the presidents began to leave, and new presidents arrived with their own agendas, participants questioned how much of their time and energy to devote to the Partnership, which now had a more uncertain future. (Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative, p 36)

In this passage, the legitimacy of staff spending time and energy for the Partnership is questioned. The mechanisms of legitimacy were affected, thus impacting the Partnership's organization, as the following comment by Claudia Fritelli:

> I don't know that as a structure you can carry on with that many changes in leadership. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Claudia Frittelli, program officer for the Carnegie Corporation of New York).

New presidents brought in change and the decision to terminate the Partnership

became a reality. The following excerpt retrieved from the minutes of a 2008 meeting offers a clear example:

> Luis Ubiñas made it clear that program officers involved in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa / African Higher Education Initiative cannot commit one penny beyond 2010. There will be no tie-off grants, no legacy grants. (Suzanne Grant Lewis, June 26, 2008 minutes, PHEA archives).

In 2008, the presidents of the Partnership's foundations decided to close the Partnership secretariat and not embark on a third formal phase with a public pledge of funding.

> At first, they planned on closing it in just two months. Senior participants persuaded the presidents to continue the Partnership until the planned end in 2010. In theory, the work will continue among the foundations but without a coordinating body. In practical terms, that will be difficult to carry out, especially as new priorities emerge for foundations. (Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative, p 35)

But the general feeling among program officers was that they would have liked to see the Partnership continue.

> I think that probably if you ask the people involved, I would tend to think that most people would say yes, it would have been nice for it to continue. (August 23, 2011 phone interview with Janice Petrovich, former program director for the Ford Foundation)

These words take a particular meaning considering that the grant-makers were becoming more effective as a group towards the end of the Partnership. Indeed,

more funds were being invested in a more coordinated fashion, and counted as joint investments. In actuality, terminating the Partnership put program officers in an awkward position vis-à-vis their grantees. Justifying the decision to end ten years of collaboration, the impact of which is hardly measurable in the short term, undermined their position with partners on the ground and the sustainability of various projects, as the following extract highlights:

> With new presidents at several foundations it may have made sense to end the collaborative. However, some participants felt that there could have been more thoughtful planning on how to sustain or continue the work begun by the Partnership. The decision left them scrambling to explain the implications of the decision with their grantee organizations including how those organizations could sustain the work. (Lessons from a 10-year funder collaborative, p 35).

As these lines suggest, the lack of an exit plan undermined the Partnership's legitimacy as a provider of sustainable solutions for grantees. Arguably, it also contradicted its earlier statements which advocated for the development of higher education in Africa.

The difference in perspective described above translated into systematic negotiations between different hierarchical levels. These negotiations, which played a role in influencing the orientations and good functioning of the Partnership in general, were first meant to reconcile the differences in perspectives between foundation presidents and their staff. Balancing out the reality of joint grant-making and collective decision-making with the validation and expectations of presidents, who were the ultimate bearers of legitimacy and

accountability in the Partnership's foundations, was a common dilemma for the Partnership's program officers and directors, who strove to defend their point of view as well as that of their grantees'. The preponderance of neo-institutional characteristics among the grantors as a whole, and more substantially at the top of the ladder, is explained here by the pressures of each foundation's internal power mechanisms - epitomized by their President's charismatic authority. These characteristics contrast with the resource-dependent attributes characterizing their grantees for whom sustainability was a dominant element. Thus, questions arise about the foundations' internal legitimation mechanisms, exemplified by the influence of the presidents' charismatic legitimacy on their staff as described above, and the relative consequences of these mechanisms on the overall legitimacy of the Partnership, particularly as perceived in the eyes of the foundations' grantees. The following section explores the aspect of legitimacy by taking into account the perspective of the Partnership's grantees.

A Partnership of Foundations vs. a Partnership of Foundations and Universities

Foundation leaders were not the only providers of normative legitimacy in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The Partnership received endorsement from its grantees who, by being involved at varying degrees in the Partnership's processes, provided a form of approval and validation. This was, as this study argues, both sought after and orchestrated by the grantors. This type of normative legitimacy was obtained through the validation of grantor practices by grantees. These practices and procedures described in the following pages. Grantee

endorsement, however, occurred in a context of power asymmetry. The Partnership's foundations were placed, both on an equal footing among themselves, and at an advantage over the institutions if funded. The following comments by program directors Narciso Matos from Mozambique and Tade Akin Aina from Nigeria, who both ran Carnegie's Higher Education in Africa program at different stages of the Partnership, and occupied various academic functions in Africa prior to joining Carnegie, demonstrate this point:

> The foundations were equal, right from day one, the first four and the three later. You know, not with the universities, not with the African institutes. The foundations were equal among themselves (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director for the Carnegie Corporation of New York).
>
> I still recall a vice chancellor of an African university (incidentally he was the vice chancellor of one of the universities that were benefiting financially and otherwise from the partnership) … at one of the meetings… said 'Is it a partnership of foundations or is it a partnership between foundations and African universities? How are we involved in defining the agenda and so forth?' So that reflects that, in spite of all the efforts that we were making to be inclusive and conservative, we were not always successful in communicating that it was not [only] a partnership of four or five foundations but we wanted the voice of Africans to lead whatever we were doing (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, former program director for the Carnegie Corporation of New York).

The unequal dimension of the Partnership was a concern for grantees who always questioned their role and share of participation, as these quotes illustrate. In the

first quote, grantors and grantees appear to carry separate status; the foundations were equal among themselves but not with the universities. In the second, this difference of status seems to have had a bearing on how the agenda was defined. Although there was a general consensus among the participants and the study's interviewees that the foundations had listened and understood the needs of African universities, the Partnership remained a partnership of foundations, as several foundation staff indicated. Thus, running the risk of being perceived as dominating the agenda or imposing an American worldview on African universities was always a possibility, as a 2004 "Evaluation of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa" suggested.

> There are a few critics who feel that the Partnership approach is too rooted in an American worldview of democracy, liberal economics and gender equality as criteria for selecting institutions to support. These observers would favor more support going to weaker universities in difficult political climates where most donors fear to tread. (p. 20)

The following section explores grantee-conferred legitimacy as a source that motivated Partnership grantors to pay close attention to their grantees' input.

The aspect of grantee participation, and the tension that it produced on both sides, created a context for legitimacy normalization. This in turn had a positive impact on the grantor-grantee relationship and on the foundations' grant-making. This point is illustrated by a quote from Susan Grant Lewis, the Partnership's coordinator:

> What I had been looking for was a more direct interaction with African scholars and African higher education leaders, and that came to fruition. And that was really rewarding: to meet with them, to have conversations, to engage them in two different university leaders' forums. The first one was actually a very frustrating experience because some of the program officers wouldn't let go, and the second one was fantastic because it was organized by a steering committee of African university leaders, which I staffed. It was much more of a buy in and I think the quality of the whole thing was better, as well. (July 8, 2011 phone interview with Susan Grant Lewis, coordinator of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa)

This passage highlights both the willingness and the complexity of including grantees in the Partnership's discussion, not to mention the "buy in" outcome anticipated in this process of inclusion. It also reflects the gradual, and nonetheless real, involvement of grantees in dialogue with foundations. Additionally, it underscores the role of the Partnership facilitator in creating opportunities for dialogue between grantors and grantees. It also introduces a connection between legitimation and quality, as the inclusion of grantees reflected a practice commonly accepted as good among the Partnership's program officers and directors.

It is relevant to examine this issue as both a positive source of legitimacy for foundations and a guarantee for grantees to level the playing-field with grantors. This validation is substantial for foundations and also puts grantees in a position of strength. This point was well recognized by the Partnership's actors, most of whom stated to have given grantees significant consideration in their choices.

> Our agenda, in many respects, came from the universities the foundations were working with. Again, IT came directly from that. If you're working with a group of universities and all of them are asking as part of their funding to dedicate some towards IT, you know IT is a priority. And that to me gives you permission to act on that because it's clearly something that's of interest. We did this, in that respect, a bottom-up. Not everything was bottom-up, but that was. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Andrea Johnson, program officer for the Carnegie Corporation of New York)

In this first example, foundations were given a green light to transform the area of information technology. The grant-makers' are granted legitimacy by grantees who saw the area of focus as a priority for them.

> Those designs were done pretty much jointly and frequently in response to demand by the recipients so the partnership is very good about not sort of saying 'here's a pot of money and we want you to do this with it.' That's not the way they operate. It's more they sit down with the partner universities and talk through what their priorities are and agree on some course of action. (July 20, 2011 phone interview with Phillip Griffiths, advisor for The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)

In this passage, the demands of grantees appear to have filled the designs of grantors through a process of dialogue, negotiations and agreement.

> But, the clients themselves were recognized, many of the vice chancellors on various occasions when they were brought over to New York, that was rather, in my view, very functional, it may have been useful and was friendly but it wasn't operational in a sense that it lead to practical steps that the partnership pertained, but it did enable people to meet key figures and exchange views, but it wasn't a formal membership or partnership. (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer for The Rockefeller Foundation)

In this quote, the process of grantee participation is described as functional and not leading to concrete steps. Arguably, the process of consulting grantees served the purpose of legitimizing actions in their early stage.

Yet, as a safeguard against the power imbalance between foundations and universities, the participation of Africans in the Partnership's initiatives was a conscious effort desired by all foundation personnel. The following extract highlights this particular aspect. It was taken from a 2006 Partnership meeting between the various program officers about the organization of a University Leaders' Forum:

> Narciso asked whether there were sufficient Africans from Africa to ensure that participants do not feel that they are being talked at. (Minutes of August 28, 2006 meeting. PHEA archives)

The discussion revolved around the number of participants and whether or not the forum included enough African representation (which it ultimately did). The participation of grantees in the Partnership's developments was well orchestrated from the early days. Indeed, the original Partnership launch in 2000, the re-launch in 2005, and several other public relation events, included the presence of university vice-chancellors, and individuals from the academic and international education development world. The participation of vice-chancellors presented the Partnership with a form of normative validation which, this study argues, was sought after by its legitimacy-seeking actors.

The participation of African institutions in the agenda and development strategies of private funders from the West remains a topic of inexhaustible debate. Although perspectives on the issue of grantee participation in the agenda may have varied within the foundations, several comments highlighted that some elements of the agenda were indeed imposed on grantees. The following comment is from Neil Grabois, former Vice-President of Carnegie Corporation of New York, former President of Colgate University, and now the current dean of the Milano School of International Affairs at The New School:

> We did not wish to tell the universities what to do, we wanted to say 'you tell us what you want to do and if we find it a persuasive argument, we'll support you.' Except in the case of women. We did impose that on them. (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Neil Grabois, former vice-president for the Carnegie Corporation of New York)

The ambivalence reflected in this quote highlights the limits of agenda-sharing in the Partnership, and reinforces the issue of asymmetry in the grantor-grantee relationship. Universities were given the privilege to receive funding from the foundations if they made persuasive arguments. This suggests that both the agenda and the criterion for evaluating proposals were pre-established, and that grantees were not involved in establishing these criteria. The following comment from David Court confirms this point:

> The weakness of this partnership is that it didn't involve the clients as formally and openly as it perhaps should've done, and this is something that needs to be done in the future.

> (September 29, 2011 phone interview with David Court, former program officer for The Rockefeller Foundation)

Furthermore, not only did this privilege appear to be conditional, foundations also reserved the right to impose certain prerogatives based on their own judgment. It can be inferred that including grantees in the foundations' preordained agenda served a specific purpose of legitimizing the foundations' choices and conditions.

Grantee participation was a source of legitimation and not of equalization, as the asymmetry of power remained active. The following quote from Tade Akin Aina, Program Director at Carnegie Corporation of New York illustrates this point in sharp terms:

> Where does the notion of partnership come from? It comes from the whole notion of commercial enterprises, the joint stock company and the partners. The [concept of] partnership was [created] in the professions: accountancy, law and all of that… When you become a partner in a medical practice or in a legal practice, in the 18th and 19th century from when this came, you have rights, obligations, responsibilities... We have perverted and prostituted the notion because we have not thought about it in terms of the symmetrical notion of partnership. And we use the notion in a way that has debased it and it is actually an ideological cover for a new form of imperialism (although Americans don't want to hear the word imperialism), a new form of an unequal relationship with non-metropolitan, global south institutions. Foundations know it, and that's also one of the norms of good grant making. There is an asymmetry of power when you give money to somebody else. (September 26, 2011 interview in New York with Tade Akin Aina, program director for the Carnegie Corporation of New York).

This thought-provoking quote qualifies partnerships as a new ideology used by grantors to perpetuate their domination over their beneficiaries in developing countries. It delineates the relationship between grantors and grantees in drastic terms, yet traces a line in the sand which neither interviewed grantors nor their beneficiaries thought they had crossed. Furthermore, it is revealing that such a view comes from an African scholar hired by a foundation. It suggests a certain uneasiness which emanates from having to wear two hats and reconcile being both an African scholar and a program director in a large U.S. foundation.

The foundations' African program officers and directors provided value-added to the Partnership, sharing their expertise and on-the-ground knowledge with their non-African colleagues. They also provided an opportunity to bridge the gap between grantor and grantee perspectives. This gap and the legitimating role of African grantors are presented in the following graph which introduces a residency factor as a source of variation. The grantor interview profiles were separated by residency. If the grantors resided or were from Africa, they were placed in the "African grantor" category. If they did not reside or were not from Africa, they were placed in the "Non-African grantor." They were then compared with the grantee interview profile (all of whom resided in Africa).

Figure 30: Comparison of Neo-Institutional & Resource Dependent Sub-Measures by Residency



Figure 30 indicates a marginal variation between grantors who resided or were from Africa and the other grantors. The profile of African grantors received slightly more RD sub-measures than the Non-African one. The main differences are located around two sub-measures: "Affinity & Collaboration" which was more important with Non-Africans, and "Policy and Context" which was more important with Africans. The latter could be explained by the on-the-ground knowledge and expertise that grantors from or residing in Africa brought to the table, whereas the former highlights a central preoccupation for Non-African grantors. Yet, this difference did not seem to create an obstacle between the two groups of grantors the following comment from Kole Shettima, Director of the MacArthur Foundation in Nigeria, shows:

> My own general sense is that people were very sensitive to the relationship in terms of differences of opinions and differences of how things should be done. And, I think Africans who are in the foundations in the headquarters were actively involved… I think that is where the Africans in the leadership who are involved in the higher education program certainly had their way. I think they had some leadership role in defining the agenda and what should be done. Certainly there may be some areas where perhaps we could have different opinions but I'm not sure if they were really very different. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with Kole Shettima, program director for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation)

This quote suggests that there were differences in opinion but not insurmountable ones between both groups. The passage also indicates that African grantors in leadership positions succeeded in influencing the Partnership's agenda with their perspectives.

Furthermore, the profile of African grantors is more similar, but not significantly comparable, to the profile of grantees. Indeed, grantees and African grantors equally shared the "Policy and Context" measure. This fact asserts the relevance of on-the-ground knowledge and expertise, as the following quote by Narciso Matos confirms:

> I was not the only person with previous experience with higher education in Africa. On the other hand I should say I was the only one who came directly from the trenches. I brought to the partnership my previous experience as secretary general of the Association of African Universities. I had been the vice chancellor of an African university which was in many ways emblematic of the kinds of institutions that we wanted to support, and I had the direct experience of teaching and doing research in one of these institutions that we wanted to help develop. So that's what I

> think I brought to the partnership. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, Former Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

Narciso Matos brought his experience, notoriety, and connections from past leadership positions in African higher education. He used this unique opportunity of being Carnegie's Program Director to guide the Partnership's agenda, and thus maximized the Partnership's legitimacy. His presence had an impact on how grantees perceived and accepted the foundations, as the following quote illustrates:

> Narciso was the driving force on where we were to go… There would be a meeting of all the people who are not the presidents and when Narciso spoke everybody listened to him. It's not that he was driving it in an overt way, he was driving it because he had tremendous knowledge. (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Neil Grabois, former vice-president for the Carnegie Corporation of New York)

This quote suggests that Carnegie gained tremendously from putting a former African higher education leader at the helm of its higher education program and in the Partnership's executive committee. Recruiting an African university leader to convey the foundation's agenda to other African university leaders is a clear act of legitimacy leverage.

Moreover, Figure 30 displays an overwhelming profile difference between African grantors and grantees, particularly around the measures of "Sustainability" and "Competition" which were dominant among grantees, and "Power & Leadership" and "Processes & Bureaucracy" which were prevalent

among "African" grantors. This reinforces the role of African grantors at the intersection of two worlds, U.S. foundations' and African universities'. This point was welcomed by Partnership participants as the following excerpts indicate:

> I thought it was a little bit shameful that… Well, Narciso was the only Black African. I mean, John Adam Butler is South Africa but the other executive committee reps were very white and I wanted to be sure that we were having some different perspectives coming in. (July 8, 2011 phone Interview with Susan Grant Lewis, coordinator of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa)

> Sometimes it would make me laugh because we would be sitting around talking as the partnership and you know there weren't even any Africans in the room. (August 10, 2011 interview in New York with Claudia Frittelli, program officer for the Carnegie Corporation of New York)

As these quotes confirm, the Partnership remained mostly guided by non-Africans, although there were exceptions. Several foundations had highly competent staff, and those with field offices received input from their local staff. Some of these field officers were also given a leadership role in the Partnership, as the following excerpt indicates:

> Katherine Namuddu from our Nairobi office will now be our representative to the executive committee of the Partnership... We are proud to have an African representative to the Partnership, and we know Katherine will be a great resource for the continued work of this important collaborative effort. (Letter from Judith Rodin, Rockefeller Foundation president to Susan Berresford, Ford Foundation president. 2/6/2007. PHEA archives).

This quote indicates that not only did the President of the Rockefeller Foundation value the addition of an African Rockefeller representative to the Partnership; it

also suggests that this was long overdue for Rockefeller. Arguably, the Partnership gained legitimacy by including African experts among its key program directors and officers.

However, the foundations did not systematically put their field experts at the forefront of the Partnership. Dr. Namuddu was a Rockefeller representative since 1992 and was only given a leadership role with the Partnership towards the end of the second phase. Ford imposed the idea of the Partnership to their field officers, as this quote confirms:

> Susan Beresford sent Jorge Balan to the Ford offices in Africa to discuss the possibility. And, from what I understand, he didn't get a very good reception. The program officers felt that they should have been consulted and in effect, Jorge's visit was simply a means for informing them of something that was already a de facto reality. So, it then took a little bit of time to get people to turn their views around but, as I understand, after that, it seemed to go reasonably well. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with John Butler-Adam, program officer, Ford Foundation office in South Africa)

This excerpt indicates that consultation with field offices did not occur immediately and even created tension within the foundation's organizational structure.

An officially-proclaimed key Partnership principle was to respond to priorities identified in consultation with African higher education leaders. Indeed, reports and evaluations confirm that some of the Partnership's actors made real efforts to include several university vice-chancellors and consultants from Africa;

the Partnership's actors listened to advice and suggestions from vice-chancellors to identify and address priorities.

> Definitely, grantees were listened to. There were discussions with them in terms of the future of the partnership, what areas we were likely to support, what new ideas we have. Many of the meetings, they came prepared with their ideas of what they want to see done and we took them seriously in terms of what they want and how it was going to be done. (June 22, 2011 phone interview with Kole Shettima, Program Director, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation)

This grant-maker confirms that there was a respectful exchange between grantors and grantees, and that grantees' views regarding goals and the methods used to reach these goals were heard. Yet, foundations needed constant reminders so that consultation was not undermined, as the following excerpt from a Partnership meeting minutes indicates:

> If University Leaders' Forum is a consultative meeting with the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa university partners, we have to be careful how we announce initiatives so as not to undermine that consultation. It was generally agreed upon that the purposes of the University Leaders' Forum are to advocate for the issue, leverage resources beyond the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa and catalyze action on the ground. (Minutes of February 6, 2008 meeting. PHEA archives)

The University Leaders' Forum appears in this quote to have served as not only a platform for exchange and consultation, but also as a tool to leverage legitimacy for a foundation-led strategy that seemed pre-determined. Indeed, if foundations had to be careful about announcing initiatives, as the quote indicates, it is because

those initiatives had clearly been decided prior to consulting with African university leaders.

The Forum among university leaders was used to create a dialogue, discuss potential projects, and hear different perspectives about the future of Africa's higher education. It also served as a legitimation mechanism for foundations who received feedback from university leaders through this conversation. However, the exchange of perspectives was not always satisfactory, as the following excerpt suggests:

> The conference was reasonably successful. The most positive aspects of the conference were the concrete cooperative projects proposed and the exchange between universities... The proceedings were less successful, in my opinion, when the group lapsed into abstract discussion (e.g the desired role of universities in The New Partnership for Africa's Development) and when the donor representatives took the lead in sharing their perspectives. (Ann Trotter, Report on Conference: Effective Use of Information and Communication Technology to Create a New Environment for Learning and Teaching, 7/29-8/1/02 presentation. PHEA archives).

The above passage discusses the participation of universities in NEPAD - an African Union strategic framework for pan-African socio-economic development spearheaded by African leaders - to address critical challenges facing the continent, including poverty, development and Africa's marginalization internationally. The donors' perspectives on this topic were reported as "less successful", "abstract", and arguably out of line.

Participation was also orchestrated through the organization of case studies in order to legitimize the Partnership in its early stages. The objective of the case studies was to improve the foundations' understanding of institutional change through exchanges of experience. This would draw attention to specific experiences, internal factors and external content.

> Defined purpose of the case studies was therefore to advance understanding of the process of institutional and systemic change, focusing on institutional innovations within their national context. (March 16-18, 2002 Minutes of meeting between the Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, MacArthur foundations. PHEA archives)

The case studies' objective was to guide the Partnership's funding strategy and base it on solid grounds. Each case study focused on a specific Partnership country, so as to determine the needs of universities in their respective environment, and direct resources and programs to better serve them.

> Differently from what has been done in the past, where you would select a consultant and have him or her write a study, the development of this study was done directly by African scholars. It was very interactive. All the countries that were selected to be part of the partnership were invited to a series of workshops where they would visit the findings of the studies' authors, they would make comments in a manner that not only enriched each individuals study but made each study better than the previous one. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, former program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

The collaboration between grantors and grantees was set on an equal footing and produced positive results.

Arguably, the case studies also served as participatory mechanisms to build a common agenda for higher education development in the Partnership's target countries. The following citation is from Dr. Jorge Balan, a former program officer responsible for the international higher education policy portfolio at Ford Foundation between 1998 and 2006:

> I suggest more studies about institutions and systems and how they work. Policies, causes and consequences. In addition, we have identified good people through the case studies, but we don't want an agenda driven by the foundations or governments. Rather we want one driven by good researchers on the ground. (Jorge Balan. 10/21/2002 Notes from September 23rd meeting. PHEA archives)

Thus, the case studies were supposedly conceived with the goal of making foundations and governments not drive the agenda. Case studies were first and foremost meant to involve university leaders in a consultation with the Partnership's foundations:

> It is very important that university leadership be involved in the case study process. Currently, both Vice Chancellors from Makerere and Dar support the program. The VCs should be consulted on the choice of the internal case study person. The insider's role will be to contribute information regarding the university, and it would be particularly helpful if that person had a high stature within the academic institution. (Minutes of 11/29/99 PHEA Meeting at Rockefeller Foundation in New York. PHEA archives)

It is important to note that in most African higher education systems vice-chancellors are university presidents nominated by the respective governments. Thus, the foundations also fought hard to avoid politicizing the case

studies, particularly when approaching complex higher education systems such as in South Africa and Nigeria.

> All recognized the need for the government to buy into the study findings, particularly the portion of the study that will focus on the higher education system, but concerns were raised over how to do this without over-politicizing the study (Andrea Johnson and Jennifer Pawlowski's notes, Workshop to Develop Case Studies in Selected African Countries, Nairobi, 10/15-17/00. PHEA archives)

This quote also indicates that the foundations intended to use the cases studies to convince governments and university leaders, and as such to validate the foundations' plan of action based on the case studies' findings.

Yet, the validity and usefulness of the case studies were questioned. They served as a process for establishing a dialogue with African universities and developing a grant-making strategy that was more suited to their needs and cultural particularities, as the following quote suggests:

> Jorge noted that the placement of the foundations in the U.S. provided some physical and philosophical distance from African universities and stakeholders, as well as a degree of detachment from special interests. (Liz Levey. February 19-23, 2003, Minutes. PHEA archives)

But the case studies were not unanimously seen as an adequate tool for solving issues and instigating reforms. The foundations debated their efficacy, depth, among other issues as the following memo indicated:

> Case studies are not a good way of studying thematic issues. The case studies were too superficial; they did not

> deal adequately with the financing of higher education, gender... Innovations and transformations were not clearly defined... Meeting of the research teams led to an exchange of information, but did not lead to institutional reform. (Liz Levey, February 19-23, 2003, Minutes. PHEA archives)

Although they became a valuable contribution to the literature on African higher education the case studies were ultimately given less weight in the foundations' grant-making strategy. At the same time, the 2004 Partnership evaluation report indicated that the case studies were "one important tangible product of the Partnership. They have been distributed in hard copy widely to libraries in Africa and to African research organizations, as well as to 124 Vice Chancellors of African Universities." (p. 25). As such, the case studies helped the Partnership's foundations establish themselves as a new collaborative force. They disseminated the Partnership's vision for African higher education via the endorsement of the vice-chancellors and researchers who participated in their making.

Normative Legitimacy in an Unequal Relationship

In *Actors and System* (1980), Michel Crozier posited that we should take into consideration the conflicting strategies of actors; their "human construct" dimension, particularly when they engage in collective action and pursue contradictory interests:

> When results of collective action are the opposite of what individual actors wished, it is never merely because of the prosperities of the problem. It is always also the result of the human structuration of the field of action, that is, because of the characteristics of the organization or of the system in which the actors interact and to which they are

committed. (p4)

According to Crozier, rational individuals place their own interests above those of others, and as such bargain with or manipulate others ideologically or affectively. The Partnership's aggregation of individual perspectives reveals a bargaining, if not manipulative, quality in the discourse of philanthropic foundations in African higher education. This discourse and its participants contributed to legitimizing the foundations' work in higher education in Africa. Although the Partnership was the sum of the individuals that composed it, these individuals nonetheless negotiated between the collective interests of the Partnership, those of their respective institution, and their own as professionals in their fields. Major sources of legitimation in the Partnership included the charismatic authority of foundation leaders with its effect on intra and extra-organizational powers, and the participation and perception of the Partnership's beneficiaries. They both impacted governance.

Governance in the case of the Partnership did not solely rest on the charismatic authority of the foundations' presidents but on normalizing legitimacy, obtained as a result of interpersonal exchanges at all levels. The omnipotence of foundation presidents in the Partnership's decision-making and their implicit legitimation role implies that foundation staff had to manoeuver within constraints set by their leaders. It is to the presidents that they were ultimately accountable. In this sense, the concentration of powers in the hands of

foundation leaders is an important element for understanding internal accountability and legitimation mechanisms in U.S. foundations.

Governance in the Partnership's grantor-grantee relationship appeared top down rather than truly consultative. Africans participated, but not as the driving force. Legitimacy was a resource provided by grantees, who for this reason needed to be invited to the table and asked to participate in the agenda. There is an asymmetry of power when a well-established institution gives money to a less endowed one, but foundations also know that grantee consultation and participation is a source of legitimation. Foundations were attributed legitimacy not because of what they did or how they did it, but through a bargaining process. The Partnership received endorsement from its grantees who, by being involved at varying degrees in the Partnership's processes, provided a form of approval and validation which was both sought after and orchestrated by the grantors. This type of validation of practices and procedures resulted in normalizing legitimacy. As such, the power asymmetry appears to be leveled as the value of grantee endorsement is increased. Could it be argued that it placed the Partnership's foundations and the African universities that they funded on an equal footing?

CHAPTER VI

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGITIMACY AND THE ECOLOGY OF HIGHER EDUCATION DEVELOPERS IN AFRICA

The Ecology of U.S. Foundations in Africa

This chapter examines the ecology of U.S. foundations and how these foundations conformed to the myths and ceremonies of institutional development and capacity building in the field of African higher education. Neo-institutionalists locate sources of legitimacy as arising from the dynamics and characteristics of an organization's environment. These environmental dynamics operate at the level of the institutional field. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), an institutional field is characterized by an expanding network of interactions, inter-organizational structures, and partnerships. Additionally, there is an increase in information and communication resources, and a shared purpose. The field of higher education development in Africa can be described along these lines. Higher education in Africa in the early 2000s was characterized by a small number of universities per country and low enrollment ratios at all levels. The sector was plagued by challenges such as an aging faculty and lack of incentives to attract younger staff. The issue of a continued brain drain tendency, that afflicts most African countries, was pervasive. Moreover, scholars such as Benneh, Awumbila & Effah (2004) argue that the inadequate financial and logistical support from national governments, weak private sector support and few private

contributions to universities can all be considered insurmountable obstacles to any form of institutional development.

The literature on non-profit and voluntary organizations suggests that organizations need legitimacy for durability and sustainability. Brinkerhoff (2005) indicates that there are important connections between legitimacy, institutionalization, and sustainability. If foundations behave in accordance with this rule, the Partnership's foundations must have paid considerable attention to environmental legitimacy while introducing transformations that were to impact the institutionalization of African higher education. Hence, legitimacy as an element of capacity building should be examined closely. Furthermore, as Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Meyer and Scott (1983), indicate, the major forces at work relating to legitimacy in an organization's environment are largely related to symbolic factors. To achieve legitimacy, an organization needs what Meyer and Rowan (1991) call 'sagacious conformity' to societal 'myths', e.g. about cause and effect, and 'ceremonies', e.g. about appropriate procedures and practices.

By the beginning of the new millennium the institutional demography of African higher education was undergoing marked change and new forms of demand. At the same time, relations among the various categories of institutions and between institutions and the state were also evolving in unpredictable ways. African universities emerged as critical engines for socio-economic development in Africa (Assie-Lumumba, 2006; Tiyambe Zeleza, 2004; Afolayan, 2007). They

became integral to the international community of donors and of U.S. foundations in particular, who saw a strategic opportunity to positively impact these institutions on the African continent. Developing the field of higher education towards the promises of knowledge economies meant creating lasting bonds with the future leaders and entrepreneurs of Africa.

However, poor collaboration and coordination among donors – particularly among governmental institutions, development agencies, and international organizations – has always been a characteristic of the ecology of higher education development in Africa (Wield, 1997). The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa's configuration also suggests that collaboration was a complex matter among private foundations. The issue of inefficient donor collaboration and coordination raises questions about the competing strategies of international donors and private foundations, aimed to seize the opportunity that African universities embody. This competition among donors raises questions about the validity of the strategies designed by them, and the legitimacy of donors who conceive them. It is necessary to emphasize the complexity of the field of higher education in Africa which can hardly be seen as a uniform system; a one-size-fits-all approach would be very unlikely to succeed.

Moreover, questions of dependence on donor funding arise, particularly when a system is not functioning well, as Samoff and Carroll (2004) stated:

> In our view, external support to higher education in Africa in general and partnerships in particular can and do play a prominent role in the perpetuation of dependence, and, through the dependence of higher education, in the perpetuation of poverty in Africa. (p. 72).

Following Samoff and Carroll's view, the risk of negatively impacting higher education in Africa is high, as is the desire to reach sustainability for all concerned actors. Arguably, these active participants are prepared to hold any wrong doers accountable in the field of higher education in Africa. Thus, they hold the key to environmental legitimacy.

The Partnership's foundations were greatly influenced by their environment and institutional field. They derived legitimacy from conforming to ceremonial norms regarding their behavior. Furthermore, if their behavior ran against expectations held by African universities about U.S. foundations, the consequences must have translated into a loss of legitimacy. This would affect the offending foundation and potentially the ecology of higher education developers as a whole. Thus, to gain or maintain legitimacy in this field the foundations must have had to rely on African institutions and academic networks, which granted them legitimacy and ensured the continuation of their work in Africa and elsewhere. This chapter examines the relationships between the Partnership's foundations and their field, as well as the foundations' interactions with African universities and academic network. Considering the scale and complexity of the Partnership's objectives, and the innumerable organizations and programs that were impacted by the foundations' individual and collective choices, the

following sections closely examines the Partnership's actions and role in the ecology of higher education development in Africa. It surveys and compares, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the date of their grants and participants.

As observed in the previous chapter, the Partnership incorporated some form of university participation in its procedures. This served to demonstrate responsiveness and increased the legitimacy of foundations within African higher education. As Aldrich and Fiol (1994) note, a number of participants, in a given institutional field, provide organizational legitimacy based on patterns of appropriateness. In this manner, universities and academic networks have the ability to present foundations with legitimacy in return of their grants. They also have the ability to withhold this legitimacy. Resource dependency's model of organization-environment interaction places this legitimacy as a resource that participants possess. This may contribute to organizational survival and long-term sustainability.

Following Aldrich and Fiol (1994), legitimacy is assessed in this chapter in terms of the Partnership's foundations' ability to serve the needs and interests of universities and higher education organizations. Most directly, environmental legitimacy emerges as a form of exchange between Partnership foundations and universities. Partnership foundations produce outputs - funds, recognition, prestige and advocacy - that universities value and in return volunteer their support. Before exploring the effect of the Partnership's environment on the

foundations' legitimacy strategy, it is important to understand the ecology of higher education developers in Africa. Based on a survey of the Foundation Center's online grant database of U.S. foundations which reported grants to Africa between 2003 and 2012, 10,760 grants to African institutions were identified and near 600 U.S. foundations made grants to Africa during this time-frame. Figure 31 illustrates how these grants were generally distributed.



Figure 31: Areas of focus of foundations in Africa

Human rights, development, education and health dominated the sectorial distribution of U.S. foundation grants. The data indicates that 12% of grants served recipients categorized and reported as "higher education" by the

Foundation Center. However, this result does not fully depict the total number of grants made to higher education institutions in Africa. Indeed, many African universities, research centers, and higher education networks play an important intermediary role in U.S. foundations' overall grant-making strategies in Africa. Foundations used universities, research centers and other higher education organizations as receptacles for their grants to fund specific projects in the country or region.

Several foundation-funded programs in agriculture, health or civil rights have created a new position for universities. For instance, the Kenya-based Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) stands out as the African organization that received the largest grants that any African organization has ever received from U.S. foundations. It received very large grants from the Gates and Rockefeller foundations which are listed in Appendix L. A closer look at AGRA's grant activities shows that many universities are involved in its Education for African Crop Improvement program. They have received significant grants through what could be seen as "re-granting with an African perspective." For instance, the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa received a 4-year grant of $8,069,016 in 2007 to "enable the African Centre for Crop Improvement (ACCI) to continue training young scientists from eastern and southern Africa in crop improvement and to collaborate with other breeding programs in sub-Saharan Africa." The University of Ghana received a 5-year grant of $4,922,752 in 2007 to "establish a West Africa Centre for Crop

Improvement (WACCI) at the University of Ghana, Legon." Makerere University in Uganda received a 2-year grant of $400, 000 in 2008 to "ensure production of improved crop varieties adapted to poor farmer conditions through advanced training for a Master of Science in Plant Breeding for ten Ugandan and Rwandan nationals and to strengthen the Plant Breeding research program through the establishment of required facilities at Makerere University." [1]

Out of all grants made by U.S. foundations to African institutions between 2003 and 2012, all sectors included, it is clear that universities, research centers and academic networks were partners of choice for U.S. foundations. Table 7 confirms this by listing the top recipients of U.S. foundation grants. Beneficiaries are marked as universities (U), research centers (RC) and academic networks (AN). Several universities are among the top recipients, particularly South African universities which dominate the table - the University of Cape Town being the most successful recipient of foundation grants by far. Recipients include the University of the Witwatersrand, the University of the Western Cape, the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Pretoria, Rhodes University, and the University of the Stellenbosch. Other universities included Makerere University in Uganda, the American University of Cairo and Cairo University in Egypt, the University of Ghana and the University of Nairobi. Other types of higher education organizations which received foundation support included research centers such as the African Population and Health Research Center,

[1] Source: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa

Table 7: Top Grant Recipients in Africa (in number of grants awarded)[1]	N° of grants	U	RC	AN	PHEA grantee
University of Cape Town	210	✓			✓
University of the Witwatersrand	113	✓			✓
Makerere University	84	✓			✓
University of the Western Cape	78	✓			✓
University of KwaZulu-Natal	81	✓			✓
African Population and Health Research Center	52		✓		✓
American University in Cairo	46	✓			✓
University of Pretoria	43	✓			✓
Nature Conservation Trust	43				
Human Sciences Research Council	40		✓		✓
South African Institute for Advancement	40		✓		✓
Rhodes University	37	✓			✓
University of Stellenbosch	33	✓			✓
African Economic Research Consortium	34			✓	✓
Centre for Education Policy Development Trust	30		✓		✓
Association of African Universities	29			✓	✓
Cairo University	27	✓			✓
Institute for Democracy in South Africa	28				
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute	28		✓		
Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust	26		✓		✓
INDEPTH Network	24			✓	✓
Special Olympics-Egypt	24				
National Agricultural Research Organization	23			✓	
Centre for Study of Violence & Reconciliation	22				
World Agroforestry Centre	22			✓	
University of Ghana	22	✓			✓
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	21				
Treatment Action Campaign	21				
African Women's Development Fund	20				
University of Nairobi	19	✓			✓
Forum for African Women Educationalists, Kenya	17			✓	✓

[1] Based on a 05/13 survey of 10,760 grants reported in the Foundation Center's online directory as grants to Africa by U.S. foundations between 2003 and 2012. U stands for Universities, RC stands for Research Center, and AN stands for Academic Network.

the Human Sciences Research Council, the South African Institute for Advancement among others. Academic networks included the African Economic Research Consortium, the Association of African Universities, among others. Table 7 confirms the recent trends in grant-making. It countenances the emergence of African universities and higher education organizations, in the eyes of U.S. grant-makers, as active participants in the development of Africa's knowledge societies. The table also highlights the connection between top recipients of foundation grants and the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. While this table reflects the presence of several universities as top recipients of foundation grants, all sectors included, the survey also found an impressive number of higher education organizations among the grantees of U.S. foundations. Indeed, between 2003 and 2012, 194 recipients classified as higher education organizations in Africa received grants from U.S. foundations. Table 8 presents a selection of African universities which received the largest number of U.S. foundation grants during 2003-2012 (see Appendices I and J for full list).

Table 8: Top University	Country	('000)	Grants	Donors	Main Donor(s)
University of Cape Town	South Africa	$80,902	210	20	Gates, Carnegie, Atlantic, Mellon
University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa	$49,295	113	18	Gates, CCNY, Mellon
University of the Western Cape	South Africa	$47,352	78	9	Kresge, Atlantic, Mellon, Ford
Makerere University	Uganda	$42,512	84	10	Rockefeller , Carnegie
University of Kwazulu-Natal	South Africa	$28,742	81	10	Carnegie, Mellon, Rockefeller
University of Ghana	Ghana	$19,992	22	7	Gates, Carnegie, Hewlett, Ford
University of Pretoria	South Africa	$19,890	43	8	Gates, Kellogg, Carnegie, Mellon
University of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	$17,154	17	2	Rockefeller, Kellogg
University of Ibadan	Nigeria	$14,162	14	2	MacArthur, Ford
University of Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	$12,055	17	4	Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller
Rhodes University	South Africa	$10,867	37	8	Mellon, Atlantic, Kresge, Ford
University of Stellenbosch	South Africa	$10,123	33	11	Gates, Mellon, Carnegie
Ahmadu Bello University	Nigeria	$8,563	11	3	MacArthur, Carnegie
American University in Cairo	Egypt	$8,036	46	7	Ford, Gates, Hewlett
African Virtual University	Kenya	$7,881	10	6	Ford, MacArth., Carneg, Rock., Hewlett
Bayero University	Nigeria	$7,158	7	1	MacArthur
Obafemi Awolowo University	Nigeria	$7,000	3	1	Carnegie
Cheikh Anta Diop University	Senegal	$6,780	10	5	Gates
Cairo University	Egypt	$6,614	27	2	Ford, Mellon
University of Jos	Nigeria	$6,300	3	1	Carnegie

These beneficiaries included universities and higher education institutions, research centers, academic organizations and scholarship funds. The domination of South African universities in the top of the list is clear. So is the number of institutions which use English as the dominant language. With rare exceptions, U.S. foundations made grants to universities, research centers and academic networks which tended to be located in current or former Commonwealth countries, as figure 32 and table 9 confirm.



Figure 32: Countries of Focus of U.S. Foundations in Africa

Francophone countries were poorly represented with the exception of Senegal, Madagascar and Burkina Faso which received a few grants. Mozambique stood out as an exception in Lusophone Countries.

Table 9: Countries of Focus of U.S. Foundations in Africa	Current / Former Commonwealth Nation	Total Grants	N of Grants	N of Recipients	N of Donors
South Africa	✓	$308,903,382	819	65	41
Uganda	✓	$59,966,927	112	9	16
Nigeria	✓	$58,864,208	86	24	11
Zimbabwe	✓	$24,387,684	37	8	6
Ghana	✓	$24,174,852	68	6	10
Kenya	✓	$22,507,937	96	21	15
Egypt		$20,873,770	101	16	13
Tanzania	✓	$17,669,969	34	5	7
Senegal		$8,931,315	15	3	7
Mozambique	✓	$4,984,445	13	5	5
Malawi	✓	$3,723,026	15	1	3
Rwanda	✓	$2,994,340	7	2	2
Mali		$2,872,987	1	1	1
Madagascar		$2,627,000	7	2	1
Lesotho	✓	$1,747,907	8	1	2
Namibia	✓	$1,694,664	8	2	4
Ethiopia		$1,425,917	12	7	4
Botswana	✓	$1,243,165	7	2	5
Burkina Faso		$807,956	5	2	4
Swaziland	✓	$553,799	4	2	3
Zambia	✓	$519,100	3	1	1
Morocco		$500,000	3	3	2
Benin		$464,446	4	1	2
Liberia		$364,000	1	1	1
Tunisia		$200,000	1	1	1
Mauritius	✓	$65,000	2	1	1
DR Congo		$60,000	1	1	1
Ivory Coast		$15,000	1	1	1
Based on a 05/13 survey of 1,471 grants to higher education reported in the Foundation Center's online directory by U.S. foundations between 2003 and 2012.					

In Arabophone countries, Egypt stood out as an exception, largely due to the presence of the Ford Foundation and the American University in Cairo. Foundations and foundation grants concentrated in South Africa which received 54% of the total amount of grants and attracted three to four times more U.S. donors than four top recipient countries on the list (Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya). Commonwealth countries dominate the list with 16 countries out of 28, and 8 countries out of the top 10.

More importantly, Commonwealth countries received 93.1% of the total dollar amount of U.S. foundation grants and 89.6% of all grants. Commonwealth grantees represented 79.9% of all U.S. foundations higher education beneficiaries in Africa. This trend is also reflected in the Partnership for Higher Education's overall funding to higher education between 2000 and 2010. Although the Partnership sought to specifically target countries where they always traditionally operated, its funding was mostly distributed to English-speaking institutions in current or former Commonwealth countries. Figure 33 illustrates this point.

Figure 33: PHEA Grant Distribution per Country (2000-2010)



Apart from making grants to former Commonwealth countries, 68% of the Partnership's dollar contribution targeted nine countries directly for a total of $297.7 million and 899 grants. The remaining 32% of funds, $142.2 million, and 583 grants were spread across several countries or regions. With $123.8 million and 455 grants, South Africa was by far the country that received most of the Partnership's attention, followed by Nigeria and Uganda. However, considering the differences between each country's GDP, the dollar amounts indicated in table 10 should be interpreted relatively, considering each country's cost of living and other economic factors. Similarly, the number of grants made per country reflects the countries' institutions' relative capacities to receive grants at the time.

Table 10: Comparison of PHEA Spending and Country Spending in Higher Education

Country	Spending by each country on higher education in 2011 (estimated)	PHEA spending per year (average)	Share of PHEA per country spending	PHEA spending over 10 years	Share of PHEA per country spending
Ghana	$295,926,312	$2,135,403	0.72%	$21,354,025	7.2%
Kenya	$366,019,124	$983,445	0.27%	$9,834,452	2.7%
Madagascar	$53,232,750	$592,700	1.11%	$5,927,000	11.1%
Mozambique	$91,713,050	$429,465	0.47%	$4,294,650	4.7%
Nigeria	$1,695,185,184	$7,701,502	0.45%	$77,015,024	4.5%
South Africa	$2,864,679,480	$13,090,299	0.46%	$130,902,994	4.6%
Uganda	$62,936,640	$5,436,473	8.64%	$54,364,729	86.4%
Tanzania	$229,746,051	$3,157,352	1.37%	$31,573,523	13.7%
Egypt	$1,290,202,256	$806,949	0.06%	$8,069,489	0.6%
Total	$6,949,640,847	$34,333,589	0.49%	$343,335,886	4.9%

Except for Uganda, the overall spending of the Partnership was insignificant compared to each country's estimated yearly spending on higher education. The amount of this funding was relatively minimal, and so the Partnership's enormous visibility during this period reveals far more about the foundations' impressive public relation skills.

Although there were some notable exceptions, the Partnership invested more in countries which invested the most in national higher education, as figure 34 indicates.

Figure 34: Comparison of PHEA Spending and Country Spending in Higher Education



Arguably, the foundations gained access to countries of geopolitical importance through the angle of higher education. They hoped to influence them and others on the continent by participating in the institutionalization of African higher education. Considering that an investment to higher education raises a country's GDP by 5.5%[1] whereas an investment to primary education raises it by 1.1%, as a World Bank report indicates, the Partnership's investments were geared towards maximizing returns on Africa's political and economic potential.

A more extensive survey of U.S. foundations confirms the foundations' general tendency to mainly make grants to English-speaking countries. This finding confirms that U.S. foundations applied a geopolitical strategy of investment maximization along former colonial lines, in particular former British

[1] Bloom, D., Canning, D and Chan K. Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa. Report sponsored by the World Bank in 2006

colonies. The following map (figure M1) illustrates this point. It also highlights the Partnership's target countries and marks the foundations' field offices.



M1: Map of U.S. Foundation Grants to Higher Education Organizations in Africa

By favoring higher education organizations that use English as the language of internal and external communication and learning, U.S. foundations create durable connections with the continent's future leaders and entrepreneurs along a language associated with cultural references that they dominate. Ford in Egypt is an exception to this rule and is explained by Dr. Dina El'Khawaga in post-colonial terms:

> For the steering committee, Africa was sub-Saharan Africa and not all Africa. The Ford Foundation leadership was kind enough with my ideas that Ford would provide funds for Egypt because of the Partnership. My main point was that these are colonial divisions, you know; let's go with Anglophone Africa and not with Francophone Africa. Let's go with sub-Saharan Africa verses North Africa. And, that we don't really endorse such divisions which were really colonial lines. (August 16, 2011 phone interview with Dr. Dina El'Khawaga, program officer, Ford Foundation, Egypt).

Ford's geopolitical agenda might not have been formulated with specific post-colonial considerations. Nonetheless, the colonial lines described above emerge as clear demarcations between Africa's new knowledge societies. These lines are then reinforced by U.S. foundations' grant-making strategies.

Furthermore, from 2003 to 2007, all sectors included, 579 U.S. private foundations made grants totaling $2.1 billion to support numerous initiatives in Africa. Cumulative grants to Africa increased steadily in size and in quantity during this four-year period. Grant distribution per sector showed a high concentration in agriculture (31%), health (26%), higher education and research (19%). The geopolitical distribution of these grants confirms the concentration of

funds in Commonwealth countries, as described above. Moreover, 50% of all funding went to three countries: Kenya (22%), South Africa (19%), and Nigeria (11%) - countries which are not only close to the United States' interests but also the most influential on the continent.

Furthermore, the share of foundation grants to higher education in sub-Saharan Africa is possibly higher than these results show since many foundations ran major programs in the sectors of agriculture, health, and development either directly through African universities or indirectly through re-granting intermediaries, research centers and universities in developing countries, or regional non-governmental organizations and foundations. In this light African universities appear to emerge as critical engines for the socio-economic development of Africa. Thus, viewing them as integral parts in the geopolitical strategies of international donors in general, and of U.S. foundations in particular, makes much sense.

In total, this study identified 78 foundations that invested intensively in higher education organizations in Africa between 2003 and 2012. These foundations made grants to African higher education that amounted to $573.5 million. Overall, 1,471 grants were made to 194 higher education organizations in 28 countries during 2003 and 2012[1]. The complete list of U.S. foundations and

[1] Based on a 05/13 survey of grants reported in the Foundation Center's online directory by U.S. foundations between 2003 and 2012. The search criteria included all countries in Africa and recipient types that included the keywords "higher education; higher education reform; higher education / college; higher education / university." The search

grants to African higher education organizations is in Appendix J. By comparison, the World Bank's lending for higher education in Sub-Saharan countries amounted to $555.9 million[1] between 1998 and 2008, while USAID disbursed an estimate of $350 million; the Swedish International Development Agency (SIPA) approximately $100 million[2], and the British Council an estimate of $50 million during the same period. There were many other players in the field: The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) from Canada; The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Danish Agency for International Development (DANIDA); the United Nations Development Program; the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prince Claus Fund, among many others. Considering the ecology of donors active in African higher education, U.S. foundations appear to be significant players indeed.

Few foundations have offices in Africa. Ford has offices in Johannesburg, South Africa and Cairo, Egypt. Rockefeller has an office in Nairobi, Kenya. MacArthur has an office in Abuja, Nigeria. Charles Stewart Mott and Atlantic Philanthropies have offices in Johannesburg, South Africa. Kellog had an office in Pretoria, South Africa but closed it in 2009. Other foundations such as

---

did not include non-African grant recipients who collaborate with African higher education or serve as intermediaries between foundations and African higher educations.

[1] Between 1998 and 2008, Bank lending for higher education averaged US$327 million per year. The Latin America and Caribbean region received the largest share (43%), followed by the East Asia and Pacific (21%). The Africa region accounted for 17%. The South Asia region had 12%. The Middle East and North Africa region had 9%. The Europe and Central Asia region received 6%. Source: The World Bank

[2] Estimate based on SIPA's 2002 and 2005 Facts and Figures Reports on Education.

Carnegie, Gates, Mellon, Hewlett, Kresge, Packard, McKnight, among others, operate their Africa programs from their headquarters in the United States and keep an extensive network of representatives in African institutions, many of whom are former academics, researchers or university leaders. Table 11 shows the largest U.S. grant-makers in the field of higher education in Africa during the same period, the total amount of grants that they made to higher education institutions in Africa, the number of grants and the grant average. In Appendix K, the full list of U.S. grant-makers to higher education organizations in Africa for the 2003-2012 timeframe is included. The foundations, half of which are located in New York and California, are classified under five main categories in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code: independent foundations; corporate foundations; community foundations; operating foundations; and public charities.[1]

U.S. independent or private foundations are the largest, and sometimes most generous types of grant-making institutions in the field of African higher education. Also known as family foundations, general purpose foundations, special purpose foundations, or private non-operating foundations, independent foundations are organizations that typically have a single major source of funding - usually gifts from one family or corporation rather than funding from many sources. Their primary activity is to make grants to other charitable organizations

[1] Every organization that qualifies for tax exemption as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is a private foundation unless it falls into one of the categories specifically excluded from that term, such as hospitals or universities and organizations that normally receive a substantial part of their support from a governmental unit or from the general public.

and to individuals, rather than the direct operation of charitable programs (Cafardi et al., 2006). Corporate foundations are the second most important type of philanthropic organizations found in the field of African higher education. These foundations are usually started by a company, with a single gift that can become the endowment. The company can contribute to this in the future, as it wishes. The foundation's officers are usually the company's owners and key executives. Company-sponsored foundations such as the Bristol-Myers Squib, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, Motorola, GE, JP Morgan Chase, Coca Cola, Google, among others, have made grants to Africa in the areas of health, education, research, and economic development.

Table 11: Top U.S. Grant-makers to African Higher Education Organizations (2003-2012)	State	Number of grants	Total Grants Amount	Grant Average	phea
Ford Foundation	NY	421	$78,826,023	$187,235	✓
Rockefeller Foundation	NY	186	$54,522,589	$293,132	✓
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation	NY	180	$59,791,320	$332,174	✓
Carnegie Corporation of New York	NY	140	$105,278,596	$751,990	✓
John & Catherine MacArthur Foundation	IL	78	$43,987,054	$563,937	✓
W. K. Kellogg Foundation	MI	58	$42,430,576	$731,562	
Kresge Foundation	MI	49	$21,902,283	$446,985	✓
Atlantic Philanthropies	NY	45	$58,826,876	$1,307,264	
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation	MI	41	$3,751,800	$91,507	
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	WA	40	$73,690,156	$1,842,254	
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation	CA	30	$9,433,500	$314,450	✓
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.	NY	26	$2,016,500	$77,558	
McKnight Foundation	MN	18	$3,223,000	$179,056	
Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Inc.	NY	15	$1,432,002	$95,467	
Citi Foundation	NY	9	$556,100	$61,789	
Spencer Foundation	IL	7	$795,000	$113,571	
Christensen Fund	CA	6	$427,132	$71,189	
Motorola Solutions Foundation	IL	6	$261,000	$43,500	
J. Paul Getty Trust	CA	5	$568,800	$113,760	
Goldman Sachs Foundation	NY	4	$1,550,041	$387,510	
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	CA	4	$599,785	$149,946	
Marin Community Foundation	CA	4	$195,560	$48,890	
Flora Family Foundation	CA	4	$180,000	$45,000	
Western Union Foundation	CO	4	$140,000	$35,000	
Starr Foundation	NY	4	$100,000	$25,000	
Oprah Winfrey Foundation	IL	3	$1,300,000	$433,333	
Doris Duke Charitable Foundation	NY	3	$570,500	$190,167	
JPMorgan Chase Foundation	NY	3	$216,000	$72,000	
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation	NY	3	$128,000	$42,667	
Google.org	CA	2	$1,250,000	$625,000	
Charles A. Dana Foundation, Inc.	NY	2	$557,002	$278,501	
GE Foundation	CT	2	$200,000	$100,000	
Silicon Valley Community Foundation	CA	2	$200,000	$100,000	
Levi Strauss Foundation	CA	2	$129,000	$64,500	
Michael and Susan Dell Foundation	TX	2	$122,132	$61,066	

Community foundations are public charities that conduct grant-making activities which often, but not always, benefit local charities and charitable community projects. Generally, community foundations do not operate their own programs. Examples include the Silicon Valley Community Foundation, the Marin Community Foundation, the Pittsburgh Foundation, the New York Community Trust. The fourth type is operating foundations. These private foundations may make grants, but the amount of grants generally awarded is small relative to the funds used for the foundation's own programs. Operating foundations such as the Oprah Winfrey Foundation devote most of their resources to their programs and activities. Finally, public charities are also important grant-makers in Africa, though not necessarily through grants to higher education institutions. They can be a religion-affiliated funder such as Samaritan's Purse or a medical research organization operated in conjunction with a hospital such as Howard Hughes Medical Institute.

Furthermore, the 1,471 grants surveyed targeted numerous areas. These are classified along the following four categories: Access, Capacity Building, Branches of Learning, and Dissemination.

Table 12: Grant Classification			
Access	*Branches of Learning*	*Capacity Building*	*Dissemination*
Scholarship funds Student aid Financial aid Internship funds	Curriculum development Program evaluation Professorships Faculty/staff development Research Awards/Prizes/ Competitions Fellowships	Management development Operating support Endowments Matching/challenge support Income development In-kind gifts / Seed money Capital campaigns Building/renovation Equipment Computer technology Online services	Conferences/ seminars Advocacy Publication Exhibitions Collections acquisition Film/video/ radio

Figure 35 offers an illustration of foundation grant distribution in African higher education. They summarize the organization of programmatic activities of 78 U.S. foundations, at the same time indicating funding trends between 2003 and 2012.

The 7 Partnership foundations accounted for 65.2% of all dollars invested in higher education in Africa during that timeframe and 73.7% of all grants.

Figure 35: Foundation Funding per Category



Table 13: Foundation Funding by Category 2003-2012	U.S. Foundations Total $	Grants	PHEA Total $	PHEA Grants	Non-PHEA $ Total	Non-PHE A Grants
Access	$46,009,053	144	$29,869,948	90	$16,139,105	54
Branches of	$235,118,126	647	$146,337,497	452	$88,780,629	195
Capacity Building	$258,199,978	443	$172,954,395	355	$85,245,583	88
Dissemination	$33,815,639	237	$24,579,525	187	$9,236,114	50
Total	$573,142,796	1471	$373,741,365	1084	$199,401,43	387

The dollar/grant ratio was used to create these three graphs. Capacity building dominated the study's sample. While more dollars were attributed to capacity building, more grants served branches of knowledge. Partnership foundations mainly focused on capacity building, although not as much as the other 71 foundations. Partnership foundations prioritized creating access than other foundations.

Figure 36 illustrates the evolution of these four categories across the 2003-2012 timeframe. Capacity building appears to have dominated the period and showed spectacular peaks on two occasions (2007 and 2009), while it dropped to its lowest record in 2010. All categories dropped in 2012 which can be explained by the fact that not all 2012 grants had been reported to the Foundation Center at the time that the survey was conducted.



Figure 36: Evolution of Foundation Funding (adjusted for inflation)

Capacity building increased dramatically in 2005-06 which corresponds to the re-launch of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. The 2010 drop in capacity building corresponds with the termination of the Partnership. This graph suggests that capacity building became a popular mode of operation for U.S. foundations. It also suggests that the Partnership might have played a role in endorsing this mode across the ecology of U.S. foundations involved with African higher education. Furthermore, the data confirms that most foundations do not play a role in promoting social change and greater opportunities for underserved populations. The Access line indicates that most giving served the purposes of providing broad institutional support, just as foundations have done for decades in the United States. Similar to their actions in the realm of U.S. higher education, foundations as a whole appear content to meet the core capacity and capital needs of higher education, rather than to push these institutions to change and ready themselves for major access issues that confront the field. Arguably, the rhetoric of capacity building conferred more legitimacy upon the foundations. The following section explores the Partnership's capacity building rationale in greater depth.

The Rhetoric of "Capacity Building"

The literature on non-profit organizations and development studies suggests that organizations need legitimacy for durability and sustainability. If foundations behave according to this rule, the Partnership's foundations must have seen capacity building as an important mechanism to maximize legitimacy, particularly as they strove to generate transformations impacting the institutionalization of higher education organizations in Africa. Brinkerhoff (2005) noted that the connections between legitimacy, institutionalization, and sustainability point towards legitimacy as a significant element of capacity building. Thus, identifying the connections between legitimacy and capacity building in the Partnership can shed light on prominent institutional legitimation forces.

Comparing the Partnership's individual foundation's grant-making strategy for higher education in Africa reveals a diversity of approaches. It also highlights some commonalities that Partnership foundations exhibited. Table 14 compares these foundations' interest in capacity building, particularly in relation to higher education institutions.

Table 14: Seven Foundations' Grant-making Approaches in African Higher Education	
Carnegie	Support university revitalization and transformation. Large institutional grants to eight major university grantees. Strong focus on enhancing women's opportunities in nine universities.
Ford	On the ground investments to advance the work of visionaries on the frontlines of social change. African Higher Education Initiative (AHEI) through regional offices
MacArthur	Institutional strengthening of four universities in Nigeria and one in Madagascar. Africa Higher Education area, Conservation and Sustainable Development, Human Rights, and Population and Reproductive Health areas.
Rockefeller	Build African research capacity in agriculture, health, and economics. Support of regional postgraduate training and research networks for future researchers and professionals (agricultural economists, modern crop breeders, and public health practitioners). Makerere University in Uganda as major university grantee.
Hewlett	Focus on Population, Education, Global Development, and Philanthropy. Mandate to solve social and environmental problems. Training the next generation of African population scientists, supporting individuals' reproductive health rights, and developing open educational resources.
Mellon	Strengthening South African universities and the production of excellent scholars. Support to academic and research program development, postgraduate training, faculty development, and the development of archival collections.
Kresge	Strategic planning, advancement/fundraising, and infrastructure development through matching grants. South Africa Initiative to develop South African university partners in strategic planning and advancement.

The foundations' interests in institutional development were expressed in different ways: a focus on infrastructure development, organization strengthening, research

capacity expansion, revitalization, sustainable development, advancement, fundraising, and strategic planning. When describing what united the Partnership's founding foundations, Joyce Moock, where she served as lead program officer for the Partnership, and as special advisor to the president on higher education and human capacity building, stated the following:

> Some of the foundations lean towards intellectual energy in research, research for the important point of producing new knowledge; others are more interested in doing that but also in the conversion of that knowledge into something more practical and operational, a translational form. The four foundations have a long history in these kinds of things, but it runs very deep into the grain of these institutions, into their DNA if you will. In other words, the nature of these large, private international foundations has a lot of deep capacity building. Now, maybe not in agricultural or in health or whatever some may not have a program called higher education, but if you look into their individual programs you'll find that elements of capacity building, whether in fellowships or in developing institutions, are very prominent. (June 24, 2011 phone interview with Joyce Moock, former associate vice-president, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York)

In this quote, the foundations' interest in institutional development and capacity building is described as part of the foundations' core function. With the addition of new members, the Partnership's priorities remained focused on institutional development. In fact, this was reinforced by affinities and the meshing of values among partners. The Partnership shaped the foundations' actions around the goals of resource expansion. This would serve the purpose of impacting African universities and academic networks with greater strength. This assertion underscores the myth of capacity building as an element of mimetic affinity

among foundations; a ceremonial enactment of high impact decisions indicating a shared desire to create greater returns on investment at work in the world of large, international foundations. Arguably, the myth of capacity building and the ceremonial act of impact investing gave foundations enough justification and collective endorsement to eventually maximize legitimacy.

While foundations conformed to the myth of building capacity, they also designed and promoted a discourse of capacity building to support this strategy. Core functions were defined in the language of capacity builders. The foundations would solve challenges faced by African universities through a focus on providing financial support. This concentrated on the universities' capital infrastructure, lowering costs through economies of scale, positioning higher education as a responsible partner in building democratic societies, triggering public policy reform, increasing access and gender equity, and encouraging inter-institutional collaboration.

According to its mission statement, the Partnership capitalized on the distinctive contribution of each foundation through shared learning. It enhanced the ability of grant-makers to support sustainable improvements in university performance. The Partnership's reports underscore that the foundations tried to "test and demonstrate the best that philanthropy had to offer by pooling knowledge and strategies." It aimed to provide "balanced emphases on the academic and the practical, thus enabling universities to become more robust intellectual institutions that can successfully produce a new generation of

scholars, analysts, scientists, technologists, teachers, public servants, and entrepreneurs."

The following graph presents the distribution of grants per recipient type and confirms this objective.



Figure 37: Distribution of Grants per Recipient Type

The grants made during the 10-year collaboration clearly indicate that universities were the target of this collaboration, followed by research centers and academic networks. The following graph indicates which types of grantee institutions received the most funding from Partnership foundations. The graph was plotted by linking grantee type descriptors by foundation descriptors.



Figure 38: Distribution of Grantee Type Codes by Foundation

- African Universities
- Networks & Research
- International Organizations
- Foundations & NGOs
- Government
- Libraries, Museums & Arts
- Parks and Wildlife
- Multiple

Figure 38 reflects what the dollar distribution suggested: African universities, networks and research centers were by far the main focus of the Partnership's foundations. Analyzing foundation spending by keywords used in the Partnership's grant nomenclature reflects the overarching leitmotif of capacity building that directed the foundations' grant-making.



Figure 39: Foundation Spending by Keyword

- Academic support
- Foundation administered projects
- ICT
- Institutional development

The foundations unfolded their capacity building strategy by focusing on institutional development and structuring information and communication technology, as Figure 39 illustrated. Using the study's combined datasets, the following graph can zoom in on the actual distribution of areas of focus by foundation and thus visualize capacity building in action.

Figure 40: Distribution of Areas of Focus by Foundation



Institutional and capacity development emerges as each foundation's priority. This is followed by information and communication technology, which is a form of capacity development itself. Indeed, fiber optic cable and the Bandwidth Consortium project are among the Partnership's capstone achievements. The

Partnership's most significant accomplishment was to provide internet bandwidth at affordable prices to African universities in desperate need of essential resources for research and teaching. With co-funding from the Partnership, universities in several West African countries formed a consortium to purchase a six-fold increase in bandwidth and share internet capacity at lower rates—an important first step towards parity in the online world. All participating foundations agreed on supporting the bandwidth initiative though not all foundations funded it. Other areas such as administrative staff development, technical assistance, library support and, to a certain extent, academic research support, could also be counted as capacity building. There was very little specialization in the Partnership: no foundation had a single area of focus, instead the areas of focus were distributed equally among the foundations.

To understand the evolution of the Partnership's strategy across time, space and areas of funding, the study's data was examined through various indicators. The data was organized around four phases which included 1) data pre-dating the Partnership, 2) the Partnership's first phase (2000-2005). 3) the Partnership's second phase (2005-2010) and 4) data post-dating the Partnership. An analysis by country of focus and project phase provided the following geographical comparison:

Figure 41: Distribution of Countries of Focus by Project Phase



Although South Africa consistently received the largest share of foundation focus, Figure 41 indicates that there was less concentration on South Africa and a greater balance of focus between each target country towards the end of the Partnership and even more so after the Partnership ended.

The following graph illustrates the evolution of the Partnership's focus by area of funding based on the codes provided by the study's qualitative data. The data was organized around 14 main categories which were then compared by phase. These results demonstrate the discourses that dominated the Partnership, and reveal how foundations conform to the myth of capacity building.

Figure 42: Distribution of Areas of Focus by Project Phase



Capacity building did not solely function as a leveraging process between these foundations. It also worked as a collective rhetoric framing the foundations' initiatives. In the words of David Court, capacity building helped these foundations reach a consensus, despite the fragmented nature of their collaboration:

> Through a process of self-education the Partners have developed a consensus in their approach to capacity building needs, but in practice each has different emphases in where and how they address training needs. Individually training projects, e.g. Carnegie Women's Fellowship Program, Rockefeller's Makerere decentralization training, and Ford's Fellowships all have different purposes and target groups with the result that capacity building purpose looks and is fragmented. (David Court, 2004 email correspondence. PHEA archives).

Thus, capacity building functioned as a ceremonial rite that framed the foundations' individual and collective ambitions, and rallied foundation representatives around a common goal:

> There is tremendous good will among the foundation representatives to the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. All are committed to strengthening higher education in Africa and all appear to believe that their own foundation's grant making is improved by the collaboration. (Suzanne Grant Lewis, email to John Butler-Adams, 4/5/07. PHEA archives).

This quote highlights the dual ideal of collaboration shared by the Partnership's actors. They shared both the myth of capacity building and a desire to legitimize their own foundation's grant-making. Thus, capacity building was not just a unifier among these foundations but it also served as a transformative mechanism legitimizing the foundations' objectives. The rhetoric of institutionalization prevalent in the Partnership leveraged environmental legitimacy by conforming to the myths and ceremonial rite of capacity building. In a seminal study, Ira Silvers (2006) suggests that we look beyond the rhetoric of philanthropic collaborations. Indeed, the Partnership was not simply a question of rhetoric and conformity with environmental myths; it was also a strategy that generated legitimacy from its influence on the field of African higher education. The following section explores the strategy of influence that the Partnership's members conceived collectively.

Influence Strategy and High-Impact Philanthropy

Given the complexity of the various types of legitimacy, the Partnership's foundations were unlikely to be in a position to satisfy all actual and potential constituents giving or withholding legitimacy. Program officers and foundation leaders needed to choose key environmental stakeholders to respond to and avoid the temptation to please everyone. The ability to provide or withhold legitimacy can be seen as one among a set of resources that the foundation's beneficiaries in Africa possessed. Thus determining which grantee to pay attention to, from the funders' perspective, became an exercise in grantee analysis. Strategies and visions had to be crafted for grantees to allocate their legitimizing resources in favor of the Partnership's foundations. The amount of effort put into these strategies depended to some extent on what the Partnership's foundations sought to accomplish. If the Partnership's foundations provided support that was well recognized, valued and desired, then heavy investment in strategies promoting legitimacy would not be as necessary. If, on the other hand, the Partnership's foundations were engaged in activities that were questionable or deviated significantly from commonly-accepted funding practices, legitimation from grantees would assume more importance.

Furthermore, defining a common strategy for higher education in Africa appears unrealistically complex. It required finding some form of strategic uniformity as a target. This is challenging even with a fewer number of countries.

The following comparison of the Partnership's target countries was produced by tallying the study's grantee codes by country.

Figure 43: Comparison of NI & RD Sub-Measures by Country



Although there was some overall affinity across the study's measures, the graph demonstrates significant variations among target countries. The graph summarizes opinions which suggest that instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, each country required a specific approach, a point which foundations know very well. Thus, applying a common strategy for nine target countries, with an additional expectation that it might have the ripple effect of impacting other countries on the

continent, indicates the need for more than an over-simplistic understanding of the challenges ahead. It suggests that the Partnership had a different purpose which they claim was advocacy. Arguably, this was an opportunistic campaign to promote higher education ideals that they had long established in the selected grantees.

The selection of grantees was achieved along strict principles. The inaugural Partnership meeting took place on November 29, 1999, historical connections were predominant and membership prerequisites already in motion.

> Selection of institutions has begun based on the connection of the institutions with Rockefeller (Makerere) and Carnegie (Dar es Salaam). Other cases to be selected need to be good candidates for potential support according to criteria including past and current relationship with our foundations, degree of innovation, ability to sustain innovation over time, and relationship between the university and society (responsiveness to social change). (December 1, 1999 email correspondence from Janice Petrovich, Program Director Ford Foundation, New York. PHEA archives)

The quote lays out the criteria for the selection of grantees which included the need for an existing link with one of the Partnership's foundations. The grantees had to be dedicated to innovation, which also indicated their willingness to reform their institution. Finally, the grantee had to demonstrate its ability as a proponent or participant in social change for the country it served. Furthermore, the Partnership's strategic plan of selecting countries and institutions was based on three proclaimed principles: reform, democratization and political stability. The

last in the list was ultimately removed from the list as the following excerpt drawn from a meeting of the foundations' presidents states:

> Vartan Gregorian asked about the three Partnership foundations' principles: reform, democratization and political stability. He noted that both Joyce and Narciso had deleted 'political stability' from the list and asked whether this was intentional. Although Vartan was particularly interested in Nigeria when he asked this question, it became quickly apparent that the situation in countries can rapidly change. Gordon Conway suggested that the Partnership think in terms of "countries on the move towards democratization, public reform, stability and also decentralization." Nigeria could therefore remain within the Partnership nexus. Susan closed the discussion by recommending the following language: 'the Partnership works in countries where the degree of stability enables reform and democratization'. (11/17/2003 - Meeting of the Foundation Presidents. PHEA archives).

Constructing a strategy around these principles enabled the Partnership to aspire to ambitious goals which sought to lift a continent, foster economic development and influence knowledge production as the following quote indicates:

> The partnership seeks to lift the whole higher education system of sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, it has selected six countries, thus far, with progressive democratic and liberalized environments and with universities on the move that can serve as demonstrations of what higher education in Africa can accomplish under the right conditions. Within this framework, each Foundation concentrates on those countries, and universities within them, that fit with its mission and preferences. The four foundations together support activities that offer high potential for cross-learning

> and joint problem-solving. (11/29/2004 Memo from Joyce Moock. PHEA archives).

The six countries became nine and the four foundations became seven but the approach remained the same. Arguably, the arguments supporting this approach are in contradiction with the realities of Africa. This quote suggests that the foundations believed they could impact the continent by selecting mostly Commonwealth countries when in fact clear organizational differences exist between each higher education system, particularly systems that are inherited from different colonial influences. Yet, an accomplishment report published by the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa stated that the Partnership "directly or indirectly improved conditions for 4.1 million African students enrolled at 379 universities and colleges" during its ten-year existence (2000-2010). This optimistic claim epitomizes the foundations' ambitions. It is reflected in the following quote from Joyce Moock:

> There was a sense that… if we did this the right way it would lift the entire education system on the subcontinent. That really is bizarre sounding with the kind of money we had to spend. What we were looking for were countries with a progressive environment. Also, with some important geopolitical recognition we were looking at the universities on the move as well, and we thought if we could put the funds on the right targets, at the right time, these would serve as demonstrations. (June 24, 2011 Interview with Joyce Moock, Associate Vice-President, The Rockefeller Foundation).

The Partnership's official mission was to provide financial support that concentrated on "universities in countries undergoing systemic public policy

reform and strengthening the ability of individual institutions to play their distinctive role within differentiated national systems of higher education; and encouraging inter-institutional collaboration." The following passage describes how the foundations envisioned success for their endeavor:

> What would success ultimately look like? Selected universities and centers of intellectual inquiry will demonstrate ability to promote the free flow of ideas and enlarge the public sphere of their societies. They will evidence effective use of information technology. As part of the national higher education system they will build and transfer a repertoire of skills essential for the development of their societies. They will be part of a global network of imaginative teaching, research and outreach institutions in which creativity is fed through experimentation and shared experiences. They will reflect a quiet revolution in institution building in Africa that can unleash the talents of the continent for the well-being of its people and those beyond its borders. (November 10, 2004. Core Statement of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. PHEA archives).

The success of the Partnership's strategy gravitated around the notion of a quiet revolution in institution building in Africa that could "unleash the talents of the continent."

Arguably, the Partnership's approach to build capacities by focusing on a few relatively strong universities also appears as a contradiction. Selecting weaker universities and applying a capacity building approach to developing them would make more sense. This point is also valid for education schools which foundation

presidents did not favor. It also raised some criticism particularly from universities which did not get selected, as the following remark suggests:

> Another critique that we got was that 'Well, you have selected the winners, you selected Makerere University, the University of Dar-es-Salam, the University of Ghana, and so on… What about other universities facing difficulties who are also in need of support? Are you creating an exclusive club?' So it was, in other settings, somehow perceived as an exclusive club, as not reaching out to other constituencies that were also in need and so on. Of course this was a deliberate choice that we had made, but we were perceived in that light (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, former program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

The foundations were criticized for creating an exclusive club of universities and for not supporting other universities in need. However, the Partnership's foundations believed in the multiplying potential of their strategy. By selecting grantees with whom they had long-established connections, which some critics could view as a source of dependency, the foundations orchestrated a maximization strategy which was thought to have the potential to influence the African continent.

Concurrently, the Partnership members added an advocacy component to an already intricate mission. The goal was to convince governments, international organizations and other donors with an influence strategy that relied principally on the Partnership's raison d'être and symbolic value, reinforced by the collective legitimacy of its members. To a lesser extent, non-governmental organizations

and inter-governmental organizations such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development or the African Union were also targeted by the foundations. For instance, the African Union added a new program, the "Harmonize Higher Education in Africa" program. This focuses on quality rating mechanism educational publishing, teacher development, and the revitalization of technical and vocational education. The following quote from Dr. Jorge Balan, former program officer for the Ford foundation illustrates how the Partnership's strategy served to leverage other players in the field. The quote also highlights how the notion of leverage was used to add credit to the Partnership's impact:

> Outcomes (as different from outputs) are meant to indicate impact... Impact, at this time, can be measured only at the level of perceptions and evaluations among key actors within the academic community, higher education institutions and system, governance structures, governments, and intergovernmental agencies in Africa, as well as bilateral and multilateral agencies, donor community, African studies and international higher education experts and institutions in the US and Europe. But also relevant is impact upon the four foundations in their work on African higher education. (Jorge Balan, 2004 email).

As this quote indicates, the donor community included government agencies, foreign development organizations, foundations and many other funding institutions. Thus, the Partnership's foundations gained access to discussions on higher education in national and multilateral settings. This was done with a view to maximize their influence, as the following quote confirms:

> By buying relatively inexpensive seats at the higher education table in African countries of geopolitical importance, in which funding alliances beyond the partnership are available, we can help bring promising experiments to scale -- with cascading effects across the continent. (11/29/2004 Memo from Joyce Moock. PHEA archives).

Arguably, this leveraging dimension took over the Partnership's original objectives of generating reform and institutionalizing the field of higher education in Africa, as the following quote suggests:

> Formalizing the Partnership gave it more heft. It said 'we take this very seriously, we think higher education is very serious for a country's development and a country's strength in participating in a global society or economy' and it just raised it another level of respect and dignity where it had been downgraded. (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Pat Rosenfield, Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

The Partnership's formalization is described as a statement. Through this prestigious foundations are able to advocate for higher education's role in development and promote their ideals. This point reinforces the importance of legitimacy in setting the terrain for the production of position statements. As the following quotes indicate, not everyone agreed with this approach of making position statements and opportunistic advocacy:

> Jonathan Fanton: This agenda is not focused on helping institutions improve. We need to remember that we started this Partnership to support institution building. (February 23, 2006 Minutes. PHEA archives).

> What exactly is the Partnership's overall strategy for expansion in Africa. What is the vision for coverage say 5 or 10 years from now? and why? I'm not convinced that it is enough simply to state that the Partnership works in countries undergoing systemic policy reform and in which two or more foundation have programmatic interest. These are conditions for entry, but they don't define what is the overall strategic objectives for expansion and that would guide a more systematic and (what appears to be) less opportunistic expansion. (Peter Matlon, Director, Rockefeller Foundation, Nairobi Office, February 23, 2006 Minutes. PHEA archives).

In the first quote, a foundation president reacts to a shift in the partnership's orientation and restates the Partnership's original purpose. In the second, a program officer questions the Partnership's strategy for expansion. The following quote points to the way in which expansion was put to the test when the Partnership's mission and purpose were being challenged:

> The Partnership is at the crossroads... Our own foundations are undergoing leadership changes or internal review and redirection processes. Rockefeller has announced its intentions to focus on big problem solving initiatives like Africa's green revolution... Against this background the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa must revisit and interrogate its 'raison d'être' and comparative advantage and if necessary re-invent itself. The time is not for business as usual, it is not for small joint and evolutionary ideas and actions. (Minutes of January 16, 2007 meeting. PHEA archives).

In this passage, foundations appear to be challenged by environmental constraints. The landscape for philanthropy had changed and was being interrogated by the intentions announced by players with larger resources, such as Bill Gates and

Warren Buffet. From institution building the Partnership gradually shifted its focus to advocating about the role of higher education in the development of Africa, as the following comment confirms:

> The foundations came to valorize higher education… To give value, not even add value, to give value to the importance of higher education institutions in the economic development of African countries. And to not only affect the debate by doing that, to bring money onto the table to demonstrate their interest. (September 26, 2011 interview with Tade Aina Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

Not only is the notion of value and valorization in the foundations' hands but it also has a separate yet complementary relationship to money. The relative strategic deployment of funds in this case confirms that foundations benefit from their privileged status to influence a field.

> The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa injected prestige and a light on the higher education system at a time when it was sort of disregarded as being ineffectual and weak, and I think that was valuable. (September 29, 2011 Interview with Bill Moses, program officer for The Kresge Foundation).

Influence on the ecology of donors - including government budgets, international organizations and development agencies - became an indicator for the Partnership's impact. It became a way for foundations to answer questions of accountability. The following comment is from Narciso Matos, Carnegie's former program director:

> Visibility is essential for successful interventions to encourage other African governments, donors and investment agencies to support higher education and to reassure the foundations' trustees and leaders that money is being effectively invested. On the other hand, too much publicity might raise the expectations of other needy institutions and countries, leading policymakers to steer resources away from partnership universities toward other pressing needs not presently addressed by donors. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, Former Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

The following quotes reveal that national governments, foreign investors and the World Bank were target interlocutors for the foundations' collaborative effort:

> The partnership, I think in terms of the U.S. and to some extent European policy makers, did do a lot to put the issue of higher education back on the table. The Partnership coincided with reengagement on the part of the World Bank in the field of higher education in Africa after a period of moving away from that kind of funding. (July 12, 2011 phone interview with Raoul Davion, program officer, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation)

The Partnership's advocacy focus is described as having successfully established higher education in Africa as a priority for policy makers and international funders. In the following quote, the World Bank and the Mozambique Ministry of Higher Education appear as Partnership targets that were reached:

> The partnership can claim, I think rightly, that in Mozambique it did help develop Mozambique's strategic plan for the development of higher education which over time evolved into the framework for the establishment of 20 different universities in the country. The partnership was

> very instrumental in helping the then ministry for higher education, science and technology, to spearhead the process of thinking about higher education in Africa… Eventually the World Bank did approve a major grant for something like seven million dollars to support higher education in Mozambique. I want to believe that the partnership played a role in that. (September 9, 2011 phone interview with Narciso Matos, Former Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York).

In this quote, the Partnership is described as helping a government "spearhead the process of thinking about higher education in Africa" and gives itself credit for leveraging a World Bank grant to Mozambique. Finding credit and accountability in their grantees' success is a recurrent theme in the discourse of foundation officers; it is also a way to find legitimacy, particularly within a strategy of influence, that is hard to measure otherwise as the following quotes clearly indicate:

> Higher education in Africa is back on the agenda for many organizations, and it's not clear that it needs this kind of partnership. We stir the pot, we keep it going as we try to get some motivation and some acceleration going forward, and hopefully in a strong direction and as we see now some of the larger corporations are taking it upon themselves and that we see the importance pegged to science and technology and that goes back to higher education… I'm hoping we could take a little bit of credit for coming in when we did, if we had not come in would it have happened anyway? (June 24, 2011 phone interview with Joyce Moock former associate Vice-President, The Rockefeller Foundation).
>
> The idea was this, if this was successful, this would attract not only more support, but first and foremost national support... I wish [outside donors] could go away and that governments would have strong enough budgets and see

> the commitment to this. (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Pat Rosenfield, Program Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York, USA).

The goals of these funders were to place higher education in Africa on the priority list of donors and national governments, and leverage support from them while making them recognize the contributions of higher education to the economic development of Africa.

In several instances the World Bank appeared as the Foundations' nemesis. Although the World Bank created a specific department for collaboration between the Bank and foundations in order to capitalize on the influx of cash and ideas generated by private foundations, partnering with the World Bank is not the foundations' priority, as the following quote indicates:

> Working with the World Bank as a private foundation means a lot of heartache and pain in terms of negotiating memoranda of understanding and legal documentation for partnerships. That was a scar that I think many, many people I know still bear, myself among them. (Anonymous).

According to its website the World Bank sees partnerships with foundations as important in order to "gain knowledge and experience in best practices, research and information related to their specific country knowledge and sector expertise; to share information in order to foster complementary work; and to deepen development work through consultation on corporate priorities such as country and regional assistance strategies." The Bank designed a framework for its collaboration with foundations which it describes in interesting terms:

> The World Bank also values partnerships with foundations in the development of poverty reduction strategy papers, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Comprehensive Development Framework. It supports initiatives that are foundation based, yet complementary to Bank activities, such as research, pilots, evaluations, strategies, seminars and conferences; and enlarge Bank and foundation capacity to convene and support broad consortia of donors and specialists in regional or global initiatives through intellectual and financial support. (Excerpt from a 2008 WorldBank.org webpage).

In this passage, foundations are described as complementary to Bank activities, particularly with respect to conducting research, pilots and seminars. Interestingly, these activities characterize the Branches of Learning focus described in the introduction and not the Capacity Building focus that dominated the grants data presented above. This can explain why Partnership foundations were reluctant to collaborate with the World Bank, while hoping to leverage the Bank's funding potential. The following quotes point to this:

> One question was how to deal with the controversial issue of the World Bank, which is looking at how to increase its support for higher education. The partners generally agreed that maximizing the information flow while minimizing formal association would be the most politic way of proceeding, especially given the combination in some countries of the problematic standing of the bank and the politicized nature of higher education. (Andrea Johnson, 10/15-17/00 Meeting in Nairobi Summary PHEA archives).

> The Presidents meetings only lasted three hours and that's not enough time to go over in any depth what it is that the partnership was doing and to talk through what it might do, what it shouldn't be doing, where opportunities lie. I think one consequence of this lack of involvement of the foundation presidents is that the opportunity for the

> partnership to leverage support for higher education in Africa from other organizations like the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European foundations. That obvious opportunity was never taken advantage of. (July 20, 2011 phone interview with Phillip Griffiths, The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)

As such the World Bank and other international donors such as foreign development agencies, European foundations, pan-African development funds and U.S. foundations, formed an environment where the legitimacy of one's organization was associated with the ability to leverage funds from another. Legitimacy in the environment of higher education developers thus appears as a malleable resource which can be tapped into with an intricate strategy of influence. However, this strategy does remain dependent on the legitimation role of universities, as the following section explores.

Legitimizing the Role of Foundations in African Higher Education

The discourse on priorities in African higher education is set in a battlefield where grantors and grantees not only confront their perspectives but also contend with national contexts that do not necessarily encourage the development of universities. The following excerpt from Saint (1992) confirms this perspective:

> Universities and the governments that support them exist in an uneasy and sometimes adversarial relationship across much of Sub-Saharan Africa. The principal sources of this tension are governments' perception of the university community as a frequent locus of criticism and political

> opposition, the increased involvement of governments in university affairs, and the inability of governments to provide for the financial needs of universities on a sustainable basis.[1] (P xiv)

National governments can become obstacles to the goals of foreign foundations working towards revitalizing universities and institutionalizing a field. Their strategies at times react antipathetically to a government's policies. In this context, legitimacy is granted to the extent that foundations are perceived as acting accountably; representing the interests of their beneficiaries (e.g. universities) but not raising issues that would put them in conflict with national governments. The discrepancy among perspectives and expectations between universities, governments and foundations is the locus where legitimacy is created, leveraged, managed, maximized or withheld. This locus is a controllable and malleable source of legitimation that can also serve as an indispensable currency for foundations and universities.

In order to establish the connection between institutional priorities and legitimacy formation, it is relevant to examine the variations between institutional discourses of universities. Figure 44 illustrates the perspectives of 14 universities which benefitted from the Partnership's support between 2000 and 2010. Each institutional profile was created by tallying the codes produced by the interviews of individuals who were affiliated with these institutions. The number of

[1] William S. Saint. 1992. Universities in Africa: Strategies for Stabilization and Revitalization. Technical Paper No.194. Technical Department, Africa Region. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

interviewees is indicated for each institution. The priorities of universities resided principally around notions of institutional sustainability, competition for resources, and policies and national contexts. Arguably, it is by meeting these needs that universities would grant legitimacy to their external funders



Figure 44: Comparison of sub-measures by university

Partnership foundations gained legitimacy by helping universities become self-sustainable and less dependent on external funding. They did so by

leveraging national governments and making the case for universities in national contexts. This point is clearly illustrated in the following quote:

> I think that it's a pity that the Partnership itself has dissolved because I think that the small gains that it did achieve needed to be built on, both in terms of up-scaling, because unfortunately higher education is still not a priority for governments. They don't seem to have bought into this notion that higher education is absolutely vital for the development of poor countries... We need to constantly hammer it, and I think that's where the foundations could have helped us, the Partnership could have helped us in pushing these things, because unfortunately although the higher education people both in the sector in universities and in the policymaking domain, they understand education but they don't understand development. (June 2010 Archived Transcript of Interview with Faculty, Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa, South Africa)

The Partnership is described as capable of making higher education a priority for governments and policy-makers, particularly by demonstrating the positive impact of higher education on development. In the eyes of the grantee quoted above, foundations had the ability and legitimacy to change the place of higher education in these countries. Yet, it was something that the Partnership did not do enough of though, according to this view which called for more engagement of foundations with governments to achieve sustainable results. However, not all grantees believed in this ability of the foundations. The following view sees foundations as being ultimately limited by governments' political will to create this change:

> After their contribution, there is nothing that the foundations can do because they have contributed to raising the issue and focusing the minds of involved groups of people. Beyond that, it's really up to the universities involved and their respective governments to do something about it, and that is where the challenge still remains. ML: So you are saying that the ability of something like the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa to make a difference is limited by the political will to act. NN: Yes... (June 2010 Archived Transcript of Interview with Male Vice-Chancellor, University of Cape Town, South Africa)

In this quote, a vice-chancellor in South Africa states that foundations are limited in taking issues raised in grants beyond the circle of individuals directly involved in the grants. Political will remains the main obstacle to extending these issues into a larger sphere.

Partnership interviewees acknowledged that the foundations did not engage enough with governments to make the case for higher education, which they wanted to make in other ways:

> Basically these seven foundations had almost nothing to do with government. And that's not unusual for foundations. Their view is it's not our forte. We might make grants to people who work on policy advocacy or policy change, but we don't engage in that directly. That's not our forte. We're private funders and it's better that our grantees engage at that. So, we very rarely interacted with national or local government. (July 8, 2011 Interview with Suzanne Grant Lewis, Coordinator, Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, USA)

Governments were not the targets of the foundations' advocacy campaign, as the figure 45confirms:



Figure 45: Comparison of Public Policy Code Application and PHEA Spending per Country

There is a clear negative correlation between the amount the Partnership invested (red line), and its focus on policies. The focus on policies is measured indirectly by how often public policy codes showed up in documents indexed under a given country. This data confirms that the Partnership's foundations did not engage with governments, even while this was important to generate more sustainability for universities and less dependency on foreign donors. This is a weakness of the Partnership - and perhaps of U.S. foundations in Africa in general - which were described as not having sufficient leverage on African state actors, and therefore limited the scope and durability of their grants' impact.

In most cases, the Partnership's foundations cast a watchful eye over their beneficiaries. They offered continuous support to some of their grantees, who in turn legitimated their presence and acknowledged their contributions. The

following quote from Mamman Aminu Ibrahim, convener of the Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions demonstrates this:

> We always refer to Carnegie and MacArthur as granddads because they were involved at every stage, even the discussion that started the forum, all activities, they were financing and supporting. We kept it very small...too much work I was supposed to be doing but now except with less bureaucracy and this time with institutions themselves deciding priorities. (June 2010 interview with Mamman Aminu Ibrahim, Convenor of the Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions, PHEA archives).

Although this quote portrays a certain degree of dependency - being involved at every stage and being called granddads - it also highlights a close relationship that served both parties.

Grantees expected foundations to behave in certain ways. For instance, it was expected that foundations pay attention to all the actors involved in areas targeted by their initiatives, as the following quote from Catherine Ngugi, a Faculty at Makerere University in Uganda suggests:

> Very little work is done by foundations or the universities themselves on the value of the in-kind contribution. It is important for the institutions and the foundations to be thinking about it. If foundations really want to show their commitment to higher education, it behooves them to have an understanding of what other people working on the same area are doing. (June 2010 interview with Catherine Ngugi, Faculty at Makerere University in Uganda, PHEA archives).

Foundations were expected to take into consideration the involvement of people on the ground. Their commitment to higher education in Africa depended upon this consideration, and so did their legitimacy.

Grantees gained from the process of funding and were closely monitored by grantors, as the following quote from Muhammad Y. Bello, a Faculty at Bayero University confirms:

> So for me the grant served two purposes. First there is the common African proverb, that it is better to teach somebody how to fish than to give that person a fish for the day. The MacArthur grant for us went a step further. It provided us with a fish. It provided us with the money to do a number of things, but it also taught us to source money from other places – based on our experience and sometimes using that as leverage. (June 2010 interview with Muhammad Y. Bello, Faculty at Bayero University in Nigeria, PHEA archives)

In this quote, MacArthur is clearly accepted in its role as a solution provider, as a trainer, as a fundraising adviser, and as a funder. In exchange, the grantor is fully accepted in its role. The legitimation mechanism put in place is central to the relationship, and serves both parties.

The influence of foundations on African universities is important, and has multiplying effects for both grantor and grantee when the relationship is successful. This relationship is also the most powerful legitimation process that impact-seeking philanthropists seek. The following excerpts illustrate this point. In this quote from Dr. Monica Karuhanga Berehao, a Professor in the Department

of Agricultural Studies at Makerere University, the relationship with Carnegie is described as mutually beneficial:

> Carnegie made it move beyond policy statements to something being done. Carnegie has helped us have something on the ground, which we can. It has laid ground for other donors to see the importance and relevance to push these initiatives forward. (Interview with Dr. Monica Karuhanga Berehao. Lecturer in the the Department of Agricultural Extension & Innovations Studies, Makerere University. PHEA archives)

On one hand, Carnegie's support lifted several initiatives from words into action. On the other, these initiatives also served as examples to convince other funders to support similar activities. This ensured legitimacy for Carnegie and multiplying the impact of these initiatives by leveraging other funders. In the following example, a Carnegie initiative, gender studies, is granted legitimacy by a grantee:

> Previously the university had very little in terms of gender... thanks to Carnegie's support we have some books and journals in the library... I believe that through this gradually we were able to build the interest of people in the area of gender ... a legitimate area of study... We hope to be able to establish a department of gender studies. (Interview with Dr. Wilhelmina Tete Mensah, Director, Gender Mainstreaming Directorate at University of Education, Winneba, Ghana)

Through its relationship with Carnegie the University of Education at Winneba moved from being a recipient of resources for gender studies to a proponent of gender studies as a legitimate area of study.

Carnegie was not the only foundation to benefit from these legitimation processes. Arguably all foundations did. The following example illustrates how MacArthur pushed distance learning as an area that became central to the University of Ibadan:

> One great thing happened with the funding of the MacArthur Foundation. The Distance Learning Center was identified as a place that had potential because it was part of the package of the initial grant that was actually given in 2002 as part of the funding fee. So that in itself created or put the Distance Learning on the University's priority as one of the flagships, something that the University wanted to showcase. (Interview with Dr. Francis Egbokhare, a Professor in the Department of Linguistics and African Languages, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. PHEA archives)

Like gender studies in the previous example, from being marginal, distance learning became flagship at Ibadan through just one grant from MacArthur. In exchange, the initiative was showcased by the university and most likely replicated in other universities. The initiative also became fully legitimate in the process, and even more so when the university became its best advocate.

The relationship was one of power, between a funder and a beneficiary; the sources of potential conflict were carefully monitored. Establishing trust was an arduous process, as the following quote indicates, since both parties were conscious of the risks of an unequal power-sharing relationship:

> We learned about the concept of working in partnership with the Vice Chancellors, or the appropriate person in the field so it's truly a peer to peer relationship, understanding

> that we have the power relations with the money but they have the power relations because they have the institution. There are lines of intersection and then being really open to learning and being told 'no, this is not the way to proceed.' (August 19, 2011 interview in New York with Pat Rosenfield, program director, Carnegie Corporation of New York)

In this passage, foundations and universities are described as peers with equal powers in a partnership between money and institution, immaterial and material. There is a status quo as both partners can gain or lose from the relationship. The learning process described reflects the necessary trust-building efforts that foundations have to take into consideration. Grantees are also described as having veto powers and the ability to say no. However, this conversation is also biased as the grantees' necessity will often push them to say what grantors want to hear. The following excerpt confirms this point. It is taken from a 2004 report on the evaluation of the Partnership:

> There were additional concerns that it is all too easy for donors to be told only what grantees think the donors want to hear. Frustrations were expressed by some foundation staff about how difficult it can be to get universities to lead the discourse on priorities, even when they were encouraged by the foundations to do so. (p. 18)

The process was successful at times, as the following comment by Dr. M. L. Luhanga, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam confirms:

> Foundations should believe in the philosophy of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa as practiced by Carnegie. It was responsive to the needs of African countries and spearheaded by Vartan Gregorian. For

> example, I was very glad when I met him to see he was very gender-sensitive. I have always been very gender-sensitive. (Interview with Dr. M. L. Luhanga Vice-Chancellor, University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. PHEA archives).

In this quote, a grantee praises the philosophy and approach of a grantor to the point of commending the grantor's leadership. Carnegie's president, Vartan Gregorian, epitomizes his foundation's responsiveness to the needs of African universities.

Instead of hegemonic dependency, which often transpires in the literature on U.S. foundations abroad, this last section analyzes the relationship of U.S. foundations and African universities as a virtuous circle of serving and being served, highlighting a mechanism that provided legitimacy to grantors and leverage to grantees. Makerere University in Uganda offers a good example. In 1963, Makerere became the University of East Africa, offering courses leading to general degrees from the University of London. The special relationship with the University of London came to an end in 1970 and the University of East Africa instituted its own degree programs. On July 1, 1970, Makerere became an independent national university, offering undergraduate and postgraduate courses leading to its own degrees. Carnegie first initiated grants to Makerere University in 1937 and supported a variety of programs at the university. [1] Between 2000

---

[1] The East African Institute for Social Research (1951-1957); Leadership Study (1952-1955); the Development of Teaching and Research (1954-1975); Extra-mural programs (1960-1964); the National Institute of Education (1963-1977); Social Psychology, Research, and Training in Collaboration with Syracuse University (1966-1977); the Association of Teacher Education in Africa (1969-1972); Program of

and 2010, Makerere University received $42 million from Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford, MacArthur, and Mellon through the Partnership and from other donors. Today, Makerere is a fee-based institution whose ambition is to become "a center of academic excellence, providing world-class teaching, research and service relevant to sustainable development needs of society", as stated by its mission statement. Hegemony-oriented theorists would argue that Makerere's relationship with U.S. foundations pushed the university towards an American model. However, Makerere's shift towards high tuition and globalist ambition is a result of the university's exchange of legitimacy with foreign funders. The process of integrating an international dimension into the purpose and delivery of its education came from the university's interaction with donors. Its success in attracting large foundation gifts led Makerere to become a standard for Africa's other universities, which in turn replicate Makerere's strategy in order to compete. Makerere has also used its fundraising success to legitimize its autonomy from state control, and advance to new levels. Universities such as Makerere act strategically to manage their resource dependencies. The dynamic interaction and evolution of universities with foreign donors is explained by this mechanism of inter-organizational legitimation. Hence, external resource dependence affects both internal and trans-organizational dynamics but can be maneuvered to a universities' advantage.

Research, Curriculum Revision, and Staff Development for Primary Teacher Training in Uganda (1971-1972); Educational Programs (1979-1992); Redevelopment of the Institute (1979); Seminar on Economic and Social Development in Uganda (1985-1994).

Environmental Legitimacy and Higher Education in Africa

Considering the Partnership's environmental context in Africa along with the importance of legitimacy, it can be observed that collaborative and environmental factors contribute to legitimizing the foundations' role and goals in higher education in Africa. The Partnership's advocacy component, in the eyes of their constituents, provided legitimacy to the foundations because they strove to achieve policy outcomes that reflected the general commitment to environmental principles and practices that their grantees valued. This particular legitimacy was important for foundations whose outputs were hard to measure and whose intended outcomes were difficult to attribute to particular actions. Due to this ambiguity, grantees may have also had difficulty in assuring themselves that the foundations were contributing to their interests.

Resource-dependent universities must interact with other institutions in their environment to acquire needed resources. Problems arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their environment, but because this environment is not dependable. The need for resources - financial and physical resources as well as information - makes universities potentially dependent on the external environment as a supplier of these resources. The environment, including local actors, is a strong factor influencing inter-organizational variation. This view suggests that universities are embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships. As they try to alter their environments, they become subject

to new and different constraints as the very patterns of interdependence change. African universities attempt to manage the constraints and uncertainty that result from the need to acquire resources from the environment by using various co-optive strategies. Because of external constraints on revenue and autonomy, decision-making organizations possess both the desire and the ability to negotiate their position within those constraints using a variety of tactics. Co-opting sources of constraint to obtain more autonomy and the ability to pursue organizational interests are therefore processes central to understanding African universities.

From the perspective of grantees, the Partnership's foundations preference of some over others for their legitimizing resources became an issue of power. Whose legitimation matters was determined by relative social, political, and economic power. The nature of power in inter-organizational relationships led grantees to believe that acting in the interests of more powerful partners was consistent with their own interests. The exchange relationship between the Partnership's foundations and their grantees resulted less in specific benefits for an individual university, and were more a response to the grantees' larger interests.

The Bandwidth Consortium became the Partnership's signature project. It was generally acknowledged as the foundations' most successful initiative which expanded internet affordability for universities in Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. This example illustrates how these foundations paid attention to the specific needs

of their grantees, transforming their grant-making policies into strategic philanthropy focused on initiatives which offered promising impact. In accomplishing this entrepreneurial task and serving the long-term interests of their grantees the foundations worked for social investment beyond grant-making. They established an equal partnership with universities, non-profit organizations, corporations and academic networks. This approach helped the foundations address concerns regarding their accountability, transparency, and professionalism, while acquiring legitimacy and the space to negotiate their own undertakings.

CONCLUSION

The discussion in the preceding chapters encompassed the specifics of a partnership between leading U.S. foundations - the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation. The considerable influence of these foundations, accumulated over decades of strategic grant-making in the field of African higher education, remains unrivaled and remarkable considering the relatively small size of their investments to academic institutions. These foundations have demonstrated a certain level of expertise in maximizing their investments, impact, influence, and legitimacy particularly in relation to institutions of higher learning in Africa. The study's main findings are listed below. They focus on the importance of institutional, inter-organizational and environmental factors in legitimatizing the foundations' role in African higher education. They explain the dynamics of collaboration in the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa and ways in which collaboration served the foundations involved. They also inform us about the discourse of philanthropic foundations in African higher education and the extent to which impact-seeking philanthropic foundations need elaborate legitimation mechanisms in order to operate.

Research Findings

- This study finds that the Partnership's foundations negotiated support given to African universities in exchange for legitimacy, which served their own interests. At the same time, by listening to their grantees' perspectives, establishing participatory mechanisms, and sacrificing the quintessential independence and permanency that is their trademark

and legacy, the Partnership's foundations generated valuable impact while leveraging legitimacy. In doing so, the Partnership's foundations did make significant contributions to the development of several higher education institutions.

- Issues related to interpersonal tensions, hierarchical constraint, leadership transition and grantee participation, were important people-to-people elements in the production of organizational legitimacy. The relationship and interaction between donors, particularly Partnership participants, was complex. Collaboration among the Partnership's foundations was resisted because of individualistic tendencies that dominated each foundation. As a result of the convergence of institutions with distinct, even opposite, patterns of reproduction and development, there was uneasy coexistence among foundations. Indeed, the Partnership's foundations were established in different socio-cultural eras, reflecting interests and identities that grew out of these different contexts. As such, the Partnership's foundations resisted pressures towards convergence, and navigated between collaborative and individual constraints with a view to maximize individual legitimacy. The tension between differentiation and alignment affected the balance among members.
- This study finds that the foundations surmounted these organizational challenges through constant rationalization and negotiation in order to gain from their collaborative efforts. Adapting the organizational and operational modalities of the Partnership generated more collaborative efficiency, particularly in the aggregation of reputation, knowledge transfer, and risk reduction. These elements maximized legitimacy for the foundations. Indeed, the foundations employed a strategic alignment form to suit their prerogatives. This strategy allowed them to preserve both independence and protection from collective failure, while

benefitting from legitimacy maximization. As such, the foundations' management of collaborative legitimacy increased protection against unproductive collaboration outcomes as well as the loss of credibility that those outcomes entailed. The pressure for positive outcomes and accountability among Partnership members necessitated the addition of tighter, improved legitimacy management processes. This pressure also underscored the role of foundation managers in the normalization of these processes.

- The foundations' use of the rhetoric of capacity building indicated a manipulative strategy, deployed to manage legitimacy and to introduce institutional development initiatives. The foundations succeeded in reinforcing their agenda by promoting a discourse of capacity building which advocated for the development of higher education in line with their own perspectives. In doing so, they reinforced the appropriateness and legitimacy of their views in order to safeguard their role in higher education in Africa. This rhetoric was achieved through a socially constructed process of participation and consultation with their beneficiaries, who in turn validated the foundations' actions. This normative process was also internal to the foundations as it included individuals who assessed the foundations' strategies in terms of their capacity to generate appropriate and desirable changes in African higher education.
- The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa was the sum of all the individuals that composed it. These individuals negotiated the collective interests of the Partnership and those of their respective institution, while upholding their own interpretation of social change as individuals. While it was clear that grantors were more concerned with structural, procedural and collaborative characteristics, and that grantees were more inclined towards environmental and resource-oriented factors, it is nevertheless important

to temper this view with the fact that there was variation in the trends prevalent among grantors and grantees. Both the powerful weight of foundation leaders on the foundations' assets and strategy along with the consultation and ownership of grantees in the decision-making process had significant bearing on normalizing legitimacy for the Partnership and its actors.

- The charismatic authority of foundation leaders had a significant impact on the Partnership's intra and extra-organizational equilibrium, particularly as the Partnership was initiated by the presidents themselves in order to deliver a strong message regarding the importance of higher education in Africa. In this sense, foundation leaders did not only instigate the Partnership's vision, they also served to legitimize the conveyors of their vision, that is, their staff. Apart from burdening the Partnership's decision-making processes, the legitimating power of presidents was weighed differently by foundation officers. This weight was substantial in the areas of program prioritization, power distribution and delegation.
- The Partnership received endorsement from its grantees. By being involved in varying degrees in the Partnership's processes grantees provided a form of approval and validation. This was both sought after and orchestrated by the grantors. This type of normative legitimacy was obtained through the validation of grantor practices by grantees. Grantee endorsement, however, occurred within the context of power asymmetry. The unequal nature of the Partnership was a concern for grantees who always questioned their role and share of participation. Grantors and grantees carried separate status; the foundations were equal among themselves but not with the universities. This difference of status had a bearing on how the agenda was defined. Although there was a

general consensus among the participants and the study's interviewees that the foundations had heard and understood the needs of African universities, the Partnership remained a partnership of foundations, as several foundation staff indicated. Thus, running the risk of being perceived as dominating the agenda or imposing an American worldview on African universities was always a consideration.

- The aspect of grantee participation, and the tension that it produced on both sides, created a context for legitimacy normalization. This, in turn, had a positive impact on the grantor-grantee relationship and on the foundations' grant-making. This issue was both a positive source of legitimacy for foundations and a guarantee for grantees to level the playing-field with grantors. Such validation was substantial for foundations and also put grantees in a stronger position. This point was well recognized by the Partnership's actors, most of whom claimed to have significantly considered grantee perspectives in their choices. To surmount the hurdles of power asymmetry, foundations insisted that grantee consultation and participation was an important criterion for good grant-making.

- The close relationship between foundations and select universities in Africa suggests not only that both institutions have influenced each other for a long period of time, but also that they have established a competitive field which puts pressure on weaker institutions. Without other competing financial contributors or governmental constraints, the foundations were effective in asserting their leadership in the field of higher education, particularly in former British colonies.
- The Partnership's foundations established connections and acquired access to the best organizations of higher learning in Africa, and to the new generations of academics, students, perhaps also leaders - particularly in institutions which used English as the

lingua franca. The foundations also positioned themselves strategically in the ecology of international developers to advocate for the importance of higher education in the development of Africa. They did so while promoting their conception of knowledge societies throughout current or former Commonwealth countries on the continent. By expanding their scope and expertise to higher education in Africa, the Partnership's foundations asserted their role as higher education developers as they provided support to select universities, research centers, and scholastic networks. In return, these influential beneficiaries reinforced the foundations' legitimacy and accountability by accepting their grants and agenda.

In order to occupy an important position in the sphere of African higher education, the Partnership's foundations strategically monitored their accountability around various legitimation mechanisms. This was done to maximize the impact of their philanthropy in the field of higher education in Africa while supporting the field's institutionalization. The dynamics of these foundations' collaboration illustrated the leveraging of legitimacy by both working collaboratively with peer grant-makers and paying attention to their African beneficiaries' input. At the same time, these foundations maintained an agenda close to their own worldview of democracy, liberal economics and gender equality.

Unequal Partnerships, Dependency, and the Discourse on Priorities in African Higher Education

Issues regarding the universities' dependency on donor funding remain, particularly with respect to unequal partnerships between richly endowed foundations in the United States and resource-seeking institutions in the global south. This is especially important in the case of

foundations interacting with universities in Africa. These partnerships were nurtured in a context of scarce resources for research agendas that did not always match those of the grantors, but were modified for the sake of accessing available funds. In addition, there was competition for resources amongst recipient institutions. These complicated efforts could have made a difference in their education systems, and pressured national governments to be more responsive to their needs. This debate, however, goes beyond the simple role of foundations in developing countries or on their influence over universities in Africa. It concerns all types of non-African international donors, development agencies and philanthropic organizations that seek to play a role in the development of Africa, and set priorities and strategies with limited participation from Africans. Many significant questions arise from this debate. Such as, can U.S. foundations embrace Africa's development on Africa's terms? Do African universities have ownership over their participation in U.S. foundations' strategies for Africa? What legitimizes the role of U.S. foundations in African higher education?

Much to their credit, the investments of the Partnership's foundations led to the successful support of research initiatives across a number of institutions. The Partnership also contributed to the strengthening of pan-African academic organizations such as the Association of African Universities and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research. Other areas of focus and massive investment included information technology and the provision of internet bandwidth at affordable prices for African universities. Stepping outside their comfort zone, the Partnership's foundations tackled the issue of internet accessibility which their grantees viewed as a priority. In this manner, the foundations found an opportunity to use their collective weight and influence to generate change on a wide scale. Developing bandwidth and reducing internet access costs for universities were not traditional foundation initiatives. Yet, the

foundations succeeded in leveraging economies of scale by forming a consortium of universities which purchased internet bandwidth in bulk, thus achieving volume discounts and extending these savings to higher education and research institutions in Africa.

The extent to which Partnership foundations contributed to the structure and institutionalization of the field of higher education in Africa can be observed through their success in establishing legitimation agents throughout the continent. However, institutionalizing the field of African higher education did not imply controlling the agenda for higher education in Africa, as the aggregate power of foundations was far too small to have any large-scale impact on a continent. The Partnership foundations relied on the multiplying effect of their focus on the development of select universities in Africa. This strategic approach remains questionable, as one could argue that a foundation's impact would be far greater if it focused on a larger group of weaker institutions. Out of some 800 universities in Africa, less than 10% receive support from U.S. foundations, leaving too many institutions out of the race.

Furthermore, considering the importance of language and culture in the mechanisms of globalization, and acknowledging that language groups compete in the knowledge economy, the influence of U.S. foundations in Africa reinforced the dominance of English as the lingua franca of the continent's development. By favoring higher education organizations that use English as the language of internal and external communication and learning, U.S. foundations created durable connections with the continent's future leaders and entrepreneurs along the lines of a language associated with cultural references that the foundations dominated. Universities in Francophone, Lusophone and Arabophone countries appear to be less equipped for receiving grants from U.S. foundations. Both foundations and universities in these countries should reach out to each other and work together to remedy this problem.

The Partnership' geopolitical agenda might not have been formulated with specific post-colonial considerations. Nonetheless, colonial lines emerge as clear demarcations between Africa's new knowledge societies. These lines are reinforced by U.S. foundations' grant-making strategies. The lasting connections established between U.S. foundations and Africa's elite, maintained through the English language, ensure a guaranteed return on investment for donors. To some extent, this return on investment for the United States suggests a form of legitimacy with regards to U.S. Tax Exemption Laws, which allow foundations to exist and operate outside of the United States. If indeed foundations planted the seeds of economic return for their constituents at home by serving the common good in Africa, their legitimacy in the Unites States would be guaranteed.

The Partnership's foundations claimed to have raised the standard of higher education in Africa. Yet, they concentrated on a select number of institutions that served as examples to follow. Their approach of targeted selection, which has remained central to their strategies of institutional development at home and abroad, left many institutions of higher learning struggling even more. These include less prestigious institutions, or fields that are not a priority for foundation leaders. This selective approach created intricate mechanisms through which foundations leveraged their legitimacy and maximized their influence via elite institutions to which they are accustomed to give funds.

Influences on the ecology of donors – such as government budgets, international organizations and development agencies – became an indicator of the Partnership's impact. It became a way for foundations to answer questions of accountability. The World Bank and other international donors such as foreign development agencies, European foundations, pan-African

development funds and U.S. foundations, formed an environment where legitimacy came to be associated with the ability to leverage funds from other foundations. The priorities of universities resided principally around institutional sustainability, competition for resources, and policies and national contexts. If these needs were met then universities would grant legitimacy to their external funders.

The discourse on priorities in African higher education is placed in a contested terrain, where grantors and grantees not only negotiate one another's perspectives but also contend with inhospitable national contexts. In certain African countries, governments do not necessarily encourage the development of universities or international donors who are not overtly cooperative. The Partnership's foundations gained legitimacy by helping universities become self-sustainable and less dependent on external funding. They did so by raising awareness and making the case for universities in national contexts. However, the Partnership's foundations did not engage sufficiently with national governments, even when this was important to generate more sustainability for universities and reduce dependency on foreign donors.

The Myth of Capacity Building vs. the Myth of Equal Participation

The Partnership's actors shared the myth of capacity building alongside the desire to legitimize their own foundation's grant-making. Capacity building functioned as a ceremonial rite that framed the foundations' individual and collective ambitions. It rallied foundation representatives around a common goal. Thus, capacity building was not just a unifying factor among these foundations' actors; it also acted as a transformative mechanism legitimizing the foundations' objectives. The rhetoric of institutionalization was prevalent in the Partnership as it leveraged environmental legitimacy, conforming to the myths and the ceremonial rite of capacity building.

The Partnership was not solely composed of rhetoric, it did not only conform to environmental myths; it was also a strategy that generated legitimacy through its influence on the field of African higher education.

The foundations' interest in institutional development and capacity building was not only part of the foundations' individual strategies, it was a myth which placed capacity building as an element of mimetic affinity among foundations; a ceremonial enactment of high impact decisions indicating an isomorphic desire to create greater returns on investment. Capacity building did not only function as a leveraging process between these foundations. It also worked as collective rhetoric to frame the foundations' initiatives. While foundations conformed to the myth of building capacity, they also designed and promoted a discourse of capacity building to support this strategy. Core functions were defined as capacity builders. The foundations unfolded their capacity building strategy by focusing on institutional development and structuring information and communication technology. Similar to their actions in the realm of U.S. higher education, foundations as a whole appeared content to meet the core capacity and capital needs of African universities, rather than pushing these institutions to change and prepare themselves for major access issues confronting the field. The rhetoric of capacity building conferred more legitimacy upon the foundations. The myth of capacity building and the ceremonial act of impact investing gave foundations enough justification and collective endorsement to eventually maximize legitimacy.

Furthermore, the Partnership's foundations tended to resist isomorphism and standardization in order to maintain their institutional differences and particular vantage points. Collaboration and convergence were used as accessories to the foundations' strategies of legitimation. This was clearly the case with capacity building which functioned as a unifying,

rationalized myth to which foundations adhered and aligned. Yet, this myth was transformed and used as a justification, as opposed to an effective mechanism, by the foundations. The Partnership's strategic alignment exemplifies this point. Isomorphism was resisted and collaboration negotiated, resulting in the use of a rationalized myth to justify one's role, and hide mishaps and ineffective actions. As such, the myth of capacity building should be sublimated by another rationalized myth which could strengthen the relationship between grantors and grantees.

An officially-proclaimed central Partnership principle was to respond to priorities identified through consultation with African higher education leaders. Indeed, reports and evaluations confirm that some of the Partnership's actors made real efforts to include several university vice-chancellors and consultants from Africa; the Partnership's actors listened to advice and suggestions from vice-chancellors to identify and address priorities. There was a respectful exchange between grantors and grantees, and grantees' views regarding goals and the methods suggested to reach these goals were heard. However, the Partnership's foundations could have generated more positive change by including faculty, researchers and even students in consultation processes that defined their grant-making strategies. This form of consultative participation would reinforce foundations in their role as pioneers and risk-takers while supporting social change and addressing issues that are meaningful to individuals on the ground.

Instead, foundation representatives needed constant reminders of the importance of consultation so that grantees were not undermined and power dynamics did not mold the relationship. Furthermore, grantee participation was a source of legitimation and not of equalization, as the asymmetry of power remained active. In this sense, governance in the Partnership's grantor-grantee relationship was top down rather than truly consultative. Africans participated but were not the driving force. Legitimacy was a resource provided by grantees, for

this reason they needed to be invited to the table and asked to participate in the agenda. Foundations were attributed legitimacy not because of what they did or how they did it, but through a bargaining process. Whose legitimation mattered was determined by relative social, political, and economic power.

The presidents' relative power had significant bearing on normalizing legitimacy in the eyes of the Partnership's actors. Indeed, having their support meant that the time spent by program officers on collaboration was valued within the foundation; officers were given funding to make the work of collaboration worthwhile and potentially effective. In the case of the Partnership, the channels of legitimacy disappeared when the replacement of presidents signaled the demise of the collaboration. The differences in perspective described above translated into systematic negotiations between different hierarchical levels. These negotiations, which played a role in influencing the orientation and adequate functioning of the Partnership in general, were first intended for reconciling the differences in perspective between foundation presidents and their staff. Balancing the reality of joint grant-making and collective decision-making with the validation and expectations of presidents - the ultimate bearers of legitimacy and accountability in the Partnership's foundations - was a common dilemma for the Partnership's program officers and directors, who strove to defend their point of view as well as that of their grantees'.

Governance in the case of the Partnership did not solely rest on the charisma of the foundations' presidents but on normalizing legitimacy obtained through interpersonal exchanges at all levels. The omnipotence of foundation presidents in the Partnership's decision-making and their implicit legitimation role meant that foundation staff had to manoeuver within constraints set by their leaders. They were ultimately accountable to the presidents. In this sense, the concentration of power in the hands of foundation leaders is an important aspect of

understanding internal accountability and legitimation mechanisms in U.S. foundations. The foundations' African program officers and directors provided value to the Partnership, sharing their expertise and local knowledge with their non-African colleagues. They also provided an opportunity to bridge the gap between grantor and grantee perspectives. But this expertise was intensely negotiated with the power held by the presidents, and was limited by the constraints of the foundations' hierarchical structures.

The nature of power in inter-organizational relationships led grantees to believe that acting in the interests of more powerful partners was consistent with their own interests. Yet, those interests were still molded by the power dynamic. The exchange relationship between the Partnership's foundations and their grantees resulted less in specific benefits for an individual university and was more a response to the grantees' larger interests. Nevertheless, the Partnership received endorsement from its grantees, who by being involved in varying degrees in the Partnership's processes, provided a form of approval and validation that was both sought after and orchestrated by the grantors. As such, the power asymmetry appears to be ameliorated to some degree, as the value of grantee endorsement increased. However, could it be argued that it placed the Partnership's foundations and the African universities that they funded on an equal footing?

With their status as organizations that serve the common good, foundations are validated through their inclusion in a category of organizations perceived as pursuing communally valuable goals. This is different from perceptions based on specific results achieved. The Partnership's foundations capitalized on the legitimacy accorded to the non-profit and voluntary sector in order to emphasize the significance and precedence of higher education in the economic development of Africa. In the ecology of higher education developers, environmental legitimacy

appeared to be a malleable resource which could be tapped into with an intricate strategy of influence. Indeed, collaborative and environmental factors contributed to legitimizing the foundations' role and goals in higher education in Africa. The Partnership's advocacy component, in the eyes of their constituents, provided legitimacy to the foundations as they strove to achieve policy outcomes, thus reflecting a general commitment to environmental principles and practices valued by grantees.

In re-situating this discussion within the discourse of neo-institutionalism and resource dependency, as Neo-institutionalists argue, U.S. foundations clearly emerge as non-material entities that are shaped by values, norms, and ideas embedded in their institutional context at home. Yet, these values are epitomized, transformed and disseminated by foundations' leaders before being internalized by program officers. The latter conform to existing rules and values in order to legitimize their role and action, as they are bound by their hierarchical environment. Program officers adjust their behavior to existing institutional frameworks, which are delineated by the charismatic authority of their leaders. The force of this authority is felt on individuals' actions and outcomes, on collective decisions and on coexistence with other institutions. While environmental constraints restrict this authority, it still has a significant bearing on the foundation's relationships with other institutions. Thus, foundations do not necessarily embody the societal situation prevailing at the time of their inception, as Neo-institutionalists posit. Instead, they embody the charismatic authority of their omnipotent leaders, which fluctuates and is modified during each leadership change.

Since foundations use co-optive strategies to gain legitimacy from African universities, universities possess the ability to negotiate their position within the constraints imposed by the foundations' preconceived agendas. Thus, the partnership between U.S. foundations and African

universities could be seen as functioning in a virtuous circle of serving and being served. This highlights a rationalized myth that provides legitimacy to grantors and ownership to grantees. In this sense, external resource dependence affects both resource providers and resource seekers. African universities would act strategically to manage their resource dependencies while foundations would act strategically to manage their legitimacy. The dynamic interaction and evolution of universities in relation to foundations could be re-defined according to this new myth of equal participation. Hence, internal and trans-organizational dynamics would be maneuvered to a universities' and a foundation's advantage by including a participatory mechanism that stroke the right balance between equal ownership and legitimacy.

General Reflections

Based on this study's findings, this last section offers a broad perspective on the importance of collaboration between U.S. grant-makers and beneficiaries located in the global South. This inquiry illustrated how a group of prominent foundations strategically monitored their accountability around various legitimation mechanisms to maximize the impact of their philanthropy on the field of higher education in Africa while supporting the field's institutionalization. In order to bring change to higher education in Africa, the Partnership's foundations needed legitimacy. Thus, they carefully monitored the various legitimation mechanisms of their collaboration while safe-guarding their respective agenda. The dynamics of their collaboration with African universities remained characterized by an unequal relationship.

In other words, these foundations used collaboration as a strategy to generate and maximize legitimacy, which in turn helped support their choices, effectiveness and overall philanthropy. They positioned themselves strategically in the ecology of international developers to advocate for the importance of higher education in the economic development of Africa while

upholding their own conception of knowledge societies. By expanding their scope and expertise to higher education in developing countries, foundations have asserted their role in the building of knowledge societies on a global scale, providing support to academic institutions, research centers, and scholastic networks. They have also pushed the boundaries of their legitimacy and accountability by extending their philanthropic activities and their own views of knowledge production to the rest of the world. The overall international aspirations and motivations of these large foundations at home and abroad raise significant questions.

This study points to the complex dynamics between donors and grantees developed in the context of scarce resources, and for research agendas that do not always match those of the grantors but get modified for the sake of access to available funds. In addition, competition for resources amongst recipient institutions complicated collaborative efforts that could change the education system. Collaboration must also resist pressure from national governments to be responsive to economic and development priorities. Donor-initiated reforms must face the grantees' resistance to change inherited from years of institutional upheavals, and ownership claims emanating from university-led autonomy-oriented policies.

Yet, foundations have stimulated interest in collaborative projects and in the generation of data on higher education in Africa, that will be sustained without dependency on donor funding. U.S. foundations have positioned themselves strategically as key stakeholders in African higher education. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that foundations also produce positive results in the education systems of grantees. Much to their credit, the investments of the Partnership's foundations supported many research initiatives across the African continent and strengthened pan-African organizations. Other areas of focus included information technology, with massive investment in internet bandwidth at affordable prices to African universities.

The Partnership's foundations attempted to re-energize and empower African higher education networks and academic institutions. The success of which has yet to be measured. Universities have become a primary locus for Western innovation and are providing consequential influence for the continent's future leaders. These foundations have also been in a position to propose new directions for policy and reform to a number of institutions. As a result, these foundations' influence over a small elitist group of African universities might either drive a divisive wedge within systems or push institutions to enter a competitive race for which they might not be ready. Questions about the degree of grantee participation in the foundations' pre-conceived agenda remain. It will take more effort from U.S. foundations to nurture institutional agency in local organizations, and reinforce the role of African universities in the early stages of their decision-making processes and development strategies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PHILANTHROPY, CIVIL SOCIETY, NON-GOVERMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Adam Thomas. Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society. Experiences From Germany, Great Britain, and North America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

Amheier Helmut. Toepler Stefan. Private Funds, Public Purpose. Philanthropic Foundations In International Perspective. New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, 1999.

Arnove, Robert F. Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980

Akst Daniel, What Are Foundations For? Carnegie Reporter. Vol. 3/No. 1. Carnegie Corporation of New York, Fall 2004

Atlani-Duault Laëtitia. Au bonheur des autres: Anthropologie de l'aide humanitaire. Paris: Armand Colin, 2009.

Atlani-Duault L. & L. Vidal (eds) Anthropologie de l'aide humanitaire et du développement. Des savoirs aux pratiques, des pratiques aux savoirs. Paris: Armand Colin, 2009.

Atlani-Duault Laëtitia. Ethnographies de l'aide. Paris: Ethnologie française, 2011.

Bacchetti Ray. Ehrlich Thomas. Reconnecting Education & Foundations, Turning Good Intentions Into Educational Capital. Stanford: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007.

Berman Edward H. American Influence on African Education: The Role of the Phelps-Stokes Fund's Education Commissions. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Colonialism and Education. (Jun., 1971), pp.132-145

Berman Edward H., American Philanthropy and African Education: Toward An Analysis African Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Apr., 1977), Pp. 71-85

Berman Edward H. Review: The Foundations' Interest in Africa. History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter, 1978), pp. 461-470

Berman Edward H. The Ideology of Philanthropy. The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy. Albany: SUNY Press. 1983.

Bernholz Lucy. Creating Philanthropic Capital Markets: The Deliberate Evolution. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 2004.

Bertelsmann Foundation (eds). The Future of Foundations in an Open Society. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers. 1999.

Bremner Robert H. American Philanthropy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1988.

Bremner Robert H. Giving. Charity and Philanthropy in History. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000.

Brest Paul, On Collaboration (Or How Many Foundations Does It Take to Change a Light Bulb?), Hewlett Foundation, 2006.

Brest Paul, Annual Report 2006, Hewlett Foundation.

Brison, Jeffrey D.Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Canada: American Philanthropy and the Arts and Letters in Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2005

Bullock, Mary Hopper Brown, 1944 - The Rockefeller Foundation in China: Philanthropy, Peking Union Medical College, and Public Health. Stanford University, Ph.D., 1973.

Burde, Dana. International NGOs and best practices: The art of educational lending. In G. Steiner-Khamsi (Ed.), Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending. New York: Teachers College Press. 2004.

Cafardi P. Nicholas; Fabean Cherry Jaclyn. Understanding Nonprofit and Tax Exempt Organizations. Newark: LexisNexis, 2006.

Cascione Gregory L. Philanthropists in Higher Education. Institutional, Biographical, and Religious Motivations for Giving. New York: Routledge. 2003.

Cheit Earl F, & Lobman T. E. Foundations and Higher Education: Grant-making from Golden Years Through Steady State. Berkeley: Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1979.

Clear Thinking Communications (2010) A Case Study of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa: Lessons from a Ten-Year Funder Collaborative

Clotfelter Charles T.; Ehrlich Thomas. Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Coleman, James S.& Court David. University Development in the Third World. The Rockefeller Foundation Experience. Oxford: Pergamon, 1993.

Condliffe Lagemann Ellen. Private Power for the Public Good. A History of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Middleton: Wesleyan University Press. 1983.

Condliffe Lagemann Ellen. Philanthropic Foundations. New Scholarship, New Possibilities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Conley, Darlene Joy. Philanthropic Foundations and Organizational Change: The Case of the Southern Education Foundation (SEF) during the Civil Rights Era. (Volumes I and II) [Ph.D. dissertation]. Northwestern University; 1990.

Coombe Trevor. A Consultation on Higher Education in Africa. A Report to the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. University of London. 1991.

Coone Horace. Money to Burn. Great American Foundations and Their Money. Originally published in 1938 by Longmans, Green, and Co. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 1990.

Curti Merle. American Philanthropy Abroad. A History. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1963.

Curti Merle & Nash Roderick. Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1965

Damon William, Verducci Susan. Taking Philanthropy Seriously: Beyond Noble Intentions to Responsible Giving. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, November 2006.

Dedrick, John Robert. Civil society and Private Philanthropy: A Study of Philanthropic Foundations in the United States; [Ph.D. dissertation]. The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick; 1997.

Dowie Mark. American Foundations: An Investigative History. Cambridge: Mit Press, 2002.

Edie John A. & Nober Jane C. Beyond our Borders: A Guide to Making Grants Outside of the United States, Council on Foundations, 2002.

Fleishman, Joel. The Foundation: A Great American Secret; How Private Wealth is Changing the World. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.

Fleishman, Joel; Kohler Scott; Schindler Steven. Casebook for The Foundation: A Great American Secret; How Private Wealth is Changing the World. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.

Friedman Lawrence. Mcgarvie Mark D., Ed. Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Frumkin, Peter. Strategic Giving: The Art and Science of Philanthropy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006.

Funders Concerned about AIDS (FCAA) Funder Collaborations Addressing HIV/AIDS: Examples from Around the World. A presentation of 19 case studies. 2008.

Gasman Marybeth & Sedgwick Katherine V., Ed. Uplifting A People: African American Philanthropy and Education. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005

Gaudiani Claire. The Greater Good: How Philanthropy Drives The American Economy and Can Save Capitalism. New York: Times Books, 2003.

Grant Craft (2009). Grant Craft Funder Collaboratives: Why and How Funders Work Together

Gregory Keneth. Engineering social reform: The rise of the Ford Foundation and Cold War liberalism,1908--1959; [Ph.D. dissertation]. New York University; 2000.

Guilhot Nicolas, Une Vocation Philanthropique, George Soros, Les Sciences Sociales Et La Régulation Du Marché Mondial, Sociologie De La Mondialisation N° 151-152 –2004/1-2

Hammack David C. & Anheier Helmut. K (eds). American Foundations. Roles and Contributions. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 2010.

Hammack David C. & Heydemann Steven (eds). Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society. Projecting Institutional Logics Abroad. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Hess Frederick M. With The Best of Intentions: How Philanthropy Is Reshaping K-12 Education Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005.

Hewa Soma & Stapleton Darwin. Globalization, Philanthropy & Civil Society. New York: Springer, 2005.

Hollis Ernerst V. Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education. New York: Columbia University Press. 1938.

Hosay Philip M. The Challenge of Urban Poverty: Charity Reformers in New York City, 1835-1890. Arno Press. 1981.

Karoff Peter. The World We Want. New Dimensions in Philanthropy and Social Change. Lanham: Altamira Press, 2008.

Kemp, Amy. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Faculdade de Medicina de Sao Paulo: A case study in philanthropy as policy; [Ph.D. dissertation] Indiana University; 2004.

Keppel Frederick P. The Foundation. Its Place in American Life. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930.

Keppel Frederick P. & Bertram, James. Report of the President and Secretary as to an Educational Program in Africa. December 1, 1927

Kiger Joseph. Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.

Kiger Joseph. Philanthropists & Foundation Globalization. New Brunswick: Transaction Pub. 2008.

Martin W. Mike. Virtuous Giving. Philanthropy, Voluntary Service, and Caring. Bloomingdale: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Kovacs Philip (ed.). The Gates Foundation and the Future of U.S. "Public" Schools. New York, Routledge. 2011.

Leat, D. & Anheier, H. K. Creative Philanthropy: Toward a new Philanthropy for the Twenty-First Century University of California, Los Angeles. 2006

Murphy, Jefferson. Carnegie Corporation and Africa, 1953-1973. Teachers College Press. 1976.

Masseys-Bertoneche Carole. Philanthropie et Grandes Universités Privées Américaines : Pouvoir et Réseaux d'Influence. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires De Bordeaux, 2006.

Nielsen Waldemar. A., Golden Donors: A New Anatomy of The Great Foundations. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2004.

Nielsen Waldemar. A., Inside American Philanthropy: The Dramas of Donorship, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.

O'Connell Brian. Philanthropy in Action. New York: Foundation Center, 1987.

OECD, Philanthropic Foundations and Development Co-Operation Off-Print of The DAC Journal 2003, Volume 4, No. 3

Parmar Inderjeet. American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks. Global Networks 2, 1 (2002) 13–30.

Parmar Inderjeet. Foundations of the American Century. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Payton Robert L. Philanthropy. Voluntary Action for the Public Good. New York: Macmillan, 1988.

Payton Robert L. & Moody Michael P. Understanding Philanthropy. Its Meaning and Mission. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.

Pifer Alan. Speaking Out. Reflections on 30 years of Foundation Work. Washington: Council on Foundations, 2001.

Pfitzer, Marc & Mike Stamp. Multiplying Impact through Philanthropic Collaboration. A Report for the European Foundation Centre. 2010.

The Philanthropy Initiative. Donor Collaboration: Power in Numbers, 2009.

Plastrik, P. & Taylor, M. Network Power for Philanthropy and Nonprofits. Boston: Barr Foundation, 2004

Powell Walter W. & Clemens Elisabeth S. (Eds). Private Action and the Public Good. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998

Prewitt K. Dogan, M. Heydemann S. & Toepler S. The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: United States and European Perspectives. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2006.

Raymond Susan & Martin Mary Beth. Mapping the New World of American Philanthropy, Causes and Consequences of the Transfer of Wealth. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

Roelofs Joan, Foundations and Collaboration, Critical Sociology 2007; 33; 479

Roelofs Joan. Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003.

Rosenbaum Thomas E. Rockefeller Philanthropies in Revolutionary Russia. Rockefeller Archive Center Newsletter, 1989

Salamon Lester M. The State of Nonprofit America. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.

Salamon Lester M. The State of Nonprofit America. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

Sanborn Cynthia & Portocarrero Felipe. Philanthropy and Social Change in Latin America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Sears Jesse B. Philanthropy in the History of American Higher Education. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 1990.

Silver Ira. Unequal Partnerships. Beyond the Rhetoric of Philanthropic Collaboration. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Solorzano Ramos, Armando. The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico: Nationalism, Public Health and Yellow Fever (1911-1924) [Ph.D. dissertation]. The University of Wisconsin - Madison; 1990.

Sorman, Guy. Le cœur américain: éloge du don. Paris : Editions Fayard. 2013.

Tamuno Christiana. The Roles of the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation in the Development of the University of Ibadan 1962-1978. [Ph.D. dissertation]. The University of Pittsburgh, 1986.

Tournès, Ludovic. 'La diplomatie culturelle de la fondation Ford. Les éditions Intercultural Publications (1952-1959)', XXe siècle. Revue d'histoire, octobre-décembre 2002, pp. 65-77.

Whitaker Ben. The Philanthropoids. Foundations and Society. New York: Morrow, 1974.

Whitaker Ben. The Foundations: An Anatomy of Philanthropic Bodies. New York: Penguin, 1974.

Wormser René A. Foundations: Their Power and Influence. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958.

Zurcher Arnold J. & Dustan Jane. The Foundation Administrator. A Study of Those Who Manage America's Foundations. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972.

B. AFRICA AND AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

Afolayan O. Michael. Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa: Paradigms of Development, Decline, and Dilemmas. Trenton: Africa World Press. 2007.

Ajayi Ade J.F, Goma Lameck K.H & Johnson Ampah G. The African Experience with Higher Education.Accra: The Association of African Universities. 1996.

Ashby Eric. African Universities and Western Tradition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964.

Assie-Lumumba N'dri, T. Higher Education in Africa. Crises, Reforms and Transformation. Working Paper Series. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. 2006.

Astin Alexander & Astin Helen. Leadership Reconsidered: Engaging Higher Education in Social Change. W.K. Kellogg Foundation. 2000.

Benneh George, Awumbila Mariama & Effah Paul. African Universities, the Private Sector and Civil Society, Forging Partnerships for Development. African Regional Council of the International Association of University Presidents. Accra. 2004.

Berman Edward H. American Philanthropy and African Education: Toward An Analysis African Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Apr., 1977), Pp. 71-85.

Berman Edward H. American Influence on African Education: The Role of the Phelps-Stokes Fund's Education Commissions. Comparative Education Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Colonialism and Education. (Jun., 1971), pp.132-145.

Bloom, D., Canning, D & Chan K. Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa. Report sponsored by the World Bank. 2006.

Buchanan Bob & Booker Jayne. Making a Difference in Africa: Advice from Experienced Grantmakers, Council on Foundations & Africa Grantmakers'Affinity Group. 2007.

Calderisi Robert. The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 2006

Cloete, N, Pillay P, Badat, S.; and Moja, T. National policy and a Regional Response in South African Higher Education. James Curry, Oxford. 2004

Cloete, N; Maassen, P; Fehnel, R; Moja,T; Gibbon, T; and Perold, H (editors). Transformation in Higher Education – Global Pressures and Local Realities. Springer, Netherlands. Volume 10 – higher Education Dynamics. 2006.

Cloete, N.; Maassen, P.; Fehnel, D.; Moja, T.; Perold, H.; Gibbon, P (eds.): Higher Education Policy, Institutions and Globalisation: New Dynamics in South Africa After 1994. 2002

Cooksey Brian, Mkube Daniel & Levey Lisbeth. Higher Education in Tanzania. Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. James Currey: Oxford. 2003

Grant Lewis, Suzanne. et al. Accomplishments of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, 2000–2010. Rep. New York: New York University, 2010.

Lulat Y. G-M. A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present. A Critical Synthesis. Praeger Westport, CT. 2005.

Mamdani Mahmood. & Diouf Mamadou (eds). Academic Freedom in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA, 1994.

Mamdani Mahmood. Reading Ibn Khaldun in Kampala, Makerere Institute of Social Research Working Paper N 10, August 2012.

Moja, Teboho (2007). Politics of Exclusion in Higher Education: the Inadequacy of Gender Issues in the Globalisation Debates. In N'Dri T. Assié-Lumumba (ed.), Women and Higher Education in Africa: Reconceptualizing Gender-Based Human Capabilities and Upgrading Human Rights to Knowledge, Abidjan: CEPARRED. 2008.

Moja Teboho. Internationalizing the Curriculum. The Internationalization of Higher Education in South Africa. A publication of the International Education Association of South Africa. 2006

Saint William S. Universities in Africa: Strategies for Stabilization and Revitalization. Technical Paper No.194. Technical Department, Africa Region. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 1992.

Samoff Joel & Carrol Bidemi. The Promise of Partnership and Continuities of Dependence: External Support to Higher Education in Africa.African Studies Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Apr., 2004), pp. 67-199

Tiyambe Zeleza Paul & Olukoshi Adebayo. African Universities in the Twenty-First Century: Vol 2 Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. 2004.

Wield David. Coordination of Donors in African Universities. Higher Education Policy. Vol. 10. No. 1, pp. 41-54, 1997

C. SOCIAL SCIENCES, SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Aldrich, H. E. & Fiol, C. M. Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation, Organization Studies, 19:4, 645-670. 1994.

Archibald, M. Between isomorphism and market partitioning: how organizational competencies and resources foster cultural and sociopolitical legitimacy, and promote organizational survival, in C. Johnson (Ed.), Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Emerald, London, 171-211. 2004.

Arum Richard & Roksa Josipa. Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Arum Richard, Yossi Shavit, & Adam Gamoran, eds. Stratification in Higher Education: A Comparative Study. Stanford University Press, 2007.

Ashforth Blake E. & Gibbs, Barrie W. The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation. Organization Science. Vol. 1, No. 2 (1990) pp. 177-194

Brinkerhoff, Derick W. The evolution of current perspectives on institutional development: An organizational focus. In Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, eds. Politics, projects, and people: Institutional development in Haiti. New York: Praeger Publishers, 11-62. 1986.

Brinkerhoff, Derick W. Organisational legitimacy, capacity and capacity development. (ECDPM Discussion Paper 58A). Maastricht: ECDPM. 2005.

Carroll, G. R., and Hannan, M. T. "Density dependence in the evolution of newspapers organizations," American Sociological Review, 54. 1989. 524-541.

Crozier, Michel. Actors and System. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1980.

Deephouse David L. & Carter Suzanne M. An Examination of Differences between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation. Journal of Management Studies 42:2 March 2005

DiMaggio, Paul. J. Review: A Jaundiced View of Philanthropy. Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad by Robert F. Arnove Source: Comparative Education Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Oct., 1983), pp. 442-445

DiMaggio, Paul. Interest and agency in institutional theory, in L. G. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations, MA: Ballinger, Cambridge, 3-22. 1988

DiMaggio, Paul. Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston. Media, Culture and Society, vol. 4, 1982.

DiMaggio, Paul J. Powell, Walter W. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review vol. 48 pp.147–160. 1983.

DiMaggio, Paul J. Powell, Walter W. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991.

Elsbach, K Sutton, R. I. 'Acquiring organizational legitimacy through illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories.' Academy of Management Journal vol. 35 pp. 699–738.

Greenwood R. & Oliver C. & Suddaby R. & Sahlin K. Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, London: Sage, 2008

Ingram Paul & Clay Karen. The Choice-within-Constraints New Institutionalism and Implications for Sociology. Annual Review of Sociology. 2000.

Kraatz, M. S. & Zajac, E. J. 'Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: the causes and consequences of illegitimate organizational change.' American Sociological Review vol. 61 pp. 812–836. 1996.

Lecours, André. New Institutionalism, Theory & Analysis. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2005

March, James & Olsen, Johan P. 1976. Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations Bergen:Universitetsforlaget.

March, James & Olsen, Johan P. Rediscovering Institutions, The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press. 1989.

Meyer, John W. & Rowan, Brian. 'Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony.' American Journal of Sociology vol. 83 pp. 340–363. 1977.

Meyer, John W. & Scott, Richard W. Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1983.

Meyer, Heinz-Dieter & Rowan, Brian. The New Institutionalism in Education. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.

Mizruchi, M. & Fein, L. C. 'The social construction of organizational knowledge: A study of the uses of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.' Administrative ScienceQuarterly vol. 44 pp. 653–683. 1999.

Oliver, Christine 'The collective strategy framework: An application to competing predictions of isomorphism.' Administrative Science Quarterly vol. 33 pp. 543–561. 1988.

Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B. & Hardy, C. 'Inter-organizational collaboration and the dynamics of institutional fields', *Journal of Management Studies*, 37, 23-43. 2000.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey & Salancik Gerald. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 1978.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey & Salancik Gerald. The External Control of Organizations. A Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2003.

Pierson, Paul. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review. 2000.

Ruef, M. Scott, Richard W. 'A multidimensional model of organizational legitimacy: hospital survival in changing institutional environments.' Administrative Science Quarterly vol. 43 pp. 877–904. 1998.

Scott, Richard W. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 1995.

Suchman, Mark C. 'Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.' Academy of Management Review vol. 20 pp. 571–610. 1995.

D. MISCELLANEOUS

Funders Concerned about AIDS (FCAA). Funder Collaborations Addressing HIV/AIDS: Examples from Around the World A presentation of 19 case studies. 2008.

Johnson R. Burke and Onwuegbuzie Anthony J. Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. Educational Researcher, Vol. 33, No. 7 (Oct., 2004), pp. 14-26

Grant Craft. Grant Craft Funder Collaboratives: Why and How Funders Work Together. 2009.

Gray Barbara. Collaborating. Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1989

Gray Barbara & Wood Donna J. Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Collaboration. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 27, No. 2, 139-162. 1991.

Kanter, R.M. Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances. Harvard Business Review. vol. 72, July-August 1994. pp. 96-108

Mattessich Paul W. & Monsey Barbara R. Collaboration: What Makes it Work. Saint Paul: Fieldstone Alliance. 1992

Mattessich Paul W., Murray—Close Marta & Monsey Barbara R., Collaboration: What Makes it Work. Saint Paul: Fieldstone Alliance. 2001

Parker Susan. Lessons from a Ten-Year Funder Collaborative. A Case Study of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. Clear Thinking Communications. September 2010

Pfitzer Marc and Stamp Mike. Multiplying Impact through Philanthropic Collaboration. A Report for the European Foundation Centre. FSG Social Impact Advisors. 2010.

The Philanthropy Initiative. Donor Collaboration: Power in Numbers. 2009.

E. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES

The Archives of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa at the Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University

The Archives of the Carnegie Corporation of New York at the Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University

The Ford Archives and Research Center

The Rockefeller Archives Center

The William and Flora Hewlett Annual Report 2006, 2010

The William and Flora Hewlett By-Laws and Guiding Principles

The Carnegie Corporation of New York Annual Report, 2010

The Carnegie Corporation of New York Charter, Constitution and By-Laws

The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 2000-2010

The Rockefeller Foundation By-Laws and Charter

Ford Foundation Annual Report 2010

The Mellon Foundation Annual Report 2010

The MacArthur Foundation Annual Report 2008, 2010

The Kresge Foundation Annual Report 2010-2011

The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa's online grant database 2000-2010

Giving USA (2007, 2008)

The Foundation Center's online database 2003-2012

The Foundation Center. Grants for Foreign and International Programs. 2005/2006

The Foundation Center. Foundation Giving Trends, Update on Funding Priorities. 2006

The Foundation Center. International Grant-making Update, A Snapshot of U.S. Foundation Trends. 2006

The Foundation Center. Yearbook, Facts and Figures on Private and Community Foundations. 2006

The Foundation Center. International Grant-making III. 2004

Appendix A - List of Grantors interviewed

- Jonathan Friedman, Project Associate at the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa
- John Butler-Adam, Program Officer at the Ford Foundation's Higher Education Office in South Africa
- Stuart Saunders, Senior Advisor at The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
- Raul Davion, Director and Co-Chair of the Africa Office and Higher Education Initiative in Africa at The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Joyce Moock, former Associate Vice President of The Rockefeller Foundation
- Sue Grant Lewis, Coordinator of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (2006–2010)
- Kole Shettima, Director of Nigeria Office, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Tamara Fox, former Program Officer at The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Population
- Phillip Griffith, Senior Advisor at the Institute for Advanced Study and the Mellon Foundation
- Andrea Johnson, Program Officer at Carnegie Corporation of New York's African Higher Education
- Claudia Fritelli, Program Officer and Manager of the Women's Scholarship in Africa Project and Higher Education and Libraries in Africa at Carnegie Corporation of New York
- Dina El'Khawaga, Program Officer at the Ford Foundation's Higher Education Office in Cairo
- Megan Lindow, U.S. Reporter in South Africa
- Patricia Rosenfield, Program Director at the Carnegie Corporation of New York's National Program

- Neil Grabois, former Vice President of Carnegie Corporation of New York
- Janice Petrovich, former Director of the Ford Foundation
- Narciso Matos, former Program Director of Carnegie Corporation of New York's Higher Education and Libraries in Africa
- Tade Akin Aina, Program Director of Carnegie Corporation of New York's Higher Education and Libraries in Africa
- William Moses, Senior Program Officer of The Kresge Foundation
- Gara LaMarche, former President of Atlantic Philanthropies
- David Court, former Director of The Rockefeller Foundation's Nairobi Office

Appendix B - Grantors Interview Questionnaire

i. Questions related to process and structure:

- How was the Partnership designed and structured?
- How were you and your colleagues involved in the Partnership?
- Have you been involved in a similar partnership in the past? How was it different or similar this time?
- What was the impact of this collaboration on your organization?
- How did communication with other partners occur?
- How often were meetings scheduled and who organized them and who set the agenda?
- What were the most challenging aspects of the collaboration?
- How would you interpret the advantages and disadvantages on having been involved in this partnership?

ii. Questions related to membership:

- How were the roles distributed? How was the decision made as to who should participate?
- How were joint decisions achieved and how were differences resolved?
- How were the organizational priorities and those of the partnership reconciled?
- How would you describe the role played by grantees as partners in this partnership?
- Were there other influential voices from other stakeholders?
- To what degree could other partners have joined the collaboration?

iii. Questions related to Environment:

- To what extent was the global economic and political climate favorable to the collaboration?
- How do you think other grant makers and aid agencies perceived the collaboration?

- In your opinion, how was it perceived by grant applicants and grant recipients?
- How did local authorities respond to the collaboration's choices?
- What were the biggest hurdles within each country?
- In your opinion what factors influenced the Partnership and its partners the most?
- To what extent did the collaboration help tackle issues that single foundations had struggled with?
- According to you what is the collaboration's main legacy?

iv. Questions related to Resources:

- In what ways did joint funding help achieve scale?
- To what extent did the collaboration help leverage other public or private funds?
- In what ways did accumulated expertise play a role?
- How sustainable have the collaboration's initiatives been?
- How did the collaboration assess its work?
- What valuable lessons can be retained from working collaboratively?

Appendix C - List of Grantee Transcripts

Country	Institution	Profession / Status
Egypt	Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression	*Administrator*
Egypt	Economic Research Forum	*Researcher*
Egypt	University of Cairo	*Student*
Egypt	University of Cairo	*Researcher*
Egypt	University of Cairo	*Faculty*
Egypt	University of Cairo	*Administrator*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Student*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Student*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Faculty*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Administrator*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Administrator*
Ghana	University of Education, Winneba	*Faculty*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Administrator*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Student*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Faculty*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Vice-Chancellor*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Faculty*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Administrator*
Ghana	University of Ghana	*Faculty*
Kenya	African Economic Research Consortium	*Administrator*
Kenya	Kenyatta University	*Administrator*
Kenya	Kenyatta University	*Vice-Chancellor*
Kenya	Kenyatta University	*Researcher*
Kenya	University of Nairobi	*Faculty*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Faculty*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Faculty*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Faculty*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Researcher*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Student*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Student*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Faculty*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Student*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Student*
Madagascar	University of Antananarivo	*Student*
Mozambique	Catholic University of Mozambique	*Student*

Mozambique	Catholic University of Mozambique	*Faculty*
Mozambique	Catholic University of Mozambique	*Faculty*
Mozambique	Catholic University of Mozambique	*Faculty*
Nigeria	Bayero University	*Faculty*
Nigeria	Nigerian ICT Forum	*Administrator*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Administrator*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Student*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Faculty*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Faculty*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Faculty*
Nigeria	Obafemi Awolowo University	*Faculty*
Nigeria	unidentified	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Ibadan	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Faculty*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Administrator*
Nigeria	University of Jos	*Student*

Senegal	Association of African Universities	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Student*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Faculty*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Faculty*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Student*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Vice-Chancellor*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Faculty*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Researcher*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Researcher*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Researcher*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of Cape Town	*Student*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Faculty*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Student*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Student*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Administrator*
South Africa	University of the Witwatersrand	*Vice-Chancellor*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Faculty*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Vice-Chancellor*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Student*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Tanzania	University of Dar es Salaam	*Administrator*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*

Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Vice-chancellor*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Faculty*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Researcher*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Administrator*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Administrator*
Uganda	Makerere University	*Administrator*
Multiple	Higher Education Research and Academic Network in Africa	*Researcher*
Multiple	INDEPTH Network	*Administrator*
Multiple	University Science Humanities & Engineering Partnerships in Africa	*Administrator*
unidentified	unidentified	*Student*
unidentified	unidentified	*Administrator*

Appendix D – The Partnership's Top 50 grants

Amount:	Type:	Foundation(s):	Grantee:	Purpose:
$5,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS)	Tie-off support for the International Centre for African Music and Dance
$4,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	University of Ibadan	Junior Scientists (Kruger) : To continue support of a pilot junior scientist training program
$3,500,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	International Foundation for Science	To hold a conference for Southern African universities and technikons on university-community engagement
$3,491,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Dar es Salaam	General support to contribute to a common vision of high quality education and training for all
$3,400,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	University of Ibadan	In support of activities to assist higher education institutions in eastern Africa make effective use of information and communication technologies in learning, teaching, research and management
$3,358,800	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Institute for Advanced Study	Core support for the publications, networking, workshops and special research projects of the Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies
$3,162,800	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Department of Education, Republic of South Africa	Partial costs for publishing the remaining case studies; support of the Partnership Web site
$3,146,900	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Department of Education, Republic of South Africa	Toward publication of a monograph series and Web-site development, in partnership with Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation
$3,100,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	Bayero University, Kano	Forum on Agricultural Resource Husbandry in Sub-Saharan Africa. To provide field training and research opportunities for African graduate students and academics in the agricultural sciences
$3,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	Ahmadu Bello University	For a workshop to explore global trends affecting the future of higher education in

				transition economies and developing economies.
$3,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	Bayero University, Kano	To integrate recent Ph.D.s from Africa into productive research careers on the continent
$3,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	University of Ibadan	For research on fertility rates in West Africa
$3,000,000	Individual Foundation	Kresge	University of the Western Cape	Toward research training for young scientists in Africa
$2,999,900	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Makerere University	To provide African students training in agricultural economics at various North American universities leading to a Ph.D. degree.
$2,975,665	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Dar es Salaam	To support a virtual library of international legal materials
$2,968,300	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Dar es Salaam	Toward a model university library system
$2,750,000	Individual Foundation	Hewlett	African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC)	For a project to create awareness among stakeholders about life skills and sexual maturation as they affect girls' access to and participation in education
$2,500,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	Ahmadu Bello University	To train lawyers from Tanzania to focus on ways to improve equal access to higher education
$2,500,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Obafemi Awolowo University	To support travel of African Plants Initiative partners to the 2007 annual meeting (Aluka Initiative)
$2,500,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Obafemi Awolowo University	To support travel of African Plants Initiative partners to the 2007 annual meeting (Aluka Initiative)
$2,500,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Jos	Year 4 of 5-year strategic development plan
$2,500,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	University of Port Harcourt	In support of fundraising from alumni
$2,496,215	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Cape Town (UCT)	For the gender, children's rights, socioeconomic rights and local government projects of the Community Law Centre
$2,364,099	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of the Witwatersrand	Tie-off support for the Research and Education Networking Unit to address issues related to connectivity and access to increased and affordable bandwidth for African universities
$2,100,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Dar es Salaam	For the planning and implementation of a conference on Third Stream

				Income for South African universities, and the publication of a consolidated final report
$2,073,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Makerere University	For the Steinhardt School of Education to host the facilitation office of the Partership for African Higher Education, coordinate partership's activities and arranger for and external assessment
$2,020,500	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Makerere University	Towards the costs of disseminating The Essential Electronic Agricultural Library to sub-Saharan universities and agricultural research institutions
$2,015,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Makerere University	In support of public education on Sharia'h criminal procedure in the northern states of Nigeria
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	Bayero University, Kano	Scholarships for grantees in South African universities. One to undertake a Masters in Environment and Development at the University of Natal, Pietermartizburg and one to undertake a postgraduate honors degree program in chemistry at the Faculty of Science, University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Rockefeller	Makerere University	For work with community groups and programs to promote the well-being of Africans in slum communities (included because of university research links).
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Rockefeller	Makerere University	For its Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development to help design and generate the database needed to monitor and evaluate the impact of selected interventions for agricultural development in western Kenya
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Rockefeller	Makerere University	For use by its Institute of Public Health to develop a policy tool to facilitate equity-oriented health care financing reform in Uganda
$2,000,000	Individual	Rockefeller	Makerere	For the Centre for Applied

	Foundation		University	Legal Studies to commission case studies and hold a conference on the implementation of gender equality commitments by the Government of South Africa
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Obafemi Awolowo University	To support travel of African Plants Initiative partners to the 2007 annual meeting (Aluka Initiative)
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Cape Town (UCT)	For general support of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Cape Town (UCT)	For use by its Biomedical Informatics Research Division in support of participation by African and Asian delegates in a conference on the use of open source medical records systems and health informatics to improve the quality and efficiency of health care systems in developing countries, and for a workshop on mobile data collection for health, both to be held in Durban, South Africa, June 2008
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Education, Winneba	For use by its School of Public Health toward the costs of strengthening human resource management systems to improve the quality and provision of primary health services in an urban health district of Cape Province
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Jos	Year 4 of 5-year strategic development plan
$2,000,000	Individual Foundation	MacArthur	University of Port Harcourt	For the Social Research Center to initiate a program testing, assessing and developing innovative social protection schemes on the basis of policy-related research
$1,996,100	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of KwaZulu-Natal	For annual development and fundraising workshop for women from African universities
$1,991,800	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of the Witwatersrand	For the Centre for the Study of Democracy to conduct research and nurture the next generation of scholars with internships for students from

				historically disadvantaged backgrounds
$1,984,643	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of KwaZulu-Natal	To strengthen the research culture of the University through the engagement of Senior Research Scholars
$1,900,000	Individual Foundation	Rockefeller	Makerere University	To support a program to enroll higher education institutions in JSTOR
$1,900,000	Individual Foundation	Rockefeller	Makerere University	For one-time funding of a project to train teachers and strengthen a research center for science, mathematics and technology
$1,863,000	Joint	Hewlett	South African Institute for Distance Education (SAIDE)	To continue support for the development of a coordinated digital database of images and information on African plants (Aluka Initiative)
$1,800,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Jos	Year 4 of 5-year strategic development plan
$1,686,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Education, Winneba	For the African Gender Institute to strengthen research capacity on gender and sexuality in Africa
$1,680,500	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	King's College, University of London	To support travel for African partners participating in the African Plants Initiative to attend the International Botanical Congress in Vienna, Austria, in July 2005 (Aluka Initiative)
$1,637,300	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	University of Ghana	For general operating support
$1,600,000	Individual Foundation	Carnegie	Institute for Advanced Study	Toward a collaborative program with the Medical University of Southern Africa on the management of HIV/AIDS in the workplace

Appendix E - Definitions of measures and codes

The codes used during the operationalization of qualitative data are defined below, grouped by measure and sub-measure to reflect the tension between neo-institutionalist and resource-dependent characteristics in the Partnership's grant data.

a. Processes and structures (neo-institutional)

i. Culture & Values

- Mission and Vision – Influence of institutional trajectory, mission, original charter, donor's will, leadership vision (presidents' visions, Board vision) on the partnership.
- Culture and Values – Influence of institutional culture and values on the partnership.
- Historical Connections – Influence of pre-condition, lessons learned and historical connections (between foundations, universities and other institutions) on the partnership. Path dependency implies that the sources of today's problems and conflicts come from the context within which these institutions have been created. In this case, U.S. foundations and African universities have a long history together. Similarly, some foundations have a long history of interactions with one another.

ii. Processes and Bureaucracy

- Communication Processes – Influence of internal and external communication, open and frequent communication; regular meeting management, established informal relationships and communication links on the partnership.
- Coordination Processes – Influence of shared rules and procedures (grant application, disbursement, grant reporting), collaboration-related bureaucracy (practicalities of participating, reporting, decision-making) on the partnership.
- Contract – Influence of formal contract (common agenda, objectives and expected outcomes; commitment of partners; framework, contract shifts, renegotiation and renewal, equal participation (roles and responsibilities), benefits and acknowledgment, terms of reference) on the partnership.

iii. Power and Leadership

- Veto System – Influence of the veto system and power relations (status among partners – founding member, new member, observer; majority rules decision-making, rules of order, dominance, passivity and abstention) on the partnership.
- Governance – Influence of leaders (leaders' input and commitment, weight on collective decision-making, delegation of power, lateral leadership (create opportunities for other funders to avoid marginalization), reporting, meetings – presidential meetings, retreats, etc.) on the partnership.
- Conflict Management – Influence of disagreement, conflict management, problem solving, compromise, implementation of compromise on the partnership.

b. Membership (neo-institutional)

i. Incentives& Value-added

- Resource Expansion – Influence of pool funding, resource expansion and maximization on the partnership.
- Risk Reduction – Influence of collective strategic plan, risk reduction, likelihood of success on tackling issues on the partnership.
- Knowledge Transfer – Influence of knowledge sharing and exchange of information on the partnership.

ii. Affinity and Collaboration

- Networks – Influence of connections, networks, affiliations, status.
- Collaboration – Influence of collaboration assumed benefits and visibility, validity of collaboration ("collaborating for collaboration's sake"), reputation.
- Affinity – Influence of members' affinity, type and size of endowment, cultural adequacy, and inclusion on the partnership. In this case, it refers to similarities in mission, strategy, decisions, actions or views between partners.

iii. Consultation and Participation

- Consultation – Influence of grantee participation, consultation, contribution, involvement in decision-making on the partnership.
- Borrowing and Lending – Influence of educational borrowing and lending, reactions to imposed transfers (i.e. constructing scientific knowledge) on the grantees. In this case the politics of educational borrowing and lending implies pressures that local decision makers, educators, grantees have to deal with when interacting with the partnership.
- Ownership – Influence of project ownership (of a foundation, of a grantee, etc) on the partnership. In this case, ownership rights imply rights, duties, as well as more equality and liability to the owner or owners. A foundation, a group of foundations, or a grantee might have more ownership over a specific project or idea.

c. Environment (resource-dependent)

i. Policy & Context

- Norms and Trends – Influence of norms and sectorial funding trends, norm entrepreneurs and peer pressure on the partnership.
- Global Context – Influence of global economy, market and financial situation on the partnership.
- Public Policy – Influence of political context, national and cross-national public policies. In this case, policies in certain countries might be competing or conflicting against those of the partnership.

ii. Efficiency and Accountability

- Efficiency – Influence of internal and external evaluations (measuring how the partnership is performing in terms of performance outcomes, quality of interaction, and member satisfaction), with their implied adjustments and consequences on the partnership.
- Accountability – Influence of an accountability mechanism (or the lack thereof), and the obligation to answer for the results of authorized actions and for the manner in which responsibilities are discharged. In this case, it refers to the examination of strategic uses of excuses, justifications,

rationalizations, apologies and other forms of account giving behavior by individuals and by the partnership (report to members and community, written newsletter, emails, annual general meeting, trust building).

- Authority – Influence of environmental authority on actions, impact and expectations on the partnership. In this case, authority refers to the acceptance and recognition, by the grantees, of the authority of a foundation or the partnership, whereby authority has power through consent and mutual understandings, not coercion.

iii. Competition

- Rivalries – Influence of governmental interferences, implicit and explicit competition with local and global players on the partnership.
- Societal Drivers – Influence of societal drivers (technology & inter-networked enterprise; turbulent environment; opportunity of adaptive space, social capital; more effective governments & democratic organizations) on the partnership.
- Synergies – Influence of synergies with networks, private and public institutions, and other actors on the partnership.

d. Resources (resource-dependent)

i. Resources

- Organizational Memory – Influence of organizational memory (minutes, archives, reporting, publications, PR) on the partnership.
- Financial Resources – Influence of financial resources and capabilities, or the lack of resources (for capacity building with unclear limits) on the partnership.
- Human Resources – Influence of human resources (staff time, turnover, personal gratification and motivation) on the partnership.

ii. Leverage

- Advocacy – Influence of advocacy objectives (i.e. advocating on importance of higher education on African development) on the partnership.

- Leveraging – Influence of leveraging objectives on the partnership.
- Output – Influence of results (or the lack thereof), results reporting and pressure on the partnership.

iii. Sustainability

- Empowerment – Influence of empowerment strategy (to help grantees become financially independent), surveying of grantees, constructive feedback, trust, and value of grantee perspective) on partnership.
- Perception of Impact – Influence of perception by grantees on the short-term or long-term impact on the partnership.
- Sustainability – Influence of sustainability objectives, exit plans (or the lack thereof) and grantee dependency on the partnership.

Appendix F: Top 100 U.S. Foundations by Asset Size

The list below includes the 100 largest U.S. grant-making foundations ranked by the market value of their assets, based on the most current audited financial data in the Foundation Center's database as of August 10, 2013.

1	Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (WA)	$34,640,122,664	12/31/2011
2	Ford Foundation (NY)	$10,984,721,000	9/30/2012
3	J. Paul Getty Trust (CA)	$10,502,514,302	6/30/2012
4	The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (NJ)	$8,967,712,917	12/31/2011
5	The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (CA)	$7,735,372,000	12/31/2012
6	Lilly Endowment Inc. (IN)	$7,281,773,872	12/31/2012
7	W. K. Kellogg Foundation (MI)	$7,256,863,114	8/31/2012
8	The David and Lucile Packard Foundation (CA)	$5,797,424,139	12/31/2011
9	The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (IL)	$5,703,076,554	12/31/2011
10	Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (CA)	$5,366,672,508	12/31/2011
11	The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (NY)	$5,262,632,426	12/31/2011
12	The Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust (NY)	$4,062,077,909	3/31/2012
13	Tulsa Community Foundation (OK)	$3,828,264,000	12/31/2011
14	The California Endowment (CA)	$3,660,548,000	3/31/2012
15	The Rockefeller Foundation (NY)	$3,507,144,871	12/31/2011
16	The Kresge Foundation (MI)	$3,025,786,097	12/31/2011
17	Bloomberg Philanthropies (NY)	$2,991,369,695	12/31/2011
18	Robert W. Woodruff Foundation, Inc. (GA)	$2,841,725,477	12/31/2012
19	The Duke Endowment (NC)	$2,837,905,170	12/31/2011
20	Carnegie Corporation of New York (NY)	$2,764,431,433	9/30/2012
21	The Annie E. Casey Foundation (MD)	$2,667,088,187	12/31/2011
22	Margaret A. Cargill Foundation (MN)	$2,554,461,471	12/31/2011
23	Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation (OK)	$2,330,570,250	12/31/2011
24	John Templeton Foundation (PA)	$2,290,498,854	12/31/2011
25	The Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation (NE)	$2,287,457,472	12/31/2011
26	Foundation to Promote Open Society (NY)	$2,238,969,129	12/31/2011
27	Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (MI)	$2,163,301,193	12/31/2011

28	Conrad N. Hilton Foundation (CA)	$2,125,048,563	12/31/2011
29	John S. and James L. Knight Foundation (FL)	$2,099,590,969	12/31/2012
30	Silicon Valley Community Foundation (CA)	$2,081,920,000	12/31/2011
31	Kimbell Art Foundation (TX)	$2,059,995,937	12/31/2010
32	The William Penn Foundation (PA)	$2,019,462,152	12/31/2012
33	The Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc. (MD)	$2,015,782,078	2/28/2012
34	The McKnight Foundation (MN)	$1,982,175,198	12/31/2011
35	The Simons Foundation (NY)	$1,978,000,487	12/31/2011
36	Casey Family Programs (WA)	$1,963,379,949	12/31/2011
37	The New York Community Trust (NY)	$1,908,884,580	12/31/2011
38	Richard King Mellon Foundation (PA)	$1,907,911,762	12/31/2011
39	The Cleveland Foundation (OH)	$1,883,022,162	12/31/2012
40	The Chicago Community Trust (IL)	$1,804,362,755	9/30/2012
41	Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (MO)	$1,760,000,239	12/31/2011
42	Walton Family Foundation, Inc. (AR)	$1,701,739,894	12/31/2011
43	Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (NY)	$1,653,512,812	12/31/2011
44	Doris Duke Charitable Foundation (NY)	$1,616,679,160	12/31/2011
45	Eli & Edythe Broad Foundation (CA)	$1,560,281,559	12/31/2011
46	The James Irvine Foundation (CA)	$1,545,619,278	12/31/2011
47	Annenberg Foundation (CA)	$1,533,234,915	12/31/2011
48	Houston Endowment Inc. (TX)	$1,453,875,549	12/31/2011
49	The Heinz Endowments (PA)	$1,394,345,802	12/31/2011
50	Marin Community Foundation (CA)	$1,333,725,159	6/30/2012
51	The Wallace Foundation (NY)	$1,329,034,787	12/31/2011
52	Laura and John Arnold Foundation (TX)	$1,294,738,157	12/31/2012
53	Daniels Fund (CO)	$1,285,511,708	12/31/2012
54	The Starr Foundation (NY)	$1,222,353,150	12/31/2011
55	California Community Foundation (CA)	$1,204,825,000	6/30/2012
56	The Columbus Foundation and Affiliated Organizations (OH)	$1,191,264,430	12/31/2011
57	The Oregon Community Foundation (OR)	$1,185,069,023	12/31/2010
58	Barr Foundation (MA)	$1,169,329,830	12/31/2011
59	Greater Kansas City Community Foundation (MO)	$1,161,708,347	12/31/2011

60	The Moody Foundation (TX)	$1,134,222,755	12/31/2011
61	W. M. Keck Foundation (CA)	$1,105,733,000	12/31/2012
62	The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Inc. (OK)	$1,096,656,796	12/31/2011
63	The Brown Foundation, Inc. (TX)	$1,095,141,844	6/30/2012
64	The Anschutz Foundation (CO)	$1,083,608,196	11/30/2011
65	Lumina Foundation (IN)	$1,082,176,421	12/31/2011
66	The San Francisco Foundation (CA)	$1,081,389,000	6/30/2012
67	Open Society Institute (NY)	$1,007,665,737	12/31/2011
68	The Ahmanson Foundation (CA)	$938,736,097	10/31/2011
69	Shimon ben Joseph Foundation (CA)	$920,762,522	12/31/2011
70	Bat Hanadiv Foundation No. 3 (NY)	$912,191,147	12/31/2011
71	The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation (NY)	$874,648,385	9/30/2012
72	Druckenmiller Foundation (NY)	$866,525,510	11/30/2012
73	Foundation For The Carolinas (NC)	$856,015,277	12/31/2011
74	Communities Foundation of Texas, Inc. (TX)	$852,778,000	6/30/2012
75	Robertson Foundation (NY)	$846,076,106	11/30/2011
76	Cummings Foundation (MA)	$834,371,069	12/31/2010
77	The J. E. and L. E. Mabee Foundation, Inc. (OK)	$827,598,749	8/31/2012
78	The Michael and Susan Dell Foundation (TX)	$817,009,625	12/31/2011
79	Surdna Foundation, Inc. (NY)	$814,855,442	6/30/2012
80	Hartford Foundation for Public Giving (CT)	$810,709,993	12/31/2012
81	Boston Foundation, Inc. (MA)	$804,221,000	6/30/2012
82	The Pittsburgh Foundation (PA)	$803,974,930	12/31/2011
83	The Freedom Forum, Inc. (DC)	$797,729,314	12/31/2011
84	Otto Bremer Foundation (MN)	$795,565,635	12/31/2012
85	The California Wellness Foundation (CA)	$794,337,702	12/31/2011
86	M. J. Murdock Charitable Trust (WA)	$786,828,151	12/31/2011
87	The Broad Art Foundation (CA)	$782,392,485	12/31/2011
88	Bush Foundation (MN)	$780,000,000	12/31/2012
89	Hall Family Foundation (MO)	$777,507,833	12/31/2011
90	The Joyce Foundation (IL)	$760,580,322	12/31/2011
91	Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. (NY)	$751,804,582	12/31/2011

92	The Community Foundation for Greater Atlanta (GA)	$723,793,300	12/31/2011
93	Engelstad Family Foundation (NV)	$713,592,347	12/31/2011
94	The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc. (NY)	$713,105,558	12/31/2011
95	Weingart Foundation (CA)	$698,343,478	6/30/2012
96	The Saint Paul Foundation (MN)	$695,259,473	12/31/2012
97	The Seattle Foundation (WA)	$690,275,245	12/31/2012
98	Burroughs Wellcome Fund (NC)	$681,068,537	8/31/2012
99	The Meadows Foundation, Inc. (TX)	$679,220,566	12/31/2011
100	The Ford Family Foundation (OR)	$673,362,024	12/31/2011

Appendix G: Top 25 U.S. grant-makers in total amount of grants to Africa (2003-2012)*

1	Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	$876,587,917	
2	Rockefeller Foundation	$142,218,496	PHEA
3	Atlantic Philanthropies	$132,045,988	
4	Carnegie Corporation of New York	$129,356,042	PHEA
5	W. K. Kellogg Foundation	$71,545,148	
6	Ford Foundation	$68,362,582	PHEA
7	Coca-Cola Foundation, Inc.	$43,244,662	
8	William and Flora Hewlett Foundation	$38,401,000	PHEA
9	John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	$36,831,737	PHEA
10	A Glimmer of Hope Foundation	$33,543,341	
11	Andrew W. Mellon Foundation	$31,978,000	PHEA
12	David and Lucile Packard Foundation	$18,265,932	
13	Open Doors International, Inc.	$17,839,014	
14	UN Women's Fund for Gender Equality	$13,480,939	
15	Kresge Foundation	$13,474,999	PHEA
16	Gordon V. & Helen C. Smith Foundation	$11,323,089	
17	Soros Economic Development Fund	$10,000,000	
18	Open Society Institute	$6,713,534	
19	Howard G. Buffett Foundation	$5,450,000	
20	Skoll Foundation	$5,000,000	
21	Arthur S. DeMoss Foundation	$4,725,553	
22	Howard G. Buffett Foundation	$3,100,000	
23	Howard G. Buffett Foundation	$3,033,790	
24	Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation	$2,800,000	
25	McKnight Foundation	$2,599,000	

** Based on the entries reported in the Foundation Center's online grant database at the time the survey was conducted in August 2013*

Appendix H: Top 50 U.S. foundations in number of grants to Africa (2003-2012)*

1	Ford Foundation	2000	PHEA
2	Firelight Foundation	995	
3	Koch Foundation, Inc.	850	
4	Global Fund for Women, The	556	
5	Rockefeller Foundation, The	540	PHEA
6	Mott Foundation, Charles Stewart	428	
7	Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Inc., The	312	
8	Tides Foundation	310	
9	American Jewish World Service	287	
10	Fund For Global Human Rights, Inc.	283	
11	Global Fund for Children	281	
12	Kellogg Foundation, W. K.	274	
13	MacArthur Foundation, John D. and Catherine T., The	271	PHEA
14	Mellon Foundation, Andrew W., The	226	PHEA
15	McKnight Foundation, The	223	
16	Raskob Foundation for Catholic Activities, Inc.	220	
17	Carnegie Corporation of New York	177	PHEA
18	Atlantic Philanthropies, The	169	
19	Gates Foundation, Bill & Melinda	168	
20	Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.	164	
21	Hewlett Foundation, William and Flora, The	118	PHEA
22	Banyan Tree Foundation	115	
23	Packard Foundation, David and Lucile, The	111	
24	Christensen Fund, The	100	
25	Disability Rights Fund	69	
26	Microsoft Corporation Contributions Program	69	
27	New Field Foundation	65	
28	King Baudouin Foundation United States, Inc.	60	
29	Kresge Foundation, The	56	PHEA
30	Western Union Foundation	56	
31	Buffett Foundation, Howard G.	49	
32	Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice, Inc., The	46	
33	Public Welfare Foundation, Inc.	43	
34	Intel Foundation	42	
35	Flora Family Foundation	40	
36	Gildersleeve International Fund, Virginia	36	
37	Global Greengrants Fund	29	
38	Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Inc.	29	
39	Abbott Fund	28	
40	Open Society Institute	28	
41	State Street Foundation, Inc.	28	
42	Strauss Foundation, Levi	28	
43	Motorola Solutions Foundation	25	
44	Mustard Seed Foundation, Inc.	23	
45	Arcus Foundation	22	
46	JPMorgan Chase Foundation, The	22	
47	WEM Foundation	21	
48	Coca-Cola Foundation, Inc., The	20	
49	Grassroots International, Inc.	20	
50	Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Inc.	20	

** Based on the entries reported in the Foundation Center's online grant database at the time the survey was conducted in August 2013*

Appendix I: List of Top Higher Education Grant Recipients in Africa (2003-2012)

Table 9: Top Grant Recipients	Country	Total Amount	Grants	Donors	Main Donor(s)
University of Cape Town	South Africa	$80,902,000	210	20	Gates, Carnegie, Atlantic, Mellon
University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa	$49,295,000	113	18	Gates, CCNY, Mellon
University of the Western Cape	South Africa	$47,352,000	78	9	Kresge, Atlantic, Mellon, Ford
Makerere University	Uganda	$42,512,000	84	10	Rockefeller , Carnegie
University of Kwazulu-Natal	South Africa	$28,742,000	81	10	Carnegie, Mellon, Rockefeller
University of Ghana	Ghana	$19,992,000	22	7	Gates, Carnegie, Hewlett, Ford
University of Pretoria	South Africa	$19,890,000	43	8	Gates, Kellogg, Carnegie, Mellon
University of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	$17,154,000	17	2	Rockefeller, Kellogg
Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture	Uganda	$14,379,000	4	1	Gates
University of Ibadan	Nigeria	$14,162,000	14	2	MacArthur, Ford
University of Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	$12,055,000	17	4	Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller

Rhodes University	South Africa	$10,867,000	37	8	Mellon, Atlantic, Kresge, Ford
University of Stellenbosch	South Africa	$10,123,000	33	11	Gates, Mellon, Carnegie
Ahmadu Bello University	Nigeria	$8,563,000	11	3	MacArthur, Carnegie
American University in Cairo	Egypt	$8,036,000	46	7	Ford, Gates, Hewlett
African Virtual University	Kenya	$7,881,000	10	6	Ford, MacArth., Carneg, Rock., Hewlett
Bayero University	Nigeria	$7,158,000	7	1	MacArthur
Obafemi Awolowo University	Nigeria	$7,000,000	3	1	Carnegie
Cheikh Anta Diop University	Senegal	$6,780,000	10	5	Gates
Cairo University	Egypt	$6,614,000	27	2	Ford, Mellon
University of Jos	Nigeria	$6,300,000	3	1	Carnegie
Institute for Distance Education	South Africa	$5,641,000	8	5	Carneg., Kresge, Rock., Ford, MacArth.
ICT Forum Partnership Institutions	Nigeria	$5,500,000	11	5	MacArth, Carnegie , Rockefeller , Ford
Institute for Advancement	South Africa	$5,260,000	14	2	Kresge, Carnegie
Centre for Higher Ed Transformation Trust	South Africa	$5,210,000	26	4	Carnegie, Ford
Community & Individual	South Africa	$4,830,000	12	6	Kellogg,

Development Association					Rockefeller
University of Port Harcourt	Nigeria	$4,515,000	6	2	MacArthur, Ford
University of the Free State	South Africa	$4,314,000	12	5	Kellogg, Kresge, Rockefeller, Ford
Sokoine University of Agriculture	Tanzania	$4,098,000	13	4	McKnight, Rockefeller
University of Malawi	Malawi	$3,723,000	15	3	McKnight, Carnegie, Ford
Tertiary Education Network	South Africa	$3,433,000	7	6	Mellon, Google
University Science & Technology	Zimbabwe	$3,298,000	3	1	Kellogg
Ministry of Education	South Africa	$3,162,000	1	1	Carnegie
Africa University	Zimbabwe	$3,025,000	11	3	Kellogg
University of Nairobi	Kenya	$2,958,000	19	6	Rockefeller , Ford
University of Fort Hare	South Africa	$2,891,000	17	5	Kellogg, Mellon, Mott, Ford
University of Bamako	Mali	$2,872,000	1	1	Gates
Jomo Kenyatta Univ. of Agriculture & Tech.	Kenya	$2,759,000	12	3	Rockefeller
CIDA City Campus	South Africa	$2,680,000	4	2	Kellogg, Oprah Winfrey
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University	South Africa	$2,532,000	8	4	Atlantic, Mott, Kellogg, Ford
Instituto Politecnico de Manica	Mozambique	$2,500,000	1	1	Kellogg

National University of Rwanda	Rwanda	$2,494,000	6	2	MacArthur, Rockefeller
University of Antananarivo	Madagascar	$2,477,000	6	1	MacArthur
University of South Africa	South Africa	$2,463,000	8	4	Kellogg, Mott, Ford , Gates
Council for Tertiary Education	Ghana	$2,352,000	9	2	Carnegie, Rockefeller
Tswhane University of Technology	South Africa	$2,319,000	3	3	Gates, Kellogg, Kresge
Association African Universities	Ghana	$2,046,000	29	3	Carnegie, Ford , Rockefeller
Egerton University	Kenya	$2,000,000	13	3	Ford , Ford, Gates
Cape Peninsula University Technology	South Africa	$1,841,000	6	1	Kresge
National University of Lesotho	Lesotho	$1,747,000	8	2	Kellog, Bristol-Myers Squibb

Appendix J: Complete List of African Higher Education U.S. Foundations Beneficiaries

Recipient Name	Recipient State\Country
School of African Heritage	Benin
University of Botswana	Botswana
Ba Isago University College	Botswana
University of Ouagadougou	Burkina Faso
Fond National Pour L'Education et La Recherche	Burkina Faso
University of Lubumbashi	DR Congo
American University in Cairo	Egypt
Cairo University	Egypt
University of Minia	Egypt
Assiut University	Egypt
Dreamers of Tomorrow Association	Egypt
Suez Canal University	Egypt
Quality Experts Group	Egypt
Bibliotheca Alexandrina	Egypt
Partners in Development for Research, Consulting and Training	Egypt
Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center	Egypt
Ministry of Higher Education	Egypt
Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey	Egypt
National Egyptian Fertility Care Foundation	Egypt
National Library and Archives of Egypt	Egypt
Youth Dreamers of Tomorrow	Egypt
Ain Shams University	Egypt
Arba Minch University	Ethiopia
Mizan-Tepi University	Ethiopia
Addis Ababa University	Ethiopia
Hawassa University	Ethiopia
YWCA of Ethiopia	Ethiopia
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	Ethiopia
Mekelle University	Ethiopia
University of Cape Coast	Ghana
University of Ghana	Ghana
African Network Operators Group	Ghana

University for Development Studies	Ghana
National Council for Tertiary Education	Ghana
Association of African Universities	Ghana
Saint Viator College	Ivory Coast
University of Nairobi	Kenya
African Virtual University	Kenya
Kenya Education Network Trust	Kenya
Kenya Highlands Bible College	Kenya
Jomo Kenyatta University of Agricultre and Technology	Kenya
Moi University	Kenya
African Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions	Kenya
African Population and Health Research Center	Kenya
Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa	Kenya
Women Educational Researchers of Kenya	Kenya
Kenyatta University	Kenya
Strathmore University	Kenya
Higher Education Loans Board	Kenya
African Woman and Child Feature Service	Kenya
Egerton University	Kenya
International Livestock Research Institute	Kenya
Forum for African Women Educationalists	Kenya
United States International University	Kenya
Daystar University	Kenya
Africa International University	Kenya
University of Eastern Africa, Baraton	Kenya
National University of Lesotho	Lesotho
University of Liberia	Liberia
University of Antananarivo	Madagascar
Universite de Toliara	Madagascar
University of Malawi	Malawi
University of Bamako	Mali
University of Mauritius	Mauritius
Ecole Superieure des Arts Visuels Marrakech	Morocco
Association Marocaine de Lutte Contre le SIDA	Morocco
Universite Mohammed V Agdal	Morocco

Eduardo Mondlane University	Mozambique
Catholic University of Mozambique	Mozambique
Instituto Superior Politecnico de Manica	Mozambique
Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology	Mozambique
Mozambique, Republic of	Mozambique
University of Namibia Foundation	Namibia
University of Namibia	Namibia
Ahmadu Bello University	Nigeria
Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions	Nigeria
Diocese of Makurdi	Nigeria
University of Port Harcourt	Nigeria
Bayero University	Nigeria
University of Ibadan	Nigeria
National Universities Commission	Nigeria
Shehu Musa Yaradua Foundation	Nigeria
ABTI-American University of Nigeria	Nigeria
Committee of Vice-Chancellors of Nigerian Federal Universities	Nigeria
Federal Ministry of Education	Nigeria
National Commission for Colleges of Education	Nigeria
Machina Emirate Development Association	Nigeria
University of Benin	Nigeria
Federal University of Technology, Minna	Nigeria
Obafemi Awolowo University	Nigeria
University of Jos	Nigeria
Centre for Management Development	Nigeria
Endowment Consortium Foundation	Nigeria
International Centre for Mathematical and Computer Sciences	Nigeria
AfriHUB Nigeria	Nigeria
Nigerian Publishers Association	Nigeria
Pan-African University	Nigeria
Loyola Jesuit College	Nigeria
National University of Rwanda	Rwanda
Kigali Institute of Science and Technology	Rwanda
Cheikh Anta Diop University	Senegal
TrustAfrica	Senegal

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa	Senegal
University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa
University of Cape Town	South Africa
Meraka Institute	South Africa
Maryvale College	South Africa
University of Stellenbosch	South Africa
Headstart College	South Africa
Tertiary Education Network	South Africa
University of the Witwatersrand Foundation	South Africa
Community and Individual Development Association City Campus	South Africa
Rhodes University	South Africa
University of Pretoria	South Africa
South African Institute for Distance Education	South Africa
Central Johannesburg College	South Africa
CIDA City Campus	South Africa
University of KwaZulu-Natal	South Africa
University of the Western Cape	South Africa
Southern African Wildlife College	South Africa
Cape Peninsula University of Technology	South Africa
South African Institute for Advancement	South Africa
Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust	South Africa
University of the Free State	South Africa
Tswhane University of Technology	South Africa
University of Johannesburg	South Africa
Durban University of Technology	South Africa
University of Fort Hare	South Africa
University of South Africa	South Africa
University of Port Elizabeth	South Africa
Khanya College Johannesburg Trust	South Africa
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University	South Africa
Participative Development Initiative	South Africa
South African History Archive Trust	South Africa
Community Development Resource Association	South Africa
Tshwane University of Technology	South Africa
University of Venda	South Africa

Foundation of Tertiary Institutions in the Northern Metropolis	South Africa
Cape Higher Education Consortium	South Africa
Eastern Seaboard Association of Tertiary Institutions Trust	South Africa
Higher Education South Africa	South Africa
New Africa Theatre Association	South Africa
Council on Higher Education	South Africa
Southern African Research and Innovation Management Association	South Africa
Ministry of Education of South Africa	South Africa
Evaluation Research Agency	South Africa
University World News	South Africa
University of the North	South Africa
Workers College	South Africa
University of North-West	South Africa
Elgin Learning Foundation	South Africa
National Access Consortium of the Western Cape Trust	South Africa
Valley Trust	South Africa
University of Limpopo	South Africa
Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science	South Africa
Monash Educational Enterprises	South Africa
Free State Higher Education ConsortiumTrust	South Africa
Sizanang Centre for Research and Development	South Africa
Human Sciences Research Council	South Africa
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation	South Africa
SCEZONS CC	South Africa
Academy of Science of South Africa	South Africa
Equal Education	South Africa
University of KwaZulu-Natal Foundation	South Africa
HOPE Worldwide	South Africa
Tomorrow Trust	South Africa
Information Training and Outreach Centre for Africa	South Africa
Power-Free Education and Technology	South Africa
Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland
University of Swaziland	Swaziland
University of Dar es Salaam	Tanzania
Sokoine University of Agriculture	Tanzania

Tanzania Commission for Universities	Tanzania
Mkuki na Nyota Publishers	Tanzania
Open University of Tanzania	Tanzania
Applied Social Science Forum	Tunisia
Makerere University	Uganda
Action for Youth with Disabilities Uganda	Uganda
Uganda Christian University	Uganda
Mbarara University of Science and Technology	Uganda
National Council for Higher Education	Uganda
Inter-University Council for East Africa	Uganda
Association for the Advancement of Higher Education and Development	Uganda
Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture	Uganda
Afrika Study Center	Uganda
University of Zambia	Zambia
Africa University	Zimbabwe
University of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Open University	Zimbabwe
Womens University in Africa	Zimbabwe
National University of Science and Technology	Zimbabwe
BOOST Fellowship	Zimbabwe
Students and Youth Working on Reproductive Health-Action Team	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe College of Music	Zimbabwe

Appendix K: List of U.S. Foundations and Grants to African Higher Education Organizations (2003-2012)

Grant-maker	State	N of Grants to African Higher Education	Grants per Countries	N of Recipients	Grants per Recipients
Annenberg Foundation	CA	1	Benin (1)	1	School of African Heritage (1)
Carrie Estelle Doheny Foundation	CA	1	South Africa (1)	1	Maryvale College (1)
Christensen Fund	CA	6	Ethiopia (6)	4	Arba Minch University (2), Hawassa University (2), Mizan-Tepi University (1), Addis Ababa University (1)
CS Fund	CA	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of Cape Coast (1)
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	CA	4	Ethiopia (3), Nigeria (1)	3	Addis Ababa University (2), YWCA of Ethiopia (1), Ahmadu Bello University (1)
Flora Family Foundation	CA	4	South Africa (3), Uganda (1)	2	University of the Witwatersrand (2), University of Stellenbosch (1), Makerere University (1)
Gilead Foundation	CA	1	Mozambique (1)	1	Eduardo Mondlane University (1)
Global Fund for Women	CA	2	South Africa (1), Tanzania (1)		Headstart College (1), University of Dar es Salaam (1)
Google.org	CA	2	Nigeria (1), South Africa (1)	2	Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions (1), Tertiary Education Network (1)
J. Paul Getty Trust	CA	5	Benin (3), Egypt (1), South Africa (1)	3	School of African Heritage (3), American University in Cairo (1), University of the Witwatersrand Foundation (1)
John M. Lloyd Foundation	CA	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of the Witwatersrand (1)
Levi Strauss Foundation	CA	2	Kenya (2)	1	University of Nairobi (2)
Marin Community Foundation	CA	4	Ghana (4)	1	University of Cape Coast (1)
Silicon Valley Community Foundation	CA	2	Uganda (1), South Africa (1)	2	Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (1), Makerere University (1)
Tides Foundation	CA	4	Uganda (4)	3	Makerere University (2), Forum for African Women Educationalists (1), Action for Youth with Disabilities Uganda (1)
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation	CA	30	South Africa (10), Kenya (6), Ghana (5), Egypt (4), Mauritius (2), Senegal (2), Burkina Faso (1)	7	African Virtual University (5), American University in Cairo (4), Cheikh Anta Diop University (2), Meraka Institute (1), University of Cape Coast (1), University of Cape Town (4), University of Ghana (4), University of Mauritius (2), University of Nairobi (1), University of Ouagadougou (1), University of the Witwatersrand (5)
Western Union Foundation	CO	4	Egypt (3), Namibia (1)	2	American University in Cairo (3), University of Namibia Foundation (1)
GE Foundation	CT	2	Namibia (2)	1	University of Namibia Foundation (2)
Royce Family Fund, Inc.	CT	2	Uganda (2)	1	Uganda Christian University (2)

Raskob Foundation for Catholic Activities, Inc.	DE	1	Nigeria (1)	1	Diocese of Makurdi (1)
Banyan Tree Foundation	DC	1	South Africa (1)	1	Rhodes University (1)
Koch Foundation, Inc.	FL	1	Ivory Coast (1)	1	Saint Viator College (1)
Lois and George Castrucci Family Foundation	FL	1	Kenya (1)	1	Kenya Education Network Trust
Coca-Cola Foundation, Inc.	GA	1	Swaziland (1)	1	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation (1)
Community Foundation for Greater Atlanta	GA	1	Zimbabwe (1)	1	Africa University (1)
Caterpillar Foundation	IL	1	Zimbabwe (1)	1	Africa University (1)
Elaine and Donald Levinson Foundation	IL	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of the Witwatersrand (1)
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	IL	78	Nigeria (51), Madagascar (7), South Africa (6), Uganda (6), Rwanda (3), Botswana(1), Ghana (1), Kenya (1), Senegal (1), Tanzania (1)	29	ABTI-American University of Nigeria (1), African Network Operators Group (1), African Virtual University (1), Ahmadu Bello University (9), Bayero University (7), Cheikh Anta Diop University (1), Committee of Vice-Chancellors of Nigerian Federal Universities (2), Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria (2), Federal University of Technology (1), Minna Machina Emirate Development Association (1), Makerere University (4), Mbarara University of Science and Technology (2), National Commission for Colleges of Education, Nigeria (2), National Universities Commission, Nigeria (2), National University of Rwanda (3), Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions (3), Shehu Musa Yaradua Foundation (2), Sokoine University of Agriculture (1), South African Institute for Distance Education (1), Tertiary Education Network (1), Universite de Toliara (1), University of Antananarivo (6), University of Benin (1), University of Botswana (1), University of Cape Town (1), University of Ibadan (13), University of Port Harcourt (5), University of Pretoria (1), University of the Witwatersrand (2)
Motorola Solutions Foundation	IL	6	South Africa (5), Nigeria (1)	5	Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (2), ABTI-American University of Nigeria (1), University of Cape Town (1), University of Stellenbosch (1), Central Johannesburg College (1)
Oprah Winfrey Foundation	IL	3	South Africa (3)	2	CIDA City Campus (2), Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (1)
Spencer Foundation	IL	7	South Africa (6), Nigeria (1)	5	University of KwaZulu-Natal (2), University of Cape Town (2), University of Benin (1), University of the Western Cape (1), University of the Witwatersrand (1)
Suissa Charitable Fund, Inc.	IL	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of the Witwatersrand (1)
Harry J. Lloyd Charitable Trust	KS	1	Kenya (1)	1	Kenya Highlands Bible College (1)
Conservation, Food and	MA	1	Kenya (1)	1	Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and

Health Foundation, Inc.					Technology (1)
Disability Rights Fund	MA	1	Uganda (1)	1	Action for Youth with Disabilities Uganda (1)
State Street Foundation, Inc.	MA	1	South Africa (1)	1	Southern African Wildlife College (1)
Allen Foundation, Inc.	MI	2	Botswana (2)	1	University of Botswana (1)
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation	MI	41	South Africa (41)	14	University of the Western Cape (8), University of KwaZulu-Natal (8), University of Fort Hare (5), Rhodes University (4), University of Cape Town (4), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (3), Community Development Resource Association (2), University of South Africa (2), Khanya College Johannesburg Trust (1), Participative Development Initiative (1), South African History Archive Trust (1), University of Port Elizabeth (1), University of the Witwatersrand (1)
Kresge Foundation	MI	49	South Africa (49)	14	South African Institute for Advancement (11), University of the Western Cape (8), University of Pretoria (7), Cape Peninsula University of Technology (6), University of the Witwatersrand (6), Rhodes University (2), University of the Free State (2), South African Institute for Distance Education (1), University of Stellenbosch (1), University of Cape Town (1), Tswhane University of Technology (1), University of Johannesburg (1), Durban University of Technology (1), Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust (1)
W. K. Kellogg Foundation	MI	58	South Africa (27), Zimbabwe (22), Lesotho (4), Botswana (2), Mozambique (2), Swaziland (1)	25	University of Zimbabwe (9), Africa University (7) Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (4), National University of Lesotho (4), National University of Science and Technology (3), University of the Free State (3),University of Cape Town (3), University of Fort Hare (2), University of KwaZulu-Natal (2), University of Pretoria (3), University of South Africa (2), University of Stellenbosch (2), University of Swaziland (1), CIDA City Campus (2),University of the Witwatersrand (1), University of Venda (1), Womens University in Africa (1), Zimbabwe Open University (1), BOOST Fellowship (1), Catholic University of Mozambique (1), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (1), Tshwane University of Technology (1), University of Botswana (1), Instituto Superior Politecnico de Manica (1), Ba Isago University College (1)
McKnight Foundation	MN	18	Malawi (8), Uganda (4), Tanzania (3), Kenya (2), Burkina Faso (1)	6	University of Malawi (8), Makerere University (4), Sokoine University of Agriculture (3), University of Ouagadougou (1), University of Nairobi (1), Moi University (1)
Medtronic Foundation	MN	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of Stellenbosch (1)

Johnson & Johnson Family of Companies Contribution Fund	NJ	1	Egypt (1)	1	American University in Cairo (1)
Atlantic Philanthropies	NY	45	South Africa (45)	8	University of the Western Cape (12), University of the Witwatersrand Foundation (10), University of Cape Town (10), University of KwaZulu-Natal Foundation (9), Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science (1), Durban University of Technology (1), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (1), Rhodes University (1)
Avon Foundation for Women	NY	1	Egypt (1)	1	Cairo University (1)
Judy & Howard Berkowitz Foundation	NY	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of Stellenbosch (1)
King Baudouin Foundation United States, Inc.	NY	1	South Africa (1)	1	Cape Peninsula University of Technology
Bodman Foundation	NY	1	Egypt (1)	1	American University in Cairo (1)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation, Inc.	NY	15	Senegal (4), Lesotho (4), Namibia (2), Swaziland (2), Burkina Faso (2), D R Congo (1)	6	Cheikh Anta Diop University (4), University of Lesotho (4), Fonds National Pour l'Education et la Recherche (2), National University of Namibia (2), University of Swaziland (2) , University of Lubumbashi (1)
Carnegie Corporation of New York	NY	140	South Africa (72), Ghana (30), Uganda (12), Nigeria (11), Tanzania (7), Kenya (4), Senegal (3), Malawi (1)		University of Cape Town (24), Association of African Universities (16), Makerere University (11), University of the Witwatersrand (8), University of KwaZulu-Natal (7), University of Ghana (7), University of Dar es Salaam (6), University of Pretoria (6), Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust (6), National Council for Tertiary Education (5), South African Institute for Advancement (4), Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions (4), Obafemi Awolowo University (3), University of Jos (3), University of Stellenbosch (3), University of the Western Cape (3), Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (2), Evaluation Research Agency (2), University for Development Studies (2), African Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions (2), Higher Education South Africa (1), Ministry of Education of South Africa (1), National Council for Higher Education (1), African Population and Health Research Center (1), Council on Higher Education (1), African Virtual University (1), Cape Higher Education Consortium (1), Ahmadu Bello University (1), Rhodes University (1), South African Institute for Distance Education (1), Southern African Research and Innovation Management Association (1), Tanzania Commission for Universities (1), Tertiary

					Education Network (1), TrustAfrica (1), University of Fort Hare (1), University World News (1), University of Malawi (1)
Citi Foundation	NY	9	Egypt (6), South Africa (3)	2	American University of Cairo (6), HOPE Worldwide (3)
Charles A. Dana Foundation, Inc.	NY	2	Egypt (1), South Africa (1)	2	Ain Shams University (1), University of Cape Town (1)
Doris Duke Charitable Foundation	NY	3	South Africa (3)	1	University of Cape Town (3)
Engineering Information Foundation	NY	4	Botswana (1), Kenya (1), Mozambique (1), South Africa (1)	4	University of Botswana (1), Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (1), Eduardo Mondlane University (1), Headstart College (1)
Ford Foundation	NY	421	South Africa (251), Egypt (78), Kenya (23), Uganda (20), Ghana (11), Nigeria (11), Mozambique (8), Tanzania (8), Namibia (3), Ethiopia (2), Morocco (2), Zimbabwe (2), Senegal (1), Tunisia (1)	93	University of Cape Town (43), University of the Witwatersrand (36), University of KwaZulu-Natal (29), American University in Cairo (29), University of the Western Cape (27), Cairo University (26), Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust (18), Makerere University (14), University of Pretoria (14), Rhodes University (10), University of Nairobi (8), Association of African Universities (7), University of Dar es Salaam (5), Association for the Advancement of Higher Education and Development (5), Assiut University (4),University of Fort Hare (4), South African Institute for Distance Education (4), University of Stellenbosch (8), University of the North (4), Cape Higher Education Consortium (4), Catholic University of Mozambique (3), Council on Higher Education (3), Elgin Learning Foundation (3), University of Ghana (3), Foundation of Tertiary Institutions in the Northern Metropolis (3), Free State Higher Education Consortium Trust (3), Higher Education South Africa (3), University of Namibia (3), Bibliotheca Alexandrina (3), University of South Africa (3), University of the Free State (3), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (3), University of Venda (3), University World News (2), Valley Trust (2), AfriHUB Nigeria (2), Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (2), Dreamers of Tomorrow Association (2), Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries Iran and Turkey (2), Eduardo Mondlane University (2), Egerton University (2), Equal Education (2), Higher Education Loans Board (2), Kenya Education Network Trust (2),Kenyatta University (2), Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology (2), National Egyptian Fertility Care Foundation (2), Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science (2), Women Educational Researchers of Kenya (2), Partners in Development for Research Consulting and Training (2), Workers College (2), University of

					Johannesburg (2), Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions (2), Sokoine University of Agriculture (2), Strathmore University (2), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2),Youth Dreamers of Tomorrow (1), Zimbabwe College of Music (1), University of North-West (1), University of Port Elizabeth (1), University of Port Harcourt (1), University of Limpopo (1), University of Minia (1), University of Ibadan (1), National Access Consortium of the Western Cape Trust (1), National Library and Archives of Egypt (1), Ecole Superieure des Arts Visuels Marrakech (1), Nigerian Publishers Association (1), Quality Experts Group (1), SCEZONS CC (1), Sizanang Centre for Research and Development (1), Southern African Wildlife College (1), Students and Youth Working on Reproductive Health-Action Team (1), Suez Canal University (1), Centre for Management Development (1), Committee of Vice-Chancellors of Nigerian Federal Universities (1), Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (1), Endowment Consortium Foundation (1), Human Sciences Research Council (1), Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (1), International Centre for Mathematical and Computer Sciences (1), Inter-University Council for East Africa (1), Ministry of Higher Education (1), Mkuki na Nyota Publishers (1), Monash Educational Enterprises (1), Mozambique Republic of (1), Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (1), Academy of Science of South Africa (1), African Network Operators Group (1),African Virtual University (1), African Woman and Child Feature Service (1), Applied Social Science Forum (1), Association Marocaine de Lutte Contre le SIDA (1)
Foundation to Promote Open Society	NY	2	Egypt (2)	1	American University in Cairo (2)
Goldman Sachs Foundation	NY	4	Nigeria (3), Kenya (1)		Pan-African University (3), United States International University (1)
Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation	NY	1	Uganda (1)	1	Afrika Study Center (1)
JPMorgan Chase Foundation	NY	3	South Africa (3)	1	Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (3)
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation	NY	180	South Africa (176), Ghana (2), Egypt (1), Morocco (1)	19	University of Cape Town (79), University of the Witwatersrand (31), Rhodes University (16), University of the Western Cape (11), University of KwaZulu-Natal (9), University of Fort Hare (5), Cape Higher Education Consortium (5), University of Stellenbosch (6), Eastern Seaboard Association of Tertiary Institutions Trust (2), Tertiary Education Network (2), University of Pretoria (2), University of Ghana (2), Makerere University (2), Higher Education South Africa

					(1), New Africa Theatre Association (1), University of the Free State (1) Foundation of Tertiary Institutions in the Northern Metropolis (1), Universite Mohammed V Agdal (1), Cairo University (1)
New York Community Trust	NY	3	South Africa (3)	1	University of Stellenbosch (3)
Overbrook Foundation	NY	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of Cape Town (1)
Robertson Foundation	NY	2	Ghana (2)	1	University of Ghana (1)
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.	NY	26	South Africa (26)	6	University of Cape Town (14), University of KwaZulu-Natal (4), University of the Western Cape (4), University of the Witwatersrand (2), Tomorrow Trust (1), Rhodes University (1)
Rockefeller Foundation	NY	186	Uganda (48), South Africa (45), Kenya (41), Tanzania (13), Ghana (10), Zimbabwe (8), Malawi (6), Rwanda (4), Zambia (3), Senegal (2), Mozambique (1), Nigeria (1), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (1), Ethiopia (1), Liberia (1)	47	Makerere University (41), University of KwaZulu-Natal (10), Egerton University (10), Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (10), University of Cape Town (9), University of Pretoria (8), University of Zimbabwe (8), Sokoine University of Agriculture (7), Moi University (6), University of Nairobi (6), University of Malawi (6), Association of African Universities (6), University of Dar es Salaam (5), University of Stellenbosch (4), University of the Western Cape (4), University of Zambia (3), National Council for Higher Education (3), National University of Rwanda (3), Kenya Education Network Trust (3), University of the Free State (3), Cape Higher Education Consortium (2), Catholic University of Mozambique (1), Centre for Higher Education Transformation Trust (1), Cheikh Anta Diop University (1), Community and Individual Development Association City Campus (1), Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (1), Forum for African Women Educationalists (1), International Livestock Research Institute (1), Kenyatta University (2), Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (1), Mbarara University of Science and Technology (1), Mekelle University (1), Nigeria ICT Forum of Partnership Institutions (1), Open University of Tanzania (1), Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture (2), South African Institute for Distance Education (1), Strathmore University (1), Tertiary Education Network (1), University for Development Studies (1), University of Botswana (1), University of Ghana (2), University of Liberia (1), University of Ouagadougou (1), University of the Witwatersrand (1), African Network Operators Group (1), African Virtual University (1), Association for the Advancement of Higher Education and Development (1),

Alfred P. Sloan Foundation	NY	3	South Africa (3)	1	University of Cape Town (3)
Starr Foundation	NY	4	Nigeria (4)	1	Loyola Jesuit College (4)
Ernest E. and Brendalyn Stempel Foundation	NY	1	South Africa (1)	1	University of Cape Town (1)
UN Women's Fund for Gender Equality	NY	1	Egypt (1)	1	American University in Cairo (1)
Oscar C. Rixson Foundation, Inc.	NC	1	Kenya (1)		Daystar University (1)
Magee Christian Education Foundation	OH	2	Zimbabwe (2)	1	Africa University (2)
Pittsburgh Foundation	PA	1	Tanzania (1)	1	Sokoine University of Agriculture (1)
Michael and Susan Dell Foundation	TX	2	South Africa (2)	1	University of Cape Town (2)
Four P Foundation	TX	1	Uganda (1)	1	Uganda Christian University (1)
Mustard Seed Foundation, Inc.	VA	2	South Africa (1)	2	Tertiary Education Network (1), Khanya College Johannesburg Trust (1)
Channel Foundation	WA	1	Uganda (1)	1	Mbarara University of Science and Technology (1)
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	WA	40	South Africa (19), Kenya (9), Uganda (6), Egypt (1), Ghana (2), Senegal (2), Mali (1)	23	University of Cape Town (4), Makerere University (4), University of the Witwatersrand (3), University of Stellenbosch (3), University of Eastern Africa (3), American University in Cairo (1), University of Ghana (2), Cheikh Anta Diop University (2), University of Pretoria (2), Rhodes University (2), Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture (2), African Virtual University (1), Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (1), Baraton University of Nairobi (1), Daystar University (1), United States International University (1), Egerton University (1), University of Bamako (1), Information Training and Outreach Centre for Africa (1), Tshwane University of Technology (1), University of South Africa (1), Power-Free Education and Technology (1), University of KwaZulu-Natal (1)
Microsoft Corporation Contributions Program	WA	2	South Africa (2)	2	Tertiary Education Network (1), Khanya College Johannesburg Trust (1)

Appendix L: Top 50 Grants to Africa by U.S. Foundations

Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2007	$164,580,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2011	$56,001,491
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2012	$56,000,000
Rockefeller Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$50,000,000
Gates Foundation	African Agricultural Technology Foundation	Kenya	2007	$42,450,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$28,667,000
Gates Foundation	INDEPTH Network	Ghana	2008	$28,615,239
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2010	$28,000,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$24,667,000
Gates Foundation	Wits Health Consortium	South Africa	2011	$21,766,690
Gates Foundation	ASA International Holding	Mauritius	2009	$20,000,000
Gates Foundation	Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International	Kenya	2005	$18,424,079
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$17,333,000
Gates Foundation	INDEPTH Network	Ghana	2006	$17,045,956
Atlantic Philanthropies	University of the Western Cape	South Africa	2007	$16,576,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$16,000,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2009	$15,000,000
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2008	$15,000,000
Rockefeller Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2007	$15,000,000

Gates Foundation	African Women Agricultural Research	Kenya	2012	$14,000,000
Gates Foundation	Aurum Institute for Health Research	South Africa	2011	$13,898,900
Gates Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2006	$13,333,000
Gates Foundation	World Agroforestry Centre	Kenya	2007	$12,996,342
Gates Foundation	Universities Forum Capacity Building	Uganda	2009	$12,730,748
Gates Foundation	African Development Bank Group	Tunisia	2011	$12,000,000
Gates Foundation	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	Nigeria	2012	$12,000,000
Coca-Cola Foundation	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland	2010	$11,130,770
Soros Development	National Urban Reconstruction and Housing	South Africa	2006	$10,000,000
Gates Foundation	University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa	2010	$9,999,558
Coca-Cola Foundation	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland	2009	$9,975,000
Rockefeller Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2007	$9,325,000
Atlantic Philanthropies	University of the Western Cape	South Africa	2007	$8,880,000
W. K. Kellogg Foundation	University of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	2003	$8,826,410
Gates Foundation	Makerere University	Uganda	2008	$8,691,707
A Glimmer of Hope	A Glimmer of Hope-Ethiopia	Ethiopia	2008	$8,347,561
Rockefeller Foundation	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Kenya	2010	$8,000,000
Gates Foundation	University of Cape Town	South Africa	2011	$7,567,425
Smith Foundation	School of Saint Jude	Tanzania	2007	$7,269,430
Gates Foundation	Water Services Trust Fund, Kenya	Kenya	2011	$7,130,669

Gates Foundation	Shack/Slum Dwellers International	South Africa	2010	$7,029,460
Gates Foundation	University of Ghana	Ghana	2009	$7,000,000
Coca-Cola Foundation	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland	2012	$7,000,000
Gates Foundation	Medical Research Council The Gambia Unit	Gambia, The	2011	$6,885,840
A Glimmer of Hope	A Glimmer of Hope-Ethiopia	Ethiopia	2010	$6,453,769
Coca-Cola Foundation,	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland	2007	$6,168,892
Gates Foundation	African Economic Research Consortium	Kenya	2009	$6,012,824
Ford Foundation	TrustAfrica	Senegal	2007	$6,000,000
Gates Foundation	Ecobank	Ghana	2009	$6,000,000
Coca-Cola Foundation	Coca-Cola Africa Foundation	Swaziland	2011	$6,000,000
A Glimmer of Hope	A Glimmer of Hope-Ethiopia	Ethiopia	2009	$5,629,570